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Abstract 
This thesis is a study of public policy issues relating to multinational geological 
repositories for high�level radioactive waste disposal (HL W). 
Nuclear states have attempted for decades to implement effective radioactive waste 
policies, though with limited success. The safe disposal of HL W has proven 
particularly troublesome and, thus far, a solution has eluded all states. A review of 
radioactive waste policy in the UK, the US and Switzerland reveals some of the 
underlying themes behind community opposition to repository siting and the reasons 
for a broader global search. The failure to achieve HL W repositories at a national 
level has led to much research into the technical, social and political obstacles to site 
selection, and into international collaboration. 
In 1999 Pangea Resources International (PRI) concentrated its efforts in secUJ.ing a 
multinational HL W repository in the Australian outback, with its two main 
arguments being economic incentives for Australia and safety and security benefits 
for a broader range of nation states. The tproposal' failed to gain public or political 
acceptance. An examination of the Pangea multinational project is undertaken to 
detel1l1ine why the proponents were unable to adequately make their case for the 
shared repository's benefits. The study finds that the arguments presented to 
Australia were rejected because the public perceived the risks from hosting the 
repository to be much greater than the associated benefits. 
The thesis then examines the multinational repository concept in a broader context. 
Many of the smaller nuclear states have great difficulty providing, and may be 
unable to provide, a national solution for their HLW. Some lack suitable geology and 
most are constrained by the expense of constructing a deep repository to store small 
quanties of HL W. The waste does need to be safeguarded to protect humans and the 
environment. There is now also a much greater awareness of the heightened risk of 
terrorist acts on nuclear facilities, compared with that perceived during the Pangea 
debate in Australia. A failure to better safeguard HL W may well have national, 
regional or global security implications. Thus the multinational repository concept 
iv 
can be seen as a 'public good' of ering economies of scale for some nuclear states and 
enhancing security from terrorism for all states. For many nuclear states, the safe 
storage ofHLW is a global or regional public goods problem, solvable only by their 
collective action. 
By applying public goods theory and drawing on the dual perspectives of 
international law and international relations theory, the rationale for multinational 
repositories becomes clearer. The set of circumstances most likely to achieve 
interstate collaboration, to secure a multinational repository, are explored. and the 
means for gaining public accepta.'1ce is discussed To maximise security. the 
multinational repository concept needs to include the participation of any nuclear 
state without the means to adequately safeguard its HL W. 
This thesis advances the current research by examining how ef ective the existing 
international regulatory frameworks are to facilitate such a policy shift. The research 
discovers significant gaps in the existing law and demonstrates the advantage of a 
specific multilateral treaty to manage a multinational HLW repository. The treaty 
would need to include durable long-term liability provisions to alleviate the public's 
perception of risk with the repository concept. The international law concept of 'state 
responsibility' is the only legal instrument available to manage long-term liability 
issues. but it would need specific adaptation before inclusion in a treaty designed to 
cover either a regional repository or a global network of multinational repositories. A 
specifically designed treaty would facilitate inter-state cooperation and assist with 
achieving overall public acceptance of the need for shared repositories. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO STUDY 
One of the most intractable problems cur ently facing the international community is 
the problem of finding acceptabl e solutions for the safe disposal of long lived, high­
level radioactive waste (HLW). As of September 2004, there are 439 operating 
commercial nuclear reactors in 30 states with a further 26 under construction. 1 The 
total amount of spent fuel cumulatively generated worldwide, in 2004, was around 
255,000 metric tons.2 It is estimated that by 2020, the time when many of the 
currently operating reactors will be close to the end of their licensed operating 
period, the total quantity of spent fuel generated will be approximately 455,000 
metric tons.3 As the quantity increases, so too does the pressure to find a more 
pennanent solution for storing both long-lived intermediate level waste and HLW. 
Presently, the waste is stored in containers close to the site of production, which is 
considered by the nuclear industry as only an interim solution.4 There is now the 
additional safety concern with surface storage following the terrorist attacks in New 
York and Washington on 11 September 2001 and other such attacks. High-level 
waste remains dangerous for hundreds of thousands of years and therefore should be 
isolated from the biosphere until such time as radionuclides decay to safe accepted 
levels.5
The preferred solution within the nuclear energy industry is to dispose of the HL W 
deep underground in geologically stable repositories. This concept was first proposed 
in the l 950s6 and in recent years has enjoyed strong support from a number of states 
I IAEA. Power Reactor Information System, online edition, Vienna, 2004, 
2 Currently there is no comprehensive data source available that provides a complete worldwide 
inventory of r adioactive waste, regardless of the particular class of waste. 3 W. Danker, "Current Status ofIAEA Activities in Spent Fuel Management." Paper presented at the
7th International Conference on Nuclear Criticality Safety, Tokai-mura, Japan, 20-24 October 2003. 4 C. McCombie, "Proposed Global Solution for the Disposal of Unwanted Nuclear Materials." Paper
presented at the ICEM Conference on Radioactive Waste Management an d Environmental 
Rem�diation. Nagoya, Japan 1999 p2. 
5 S. Keeny, Nuclear Power Issues and Choices: Report of the Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group.
Cambridge Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1977 p245. 
6 See National Research Council. "The Disposal of Radioactive Waste on Land." Publication 519. 
Washington: National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council, September 1957. 
I 
including Sweden, the US and Switzerland. While some states, including France,7
Sweden8 and the US,9 have provided at least semipennanent sites for low and 
intermediate level waste, a solution to HLW disposal is proving much more 
difficult. 10 There are a number of reasons for this failure. Predominant among such 
reasons is the content of radioactive waste, which stems from both nuclear energy 
generation and atomic weapons. The association of nuclear energ� with atomic 
weapons carries a negative connotation that leads to yublic resistance and helps to 
explain overall social attitudes to the use of nuClear pow�r. 11 This is despite the fact 
that a number of nation states and some of the global population rely on nuclear 
energy for economic growth and wellbeing. From its inception, nuclear technology 
was used by individual states to achieve and maintain international military and thus 
global dominance -over competing nation states. Initially the management of 
radioactive was£e was considered to be a mere technical problem and was placed way 
below the priority of acquiring: the necessary knowledge in nuclear technology to 
become a dominant world power. The race to achieve this status and the absolute 
secrecy surrounding nuclear activities over a number of decades created considerable 
mistrust amongst the wider community. 
When the nuclear industry ultimately sought solutions to the back end of the nuclear 
fuel-cycle, it was constrained by considerable lack oftrust 12 and the associated public 
perception of risk13 to achieve its preferred option of underground repositories for the 
7 See L. Tombs, (Chair). "House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology: 
Management of Nuclear Waste," Chapter Three: Some options and their advocates: recent 
international experience, London, 10 March 1999. 
8 Ibid. 
9 For a detailed analysis of the technical and political complexities surrounding the US search for an 
effective radioactive waste management policy, from the initial years up to 1986, see L. Carter, 
Nuclear Imperatives and Public Trost. Washington: Resources For The Future, 1987. [hereinafter, 
Carter, 1987]. 
1° C. Walker, L. Gould & E. Woodhouse, Too Hot to Handle?: Social and Policy Issues i11 the 
Management of Radioactive Wastes. New Haven: Yale University, 1983 pl. (hereinafter, Walker, 
Gould & Woodhouse, 1983]. 
11 M. Longstaff, Unlocking the Atom: A Hundred Years of Nuclear Energy. London: Frederick Muller,
1980 p22. 
11 T. Porte & D. Metlay, "Hazards and Institutional Trustworthiness: Facing a Deficit ofTrust." Public
Administratio11 Review 56 (1996) pp341-347. 
IJ P. Slovic, M. Layman & J. Fl
ynn, 
"Perceived Risk, Trust, and the Politics ofNuclear Waste." 
Science 254 (1991) pp1603-07. 
2 
long�tenn disposal of radioactive waste. 14 This lack of trust, combined with the rise 
of environmentalism since the early 1970s, have significantly exacerbated public 
opposition to building national nuclear waste disposal facilities. 1s Such social 
attitudes have to a large extent become institutionalised throughout government, 
industry and the wider community, in Western societies, and as such remain a 
significant barrier to the implementation of new ideas and new technologies. The 
overall failure to overcome public opposition at a national level has led to efforts to 
end a global solution to HL W disposal. 
A collaborative global solution to the problematic issue of HL W storage or disposal 
involves considerable complexity. Yet there may be benefits under certain 
circumstances that outweigh any disadvantage or the challenges facing proponents of 
a multinational solution. In 1998, the IAEA recognised that consensus in developing 
a multinational repository would "most likely result from a stepwise approach11
starting with incentives and issues of safety, followed by the more complex legal, 
institutional, and liability arrangements. 16 The multinational repository concept has 
evolved from theoretical foundations to more concerted attempts to secure a global 
or regional repository. Between 1998 and 2002 an international consortium, Pangea 
Resources International (PRI), focused its attention on outback Australia for a 
potential site. Although that attempt failed it did raise the awareness of the 
multinational option in the international arena. There is now an organisation, the 
Association for Regional and International Underground Storage (ARIUS), 
committed to advancing the shared repository option in Europe. 17
In light of the recent developments this thesis seeks to uncf1ver the most likely set of 
circumstances that would motivate the nuclear states to cooperate to provide a 
solution to the HLW problem at either a regional or a global level. The main problem 
facing the proponents will be to create the right incentives to enable a host state to 
14 For the more technical aspects of geological repositories, See N, Chapman & I. McKinley, The
Geological Disposal of Nuclear Waste. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1987. 
15 D. Easterling & H. Kunreuther, The Dilemma ofSiting a High-level Nuclear Waste Repository.
Boston: Kluwer, 1995 p3. [hereinafter, Easterling & Kunreuther, 1995]. 
16 IAEA. "Technical, Institutional and Economic Factors Important for Developing a Multinational 
Radioactive Waste Repository." Austria: IAEA-TECDOC-1021, 1998, p8. [hereinafter, IAEA­
TECDOC-1021, 1998]. 
17 See http://www.arius-world.org 
3 
come forward and volunteer a site for the multinational repository. This thesis does 
not purport to provide the ultimate solut:on to the 'not in my backyard' (NIMBY) 
syndrome.13 It does. however, expand on some of the issues raised by the IAEA in 
both its 1998 19 and 200420 reports into the possibilities of achieving multinational 
repositories. This thesis explores the incentives for state collaboration by examining 
the economic, environmental, and global safety and security issues through the lens 
of a global public good. An examination as to how international law can help achieve 
the regional or global public good of enhanced safety and security follows. :Finally, a 
reconunendation for monitored retrievable underground repositories (MRUR) is 
advanced. 
Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Nuclear Waste 
While this is not a technical paper, it is appropriate to examine the nuclear fuel-cycle 
to provide a greater understanding of the process involved in the creation of nuclear 
waste. The various steps that give rise to the production of fuel for nuclear energy or 
weapons production and the l'esu1ting accumulation of radioactive waste are known 
as the nuclear fuel cycle. First, uranium ore is mined in a method similar to that for 
othtr minerals such as gold, nickel and zinc.21 The ore is milled to obtain uranium 
concentrate and is converted into a chemical form suitable for enrichment where the 
concentration of uranium 235 is increased. This is then reconverted into an 
appropriate format and manufactured into fuel elements. The process to this point, 
which is often referred to as the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle, produces 
relatively small amounts of low activity waste. 22 Finally, the fuel is used for power 
generation, whereby enormous amounts of energy, in the fonn of heat, are released 
when uranium 235 atoms are bombarded with neutrons.23 This causes the uranium 
atom to split, releasing other neutrons that produce a chain reaction. The process of 
18 For an interesting discussion on the 'Reverse Dutch Auction' as a means of overcoming NIMBY, 
see H. Inhaber, Slaying the NIMBY Dragon. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998. 
19 Supra n 16 IAEA�TECDOC-1021, 1998. 
20 IAEA. Developing Multinational Radioactive Waste Repositories: lnfrastuctural Framework and
Scenarios of Cooperation. IAEAwTECDOC�1413. 2004. 
21 R. Warner, "The Australian Uranium Industry." In Nuclear Papers, edited by The State Energy
Conunission of Western Australia, Perth: State Energy Conunission, 1976 p26. 
22 F. Berkhout, Radioar.tive Waste: Politics and Technology. New York: Routledge, 1991 p8. 
R1ereinafter, Berkhout, 1991]. 
K. ShraderwFrechette, Nuclear Power and Public Policy: The Socia( and Ethical Problems of
Fission Technology. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1980p12. 
4 
splitting the atom is known as nuclear fission, which is the energy source for nuclear 
power plants and weapons production. During the next stage the spent fuel is 
removed from the reactor, and, depending on the particular cycle chosen, is either 
sent for reprocessing to recover the fissile materials or placed in temporary storage 
for eventual disposal. 24
While radioactive wastes are produced a t  each stage of the nuclear fuel cycle, the 
level of radioactivity increases significantly towards the latter or back end of the 
cycle. For reasons of identification and management, the waste is divided into three 
categories; namely, low-level waste (LLW), intennediate level waste (ILW) and 
highwlevel waste (HLW).25 These labels relate to the levels of radioactivity and the 
timewspan needed for the waste to decay to safe levels. HL W remains radioactive for 
hundreds of thousands of years and is approximately a thousand times more 
radioactive than ILW, which in turn is a thousand times more radioactive than 
LLW.26 It should be noted, however, that these classifications are somewhat 
arbitrary, with some ILW manifestly similar to other HLW. For example, the waste 
from the reactor at Lucas Heights, which is contracted to return to Australia 
following reprocessing, is classified as ILW, yet such waste with this level of 
radioactivity would be classified as HL W in Europe.27
The fuel operating within a nuclear reactor lasts approximately three to five years 
until such time as U-235 becomes depleted and is discharged as 'spent' fuel. These 
spent fuel rods are irradiated with a number of radioactive by-products such as 
strontiumw90, iodine-129, cesium-137 and plutoniumw239.28 Following removal from 
the reactor the spent fuel rods are at their hottest and most radioactive. At this point 
they are placed in cooling ponds to reduce the heat and allow for the short-lived 
24 D. Lochbaum, Nuclear Waste Disposal Crisis. Oklahoma: Pennwell Publishing, 1996 p31.
ll1ereinafter, Lochbaum, 1996]. 
IAEA. Safety Series: Classification of Radioactive Waste, a Safety Guide. Vienna: International 
Atomic Energy Agency, No 111-G-1.1, 1994 p8. 
25 E. Reid, Rock Solid: The Geology of Nuclear Waste Disposal. Glasgow; The Tarragon Press, 1990
g3. 7 Nuclear Energy Agency. "The Disposal ofHighwLevel Radioactive Waste." NEA Issue Brief3
(1989) pl. [hereinafter, NEA, 1989]. See also The Honourable Sandra Knack. Australian Democrats 
Deputy Leader. South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, 19 November, 1999. 
28 Supra n 22 Berkhout, 1991 p9. 
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fission products to decay.29 Initially, it was widely expected that spent fuel would be
reprocessed and the uranium and plutonium removed and recycled to fonn new fuel 
assemblies. The option of reprocessing as a viable solution to spent fuel management 
failed to live up to expectations in the US.30 The two plants designed and constructed 
in the US to achieve this were unsuccessful because they had safety and technical 
difficulties and proved expensive to run. In addition, in 1977 President Carter's 
administration decided to discontinue commercial spent fuel reprocessing because of 
concerns that the separated plutonium could be diverted and utilised to manufacture 
atomic weapons.31 The reprocessing option largely survived in the UK and France, 
due to massive government subsidies and the willingness by some foreign nuclear 
states to pay a premium price to have their spent fuel reprocessed. 
The Significance of the Study 
The overall failure to provide sufficient reprocessing facilities worldwide has 
resulted in the accumulation over a number of decades of spent fuel rods in 
temporary storage ponds. This has become a critical issue for the nuclear industry, 
because in many instances the ponds are reaching capacity, and the industry is faced 
with the additional problem that spent fuel in the US and elsewhere is no longer 
considered as a resource but as a high level waste product. 32 Where reprocessing 
occurs there is the primary concern of safeguarding the plutonium extract and 
enriched uranium from theft and diversion where it could be used to manufacture 
hannful weapons.33 To add to the complexity and expense is the need to solidify the 
highly active liquor waste by-product from the reprocessing process. The waste 
management problem is complicated by the fact that the HL W contains long-lived 
radionuclides, which ideally should be isolated from the community for tens of 
thousands ofyears.34 There appears to be increasing demand within the industry for a 
19 Jbidp9. 
30 J. Holdren, "Radioactive-Waste Management in the United States: Evolving Policy Prospects and
Dilemmas." Annual Review of Energy and the Environment 17 (1992) p241. 
31 F. von Rippel, "Plutonium and Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel." Science 293 (2001) p2397.
32 Supra n 15 Easterling & KUMeuther, 1995 p22.
33 See L. Carter, & T. Pigford, "Confronting the Paradox in Plutonium Policies." Issues in Science and
Technology 16 (1999) p30. 
34 Supra n 9 Carter, 1987 p33. 
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more pennanent solution to both the open and closed nuclear fuel cycles and the 
increasing amount ofHLW.35
Stan Albrecht, cites five main factors accounting for overall nuclear waste policy 
failures at the national level: 
1. a history ofbenign neglect of the waste end c.fthe nuclear cycle;
2. a general failure of both the public polic y sec:ur and private industry to
anticipate the volatility of public response to proposals for nuclear waste
disposal;
3. overriding public fear of things nuclear;
4, a track record among nuclear managers that has failed to nurture bust; and 
5. strong, effective opposition from the larger environmental community and
more recently from civil.rights organisations.36 
He contends that these combined factors have provided a fonnidable challenge to 
those charged with finding a solution to the HLW disposal issue.37 Moreover, in 
expanding the search to the international domain these factors will still have to be 
overcome, while a variety of other considerations will significantly add to the 
complexity of the challenge. These include increased shipments of radioactive waste 
on the high seas and territorial waters, prohibition treaties for exporting hazardous 
materials between certain states, issues of safety, issues o!' legal liability, and the 
necessary strategic arrangements for effective emergency responses in various 
locations should an accident occur. 
Following the lack of success in securing HLW repository sites at the national It..vel, 
an international c onsortium, Pangea Resources International (PRI),38 was formed in 
March 1997 to examine the feasibility of building a geologic repository for the 
disposal of radioactive waste in a voluntary host state. The companies behind PRI 
were British Nuclear Fuels Limited (BNFL), NAGRA (a Swiss Cooperative for 
3
� Supra n 27 NEA 1989.
36 S. Albrecth, "Nuclear Gridlock." Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy 14 (1999) pp96-
102. 
37 Ibid. 
38 PRI is used here to differentiate between the international body and its Australian subsidiary 
company discussed later. 
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nuclear waste management) and a US engineering finn, Golder Associates. 39 PRI 
actively sought a multinational solution to the HL W policy failure for a number of 
nuclear states. The proposal was designed to isolate around 20 per cent of the world's 
nuclear waste in an underground 1stable' environment. According to PRI, the ideal 
site would provide geologic stability and dryness to minimise both movement and 
erosion, have low relief topography, contain no valuable minerals and be remote 
from centres of population. 4° Furthennore, the country chosen would have a 
democratic permanent system of government. In PRI's view, Australia provided the 
perfect requirements for storing HLW, and they focused on two potential sites, one in 
Western Australia and one in South Australia. PRI registered a subsidiary company 
in Australia on 28 November 1997 known as Pangea Resources Pty Ltd. (PRA). 
One of the main failings of the nuclear waste site selection process in a number of 
nation states has been the inability to merge concerns and expertise across 
disciplines.41 The search for a global HLW disposal site incorporates scientific, 
technical, legal, political, environmental, economic, ethical and safety issues at both 
national and international levels. The PRA proposal for Australia was the first 
commercial attempt to locate a multinational radioactive waste repository.42 
Although PRA advocated the environmental, safety and economic benefits of the 
multinational repository, their arguments were somewhat weakened in the absence of 
a comprehensive conceptualisation of the problem. The significance of the research 
in this thesis resides in the fact that it partially addresses the above criticism, by 
adopting an interdisciplinary approach encompassing international relations, 
international law and the phik,sor,hy of public goods theory, to examine why the 
PRA proposal failed, and to explore how a future proposal could be improved. Such 
analysis is important because the prospect of achieving the public good of a 
39 "Australia Deemed to Have Suitable Sites for Permanent Nuclear Waste Disposal." Engineers
Australia 71 (1999) p26. 
4° C. McCombie, G. Butler, M. Kurzeme, D. Pentz, J. Voss, & P. Winter, "The Pangea International 
Repository: A Technical Overview." Paper presented at the Waste Management '99 Conference, 
Tnscon March 1999 pl. 
41 A. Baer, "Issues and Answers: Towards Improved Management of Radioactive Waste." IAEA
Bulletin 42 (2000) pl9. 
42 D. Pentz, "Pangea - an International Repository." Paper presented at the Waste Management '99
Conference, Tucson March 1999 p I. 
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multinational repository depends upon significant conceptual improvement on the 
PRA proposal for Australia. 
Problem under Investigation 
Some nuclear states will possess suitable geological conditions, the required level of 
expertise, adequate financial means and the desire to provide a national solution to 
their HL W disposal problem. Others may have only some elements of the above 
combination. Some for example may have the appropriate geology but la.ck the 
relevant expertise. Others nuclear states, regardless of geology or expertise, will find 
the cost of constructing an underground repository simply beyond their means. For 
many of the smaller nuclear states, it is not feasible to construct an expensive 
underground repository to store relatively small quantities of accumulated 
radioactive waste. Those small states may have no alternative, and would likely 
benefit by embarking on a collaborative solution to their HLW problem. There is 
also the possibility of the medium or larger nuclear states participating in a 
multinational collaborative effort to secure a common or shared repository. The 
shared solution requires a host state coming forward with the offer of a site to 
construct and operate the multinational repository and provide the service. 
An analysis of the multinational repository concept through the lens of a global 
public good is provided in chapter four. Public ur collective goods can be best 
understood by contrasting them with private goods.43 The marketplace is the most 
efficient way of producing private goods that have clear property rights, and owners 
may decide whether to preserve, consume, trade or lease such goods. Public goods, 
by contrast, are goods in the public domain available for all to consume.44 The 
private market relies on public goods that it is unable to produce, such as safety, 
security ancl, the rule of law to provide stability. In their purest fonn, public goods 
have two cemral characteristics not found in private goods: nonrivalry in 
consumption and non-excludability.45 Nonrivalry means that consumption of a public 
43 I. Kaul, P. Conceicao, K. Le Goulver. & R. Mendoza, "Why Do Global Public Goods Matter
Today?" In Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, edit�d by I. Kaul, P. 
Conceicao, K. Le Goulven, R. Mendoza. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003 p3. 
44 Ibid. 
45 T. Sandler, "Global and Regional Public Goods: A Prognosis for Collective Action." Fiscal Studies
19 (1998) p222. 
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good by one user does not reduce its availability for others. A traffic signal light 
provides a good example: a pedestrian's use of the traffic light (combined with the 
accepted norm of drivers to stop at a red signal) enables a person to safely cross the 
road, but in no way reduces the light's utility for other persons.46 It would also be 
unfeasiblc and impractical to reserve usage of the light for a single person or group 
of persons to the exclusion of others. Thus, traffic lights are non-excludable, meaning 
that someone who does not contribute to the production of the public good cannot be 
prevented from using it.47 In reality few goods are purely public or purely private; 
most are a combination of both. 
The issue of the provision of public goods and bads has extended to the global arena 
because of integrated markets and increased travel and transfer of knowledge and 
information. A lighthouse to guide international shipping would be a global public 
good somewhat comparable to the traffic signal light at the national level.48 
Examples of pure global goods are clean air, peace and security, and public health 
practices such as the prevention of the spread of disease. 49 The latter goods virould be 
considered universaily beneficial, but due to the problem of resource allocation the 
provision of a range of various global public goods involves political decisions. 
Clearly if only one nation benefits from a public good it could not be considered a 
regional or global public good, yet one nation could provide a good which benefits 
many.50 Arguably, nation states have now entered a new era of public policy wherein 
a range of problems that traverse national borders require cooperative solutions. A 
HL W repository could be provided by one or more nations to the benefit of a much 
greater number of nuclear states. Yet the problem of 'free riding' would have to be 
resolved before a host state would con,e forward to volunteer a site. It is highly 
unlikely that a regional or global multinational repository could ever be achieved 
46 1. Kaul, I. Grunberg & M. Stern, "Defming Global Public Goods." In Global Public Goods:
International Cooperation in the 2 lst Century, edited by I. Kaul, I. Grunberg & M. Stem. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999 p4. [hereinafter, Kaul, Grunberg & Stern. 1999]. 
47 Ibid. 
48 H. Stretton & L. Orchard, Public Goods, Public Enterprise, Public Choice: Theoretical
Foundations of the Contemporary Attack 011 Government. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994 p54,
49 M. Ferroni, "Regional Public Goods: The Comparative Edge of Regional Development Banks."
Paper presented at the Financing for Development: Regional Challenges and the Key Role of 
Rt.1gional Development Banks, Washington, 19 February 2002 p2. [hereinafter, Ferroni, 2002]. 
so Ibid.
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unless the beneficiaries share the full cost of constructing, operating, monitoring and 
managing the repository over the long-term. 
The purpose of this study is to uncover the most likely set of circumstances that 
would motivate the nuclear states to find a collaborative solution to safely secure the 
growing inventory of HL W. 51 The repository concept is assessed through the lens of
public goods theory to determine its viability. By applying public goods theory the 
primary research question is: Under what set of circumstances would the nuclear 
states be expected to collaborate to secure a multinational repository for the shared 
storage/disposal of HL W? Once the multinational repository concept is assessed 
through the lens of a global public good, and the incentives most likely to gain 
political commitment arc identified, the thesis turns its attention to the mechanisms 
available under international law. Because of the extended time frame for the 
radioactive material in the HL W to decay to safe limits, issues of liability and safe 
responsible management are most important. In the case of the Pangea proposal for 
Australia, the operator was to set aside approximately $US 400 million for 
compensation for potential future damages. 52 After 40 years, the site would have
become the responsibility of the Australian Government, and the question arises as to 
whether this is an adequate amount or are there valid reasons for securing 
multilateral agreements with long-term liability arrangements to protect the host state 
under international law? 
Supplying global public goods requires two separate yet intertwined processes, the 
politica: and the production process itself. The first involves political commitment 
reliant upon the necessary incentives for cooperative action. The incentives are 
largely determined by the net costs of providing the goods or service and the extent 
of benefits received. The second, producing the good, involves a range of factors 
including negotiations among and between state and non-state actors, institutional 
arrangements, and compliance measures if binding agreements are chosen to manage 
the complex issue. Kaul, Grunberg and Stem make the point that final public goods 
51 Supran I. 
52 This is a requirement of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, 
1997. See also Freehill Hollingdale and Page. "Briefing Paper - Application ofTreaties to Importation 
ofNuclear Waste to Australia." Perth: Prepared for Pangea Resources Australia Pty. Ltd., 1998 pl2. 
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are outcomes rather than 'goods' in the standard sense. They state that "there is 
nothing intrinsically good about agreeing to reduce chlorofluorocarbons (CFC's)" but 
the desired outcome is of course an intact ozone shield. 53
The 1997 Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer54 (commonly known 
as the Montreal Protocol) is often cited as perhaps the most successful international 
regime, because it was instrumental in helping to achieve the overall CFC reduction 
targets. Marco Ferroni maintains that international regimes such as the Montreal 
Protocol are 11intennediate public goods" because of their capacity to include 
measures and procedures that can help achieve the desired outcomes. 55 International
agreements typically include statements of commitment and policy priorities; they 
identify or set norms and standards; they facilitate consultation and negotiations; and 
they outline obligations and detail compliance mechanisms which all help to achieve 
the desired outcome. By integrating regime theory and international law, the last 
question this study seeks to resolw; is: Can a specifically designed multilateral treaty 
facilitate interstate cooperation and advance the necessary public acceptance to help 
achieve a regional or a global multinational repository? 
Theoretical Framework 
Given that the search for a multinational HL W repository is of global significance 
and requires the involvement of a number of states, as well as being subject to 
international regulatory considerations, the appropriate theoretical framework for this 
analysis is grounded in the dual perspective of international law and international 
relations theory. Until the last decade or so, such a combined analytical approach was 
rare because the two disciplines had confined themselves to their respective areas of 
expertise.56 These distinctly separate lines of inquiry stem from the RealistMLiberalist
divide in international relations, with intematior.,al law aligned closely to the 
Liberalist perspective. Realist theory contends that each state will act in its best 
interest, and the constant strives to maximise power will achieve a balance that 
sJ Supra n 46 Kaul, Grunberg & Stem, 1999 p13. 
�
4 Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer 1987, (Montreal Protocol) 26/LM 154. 
ss Supra n 49 Fe1rnni, 2002 p2.
s6 K. Abbott, "Modem International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers." Yale
Journal of International law 14 (1989) p337. [hereinafter, Abbott, 1989]. 
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results in stability and order.57 In such anarchical58 societies relations between states 
revolve around the pursuit of relative power.59 Political Realism gained ascendancy 
in the unsettling period leading up to and following World War Two and became the 
main driving force in international relations theory. Realism's central principle is the 
notion of self-help and absolute reliance on the state's own resources to promote its 
interests and protect itself. This was the paradigm used by Hans Morgenthau60 and 
others to explain how order is achieved in a world of sovereign autonomous states. 
The interwar Realists observers reacted to and completely rejected the Wilsonian 
liberal internationalist approach. The Liberalist perspective rose to prominence with 
great optir.1.ism following World War One but received a shattering blow on 
aspirations for a hannonious world with the rise of Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich. 
Woodrow Wilson and his followers held the conviction that global peaceful order 
could be maintained with a combination of democratic and international 
institutions.61 As Slaughter contends, the political Realists 11believed instead in the 
polarity of law and power", which resulted in the Realist-Liberalist divide 
dominating international relations theory for at least forty years.62 The theory of 
Realism can best account for the protracted arms race, struggles for hegemony, 
obsession with military security and certain acts of aggression against nation states. It 
may still be the best theoretical perspective within international relations to explain 
certain issues of interstate conflict such as that which occurred in Iraq in 2003. Yet it 
is impossible for one perspective to provide an explanation for all situations. Realism 
lacks the capacity to account for disannament program.mes, increased global 
51 Hedley Bull defined international order as "a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or 
primary goals of the society of states, or international society". See H. Bull, The Anarchical Society: A 
Study of Order in World Politics. London: Macmillan Press, 1977 p8. 
58 Anarchy is used here and in much of the international relations literature not as a reference to chaos 
or disorder, but simply to mean that power and authority are decentralised, 
59 Hence, there is a strong emphasis on issues of security and military force, followed by economic 
iains, which are issues sometimes referred to as high order politics,
H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Knopf,
1967. 
61 A. Slaughter, "Intemational Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda." The
American Journal of International Law 87 (1993) p207. 
62 C, Kegley, "The Neoliberal Challenge to Realist Theories of World Politics: An Introduction," In 
Controversies in International Relations Theory, edited by C. Kegley. New York: St Martin's Press, 
1995 pl. 
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cooperation between states in specific issue areas, or trends towards economic 
integration and interdependence. 63
Commencing in the late 1960s, a number of writings from international relations 
theorists emerged to significantly challenge the dominant Realist paradigm. In one 
study, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye64 proposed an alternative model, which 
contends that nation states engage in transnational relations to promote shared 
benefits. Their initial analytical emphasis was primarily in the area of international 
political economics. 65 The authors expanded their theory in Power ar.d 
Jndependence66 by introducing the notion of 'complex interdependence'. As the term 
indicates, nation states are regularly involved in multiple issue areas of no specific 
hierarchical67 order. These include issues of trade, telecommunications, aviation, 
human rights and the environment. Their study made a significant contribution to 
the debate and provided an alternative explanation for cooperation among nation 
states. The authors defined "sets of governing arrangements that affect relationships 
of interdependence as international regimes". 68 These regimes or institutions can 
help shape behaviour and have a direct impact on national policy. Two early 
examples of regimes were the Bretton Woods international monetary arrangements 
agreed to in 1944 and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) laid 
down in 1947.69
The concept of international regimes in international relations stemmed from the 
desire to understand why nation states cooperate in specific issue areas. It appears 
from the examples of Bretton Woods and GAIT that the practice of regimes 
preceded much of the theoretical deliberations on the definitional, functional and 
analytical aspects of regimes. In contemporary international relations scholarship the 
63 lbidp6. 
64 R. Keohane & J. Nye, "Transgovemmental Relations and International Organizations." World
Politics 27 (1974) p39. 
6s P, Gourevitch. "Robert O Keohane." Political Science and Politics 32 ( 1999) p624.
66 R. Keohane & J, Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Borton: Little,
Brown and Company, 1977. 
67 In the absence of a hierarchy of issues military security does not constantly dominate the agenda. 
Ibidp25. 
68 lbidp9. 
69 Supra n 56 Abbott, 1989, p366. 
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most widely accepted definition of international regimes is the one agreed on by 
Stephen Krasner and colleagues70 during an exploration of the concept in 1980, 
whereby 
Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, nonns, rules, and 
decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given area 
of international relations.11 
Oran Young provides a similar but firmer definition of regimes as: 
social ins titutions that consist of agreed upon principles, nonns, rules, decision-making 
procedures, and programmes that govern the interac tion of actors in specific issue 
areas.12 
An important inclusion in Young's definition is the additional key words, "social 
institutions" and "govern", which are based on the clear distinction between 
governance and govenunent. Governance is the establishment of social institutions, 
sets of rules, and/or decision making procedures and activities that serve to define 
social practices and guide the interactions of the actors involved.73 While nation 
states play a prominent role as actors, the governance arrangements of regimes 
allows for the involvement of various NGOs, while avoiding any need or suggestion 
for particular forms of 'world government'. Such regimes or institutional 
arrangements can address social conflicts, foster cooperation and help resolve 
collective action problems among interdependent actors. 
Despite its wide acceptance, there are some variations and some direct disproval of 
the regime concept among international relations , theorists. 74 Yet the analytical 
contribution of regime theory in providing an alternative explanation for interstate 
cooperation in specific issue areas has been valuable. The above definitions provide a 
70 See S. Krasner, International Regimes. London: Cornell University Press, 1983, which published 
the entire set of articles from the 1982 Spring edition of International Organisation.
71 S. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables." In
International Regimes, edited by S. Krasner. London: Cornell University Press, 1983 p2. [hereinafter, 
Krasner, 1983]. 7l 0. Young, "Rights, Rules, and Resources in World Affairs." In Global Governance: Drawing
Insights from the Environmental Experience, edited by 0. Young. Massachusetts: Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, 1997 p5. 
73 lbidp4. 
1
• See S. Strange, "Cave! Hie Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis." In International Regimes,
edited by S. Krasner. London: Cornell University Press, 1983 pp337-54. 
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good starting point, but (as its critics correctly contend) they are somewhat broad and 
imprecise and can be applied equally to fonnal or informal agreements. Krasner1s 
defit,ition has been compared both critically75 and more favourably76 to the 
interpretation and w1derstanding of the term 'regime' as used in international law. 
Neither definition is as rigid or as legalistic as that provided by Eckart Klein, whose 
version of regimes is grounded in a traditional legal sense. Klein states that regimes 
11refer to treaty-based settlements which are intended, by defining the status of a 
certain area, to form part of the international order11, the purpose of which provides 
some form of formal regulation. 77 A specific reliance on a conventional treaty from 
the outset can counteract or directly impede negotiations and thus consensus building 
at the important initial stage. Hence criticism has also been directed towards 
international law for its positivistic inflexible approach and incapacity to quickly 
adjust to an ever-changing world. Moreover, Hurrell and Kingsbury highlight the 
omission of political considerations among some international law theorists. 
Theoretical accowits of international environmental law have often paid rather little 
explicit attention to the political bargaining processes that underpin the emerg ence of 
new norms of intemational·eovironmental law, to the role of power and interest in inter­
state negotiations, and to the range of political factors that explain whether states will or 
will not comply with rules.78 
It has become clearer in recent times that neither discipline can ignore the other. As 
Slaughter, Tulumello and Wood contend, 11political scientists and international 
lawyers have been reading and drawing on one another's work with increasing 
frequency and for a wide range of purposes". 79 While the two disciplines have still 
some way to go to catch up with the practical realities of interstate relafions in a 
75 R. Keohane, "The Analysis of International Regimes." In Regime Theory and International
Relations, edited by V. Rittberger & P. Mayer. New York: Oxford Ur.iversity Press, 1993 p27. 
76 O. Stokke, "Regimes as Governance Systems," In Global Governance: Drawing Insights from the
Environmental Experience, edited by 0. Young. Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 1997 p31. 
77 E. Klein, "International Regimes." In Encyclopedia of Public International Law, edited by R. 
Bernhard. Netherlands: Elsevier Science Publishers, 1986 p202, 
78 A. Hurrell & B. Kingsbury, (eds). The International Politics of the Environment: Actors, Interests
and Institutions. Oxford: Claredon Press, 1992 p12. 
79 A. Slaughter, A. Tutumello & S. Wood, "International Law and International Relations Theory: A
New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship." The American Journal of International Law 92 
(1998) p367. 
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range of specific issue areas, significant improvement in widerstanding the benefits 
of interdisciplinary collaboration has been achieved. 
International Law and Overview of Nuclear Regulation 
International law is primarily the body of law that governs conduct and relationships 
between states. 80 It also includes rules of law that regulate the functioning of 
international institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and the International 
Labour Organization (ILO). Since 1945, the UN has played a significant role in the 
development of international law. Yet the driving force behind the creation, 
implementation  and enforcement of international law is the collective will of the 
sovereign states. Unlike municipal law, which usually has a hierarchical legal 
structure with the sovereign at the apex, the international system is horizontal, 
consisting of equal independent sovereign states,81 of which there are now 191. 
International regimes do modify the nonns and practices of sovereign states but 
states agree to collaborate for a range of common interests and for the greater global 
good.82
Shaw identifies the main sources of international Jaw as twofold: "the formulation of 
international agreements, which create rules binding upon the signatories, and 
customary rules, which are basically state practices recognised by the community at 
large as laying down patterns of conduct that have to be complied with".83 Hence two 
important sources of international law are Treaty Law and Customary International 
Law, the latter based on accepted state practice over time combined with expected 
legal behaviour. The proliferation of international agreements over recent decades 
has resulted in fonnal agreements or treaties on a wide range of issues, including 
security, human rights, Law of the Sea, envirorunental law, extradition and trade. 
Treaties can be described as law making in the sense that they seek to codify legal 
80 S. Blay, "The Nature oflnternational Law," in Public International Law: An Australian
Perspective, edited by S Blay, R. Piotrowicz & B. Tsamenyi. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
1997,pl. 
81 M. Shaw, International Law. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991 p6.
naereinafter, Shaw 1991]. 2 M. Miller, "Sovereignty Reconfigured: Environmental Regimes and Third World States." In The
Greening of Sovereignty in World Politics, edited by K. Litfin. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1998 pl 73. 
83 Supra n 81 Shaw, 1991 p6. 
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rules between and among states.84 When a state agrees to formally abide by the tenns 
of a treaty, it enters into a process of ratification whereby it passes national 
legislation endorsing the objects of the treat)'.85 Multinational agreements can also 
establish significant guiding principles and objectives that are not legally binding but 
may gain acceptance and ascendancy over time through customary international 
law.86 These guiding principles and objectives are sometimes referred to as 'soft law•, 
but much debate surrounds the legal extent of such principles. Philippe Sands 
explains the difficulty in detennining the legal status of principles in this way: 
Some principles may be considered to reflect a rule of customary law; others may 
reflect only an emerging rule; and yet others might be considered to have an even less 
well developed legal status. 87 
The particular values and geo-political priorities pertaining to events in time largely 
detennine international regulation of any activity. International nuclear law is no 
exception and was influenced by the atomic era and the euphoria of the 1950s 
surrounding nuclear energy development. Molodstova88 contends that initially only 
the military uses of nuclear activities were considered dangerous, which explains 
why attention was focused on law for nuclear weapons disannament and non­
proliferation of weapons grade material. In January 1946, the first General Assembly 
of the United Nations (UN) began to seek a solution to the international concerns 
raised by the discovery of atomic energy. 89 At that first session the members 
established a UN Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC) under the guidance of the 
Security Council. Among the main issues for consideration was the pro�osed 
Lilienthal-Baruch plan, the intent of which was to exercise control over nuclear 
84 D. Greig, "Sources oflntemational Law." In Public International Law: An Australian Perspective, 
edited by S. Blay, R. Pietrowicz & B. Tsamenyi. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1997 p70. 
8s The actual process of formally ratifying treaties may vary from country to country. In Australia, for
a treaty to become legally binding specific legislation is passed by the Federal Parliament, rucl signed 
into law by the Governor General. 
86 lbidp10. 
87 P. Sands, "International Law in the Field of Sustainable Development: Emerging Legal Principles."
In Sustainable Development and International Law, edited by W. Lang. London: Graham & Trotman, 
1995 p54. 
88 E. Molodstova, "Nuclear Energy and Env ironmental Protection: Responses oflnternational Law."
Pace Environmental Law Review 12 (1994) p187. 
89 V. La mm, The Utilization of Nuclear Energy and International Law. Budapest: Akademiai Kiado,
1984 p32. 
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plants engaged in 11potentially dangerous atomic energy activities". 90 Yet significant 
contention existed between the US, who sought an international body to control 
atomic energy, and the USSR, who demanded a complete prohibition of atomic 
weapons.91 In essence, this first attempt at international regulation of atomic energy 
failed because of mistrust between the two major powers. 
Bertrand Goldschmidt92 maintains that, in the absence of an international agreement 
on non-proliferation, the US assumed responsibility for inspecting and thus policing 
the application of nuclear materials in foreign states. A number of states were 
extremely concerned with such a role being adopted by the US, and argued for a 
broader international solution. A concerted effort followed with President 
Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace proposal, and, after considerable negotiation, 
consensus was reached on an international regulatory agency under the auspices of 
the UN. 93 In 1957, an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was created but 
it had no substantial safeguard duties unless specifically requested by the major 
nuclear states. Upon creation, the IAEA was responsible for the dual roles of 
promotion and regulation, tasks that Sands argues were mutually incompatible.94
Other important 'nuclear' institutions established in 1957 were the European Atomic 
Energy Agency (EURATOM) and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD. The 
IAEA, as the body responsible for the nuclear states, was criticised during the initial 
years of nuclear energy development for its failure to secure more effective regimes 
for all forms of nuclear activities. 
Although public health and safety concerns were not neglected throughout the push 
for nuclear energy, the emphasis was heavily skewed in favour of safeguarding 
weapons grade material. This was demonstrated by treaties on atmospheric and 
90 Ibidp35. 
91 /bidp38. 
92 B. Goldschmidt, The Atomic Complex: A Worldwide Political History of Nuclear Energy. Illinois:
American Nuclear Society, 1982 p277. 
93 B. Bechhoefer, "Historical Evolution of International Safeguards," in International Safeguards and
Nuclear Industry, edited by M. Willrich. Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1973, 
l'.3!
.
P. Sands, "Observations on International Nuclear Law Ten Years after Chernobyl." Review of
European Community and International Environmental Law 5 (1996) pt 99. [hereinafter, Sands 1996]. 
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nuclear testing,95 the placement of nuclear weapons,96 and by a significant 
improvement in US and Soviet Union relations, which culminated in the signing of 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 15168.97 The NPT is the pivotal legally 
binding regime that seeks to restrain the spread of nuclear weapons while enabling 
the peaceful use of nuclear technology. The NPT also instructs the nuclear weapons 
states to engage in efforts on nuclear disannarnent. The NPT is an important 
international institutional regime. Safety concerns about the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy were addressed to some extent with the Paris98 (1960) and Vienna99 (1963) 
liability Conventions. However, Lee100 highlights the inherent weakness of both 
agreements, which on the one hand recognised the potential for harm caused by 
nuclear accidents, while on the other sought to encourage the infant nuclear industry 
with protection mechanisms. Sands101 is even more critical of the two conventions, 
which he states inter alia failed to provide in express terms for environmental 
damage and allowed absurdly low ceilings of financial liability. Indeed, he cites the 
example of non-nuclear states such as Ireland, Luxembourg, and Austria who chose 
to remain outside of the treaty arrangements, preferring to rely on the liability 
provisions of private and public international law. McMillan supports these views 
and provides the strongest critique of the existing international regulatory framework 
for nuclear energy, labelling the entire regime "inadequate". 102 While this criticism 
may or may not be warranted, international regulation of radioactive waste 
management appears even less rigorous. 
The importance of promoting safe and environmentally sound practices for 
radioactive waste management was reaffinned by the United Nations Conference on 
95 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water 1964, 
480 UNTS3.
96 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement ofNuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass 
Destruction on the Sea-Bed and on the Ocean Floor, and in the Subsoil Thereof 1973, UKTS 13. 
97 Treaty on the Non-ProliferationofNuclear Weapons, l July 1968, in force 5 March 1970, 729 
UNTS 161. 
98 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field ofNuclear Energy (Paris) 1960, 956 UNTS 251 (as 
amended by the 1964 protocol). 
99 Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (Vienna} 1963, 1063 UNTS 265. 
100 See M. Lee, "Civil Liability of the Nuclear Industry." Journal of Environmental Law 12 (2000) 
r,3 t 7.01 Supra n 94 Sands, 1996 p200. 
102 K. McMillan, "Strengthening the International Legal Framework for Nuclear Energy." The
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 13 (2001)p984. 
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Environment and Development, htld in Rio de Janeiro, in 1992. 103 Agenda 21 is one
of the key documents produced at the Earth Summit in Rio and is a statement of 
intent and commitment for sustainable development into the 21 st century. There are 
40 chapters contained in Agenda 21 covering a broad range of issues. Chapter 22 
specifically refers to the necessity for states to 11support efforts within IAEA to 
develop and promulgate radioactive waste safety standards or guidelines and rodes 
of practice as an internationally accepted basis for the safe and environmentally 
sound management and disposal of radioactive wastes". De K.ageneck and Pinet 104 
maintain that that specific political statement, within Agenda 21, was probably the 
first important step in the process that led to the adoption, in September 1997, of the 
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of 
Radioactive Waste Management. !05 The Joint Convention refers to Chapter 22 of
Agenda 21 in its preamble.106 
Specific international regulation of radioactive wastes has been avoided in preference 
for national controls. Where international controls are applied, the nuclear states have 
relied on the non-obligatory IAEA codes of conduct or soft law provisions to guide 
the safe management of nuclear waste. !07 Notably, tougher restrictions and 
prohibition of radioactive waste materials have been achieved outside the influences 
of the IAEA. A number of treaties have express provisions for regulating radioactive 
wastes at sea, including the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas,108 the 1972 
Oslo Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and 
Aircraft, !09 and the 1992 Paris Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the North-East Atlantic. 110 In London, in 1972, the Convention on
103 Report of the UN Conference on Environment and Development 1992, UN Doc.
AJCONF,151/26/Rev.l. 104 A. de Kageneck & C. Pine!, "The Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and
on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management." International and Comparative law Quarterly 41
(1998) p409. 105 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste 
Management 1997, INFC/R/546 [hereinafter, the Joint Convention]. 106 Ibid paragraph (xv) of the preamble to the Joint Convention. 107 IAEA. "Code of Practice on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste."
November 1990, INFCIRC/386. [hereinafter, IAEA INFCIRC/386, 1990]. 108 Geneva Convention on the High Seas 1958, 450 UNTS 82.109 Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft 1972, 932 
UNTS3. 11° Convention for the Prevention of the Marine Environment of the N.E. At1antic (Paris) 1972, 3 
YBIEL 759. 
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the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter was 
established and gained widespread ratification to restrict hazardous waste dumping at 
sea.111 The London Dumping Convention was strengthened further with various
amendments, the most notable being in 1993, 112 which completely prohibited the
disposal of all radioactive wastes at sea. Those amendments not only protected the 
marine environment but also compelled the nuclear industry to find a land-based 
solution to the problem of radioactive waste disposal. Although outside of the IAEA, 
this is a good example of a multinational regime having a direct influence on 
domestic nuclear waste policy. 
The significance of the IAEA as the leading organisation in the area of radioactive 
wastes, 113 while most important, also presents some problems. Reliance on their
expertise and safety codes, which are non-binding, can have the effect of weakening 
international agreements. Kummer, for example, highlights the point that radioactive 
wastes were excluded from the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, because such 
wastes are subject to control by the IAEA. 114 Consequently, the transboundary
movement of most radioactive waste comes under the non-binding Code of Practice 
on the International Transboundary Movement of Radioactive Waste.115 Sands
emphasises the ambiguity surrounding the two instruments and the different 
definitions ofradioactive waste contained in each one. 116 Moreover, the exclusion of
radioactive waste from the 1989 Basel Convention may now be more significant, 
because that Convention has since banned the transboundary movement of hazardous 
wastes between developed and developing nations. 
111 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1972, 
1046 UNTS 120 [hereinafter, the London Dumping Convention]. 
112 This followed the Sixteenth Consultative Meeting of the Convention, cited in Sands, supra n 94 
�201.13 A. Gonzalez, "The Safety of Radioactive Waste Management: Achieving Internationally Accepted
Solutions." IAEA Bulletin 42 (2000) p5. 
I u K. Kummer, International Management of Hazardous Wastes: The Basel Convention and Related
Legal Rules. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999 p51. 
rn Supra n 107 IAEA INFCIRC/386, 1990. 
116 Supra n 94 Sands, 1996 p201. 
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Methodology 
The thesis undertakes a qualitative documentary analysis of primary and secondary 
sources related to the problem under investigation. The findings will be subjected to 
cross-validation from a number of diverging experts in the field. This process is 
known as triangulation, which increases the accuracy and reliability of reported 
disclosures.117 As stated previously, the thesis adopts an interdisciplinary approach 
involving international law and international relations theory. The intended primary 
sources will include Treaty Law, Case Law, Domestic Legislation, Parliamentary 
Debates, Committee Reports and the Pangea Project documents. Secondary sources 
shall comprise books, journal articles, conference papers, newspaper articles and, 
where appropriate, reputable Internet sites. The modus operandi involves both a legal 
institutionalist evaluation and a political contextual analysis underpinned by the 
theoretical framework outlined above. 
This first chapter provides a brief introduction to the topic and problem under 
investigation. It contains a summary of the nuclear fuel cycle and a review of 
existing international law on nuclear activities. A brief explanation of public goods is 
provided, as well as the rationale for utilising the dual theoretical framework of 
international law and international relations theory. It is contended that this is the 
most likely approach to find an integrated solution to collective action problems in 
contemporary times. 
Chapter Two conducts an analysis of radioactive waste policy in a number of nations 
with particular emphasis on the UK, the US and Switzerland. It seeks to identify the 
obstacles and underlying themes behind the failure to locate acceptable HL W sites 
and hence the reasons for a global search. The public perception of risk associated 
with radioactive waste repositories is a constant theme throughout the nuclear waste 
literature, and the need for genuine public participation to counter that problem is 
highlighted. 
117 G. Allen, "Qualitative Research," In Handbook for Research Students in the Social Sciences, edited
hyG. Allen & C. Skinner. New York: Falmer, 1991 p179. 
23 
Chapter Three examines the failed Pangea Resources Australia (PRA) proposal to 
locate a multinational high-level radioactive waste (HLW) repository in Australia. 
This was the first significant attempt to find an international 'voluntary host' nation, 
and thus led to the first political response to the multinational concept. The study 
finds that PRA placed too much emphasis on the economic arguments and failed to 
provide convincing social arguments or indeed to adequately communicate the 
repository benefits over the perceived risks. 
Chapter Four applies public goods theory to the multinational repository concept to 
ascertain its strengths and weaknesses. It seeks to identify the most likely incentives 
required to encourage interstate cooperation and bring about the necessary political 
commitment to the shared repository concept. There are two separate yet 
complementary types of interstate collaboration to secure a multinational repository: 
'regional' and 'global'. Both involve economic, environmental, safety and security 
considerations, but the smaller nuclear states would likely choose a regional 
repository because of economies of scale. By contrast, a set of global multinational 
repositories, designed to safeguard all remaining HLW, would require the most 
comprehensive security incentives. 
Chapter Five explores the international legal principle of state responsibility, to 
ascertain how well suited the concept is to manage the complex long-term safety 
requirements for radioactive waste decay over unprecedented timeframes. The 
chapter also explores the potential for the concept to alleviate the pub1ic perception 
of risk associated with multinational repositories, and advances the case for a 
multilateral treaty. The important issue of responsibility for the HL W during 
transportation, with associated liability in the event of an accident during shipment, 
is beyond the scope of this study. Transboundary movement of the HLW may get a 
mention from time to time but it is not discussed to any great extent. 
Chapter Six puts forward additional arguments for securing a specific and detailed 
binding multilateral treaty for multinational repositories. These include the capacity 
to facilitate cooperation between the states during the negotiation phase, and the 
treaty's propensity to alleviate perceptions of risk and assist with building public trust 
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in order to achieve legitimacy. The multilateral treaty would also provide the 
necessary framework for governing the negotiated outcomes associated with a 
multinational regional or global repository. 
The conclusion is contained in Chapter Seven, which draws the thesis together and 
presents the main conclusions of the study. It briefly restates some of the reasons 
why a multinational repository may be necessary, and why HLW storage/disposal 
should be conceived as a global public goods problem. It reiterates the main finding 
that a multinational geological repository for storing HLW is achievable, if the 
repository provides more comprehensive benefits to a larger number of states. 
Finally, it demonstrates how a specifically designed multilateral treaty can help 
alleviate public perceptions of risk, as well as providing the mechanisms for 
governing some of the complex issues in operating a multinational repository. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
AN ANALYSIS OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE POLICY IN 
SPECIFIC NATION STATES 
Attempts to site high�level radioactive waste (HLW) repositories have encountered 
great difficulty and outright opposition in many nation states. This has led to an 
abundance of research into the scientific, technical, political and to a lesser extent the 
social aspects of site selection to try and achieve more successful policy outcomes. 1
The only point of consensus that has emerged in the literature, however, is that 
public opposition is perhaps the single most difficult problem to overcome in any 
selection for a HLW repository.2 The lack of a national solution has resulted in 
international collaboration in geological research, and in attempts to search for a 
global HLW repository site.3 Considering the seemingly insunnountable problems, 
and that the search for a repository site has now extended into the international 
domain, it is appropriate to explore how national governments previously responded 
to the siting challenge. 
This chapter undertakes an analysis of radioactive waste policy in the UK, the US 
and Switzerland. It explores how the policy makers in each state responded to the 
overwhelming public opposition to radioactive waste repositories. It seeks to uncover 
the main obstacles and underlying themes behind the failure to locate national HL W 
sites in particular, and hence some of the reasons for a global search. This is 
important not only for showing the history of policy development and the constraints 
operating on policy makers, but also to illustrate that current and future policy 
1 C. Walker, L. Gould & E. Woodhouse, Too Hot to Handle?: Social and Policy Issues in the
Management of Radioactive Wastes, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983; N. Chapman & I. 
McKinley, The Geological Disposal of Nuclear Waste. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1987; D. 
Lochbaum, Nuclear Waste Disposal Crisis. Oklahoma: Pennwell Publishing, 1996; K. Shrader­
Frechette, Burying Uncertainty: Risk and the Case against Geological Disposal of Nuclear Waste. 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993. 
2 L. Warren, "Public Perception of Radioactive Waste." Interdisciplinary Science Reviews 23 (1998)
p204.
I. McKinley & C. McCombie, "The Place of International Collaboration in Nagra's R & D
Programme." Nagra Bulletin 29 (1997) p5. 
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implications derive from past choices and past events.4 The UK is selected as the
main focus because British Nuclear Fuel Limited (BNFL) was the main shareholder 
in Pangea Resources International (PRI). Switzerland was chosen for NAGRA's5 role 
as a secondary shareholder, and the US because of its major role in nuclear activities 
and connection to PRI through Golder Associates. 
The 'not in my back yard' {NIMBY) syndrome is a prominent response to the siting 
of a range of hazardous facilities including nuclear installations. Yet to rely solely on 
the NIM:BY syndrome as an. explanation for strong community opposition is not 
particularly helpful in understanding the underlying motives behind public objections 
to radioactive waste sites.6 too often, policies are formed and decisions made 
without a proper appreciation of community concerns, which can lead to a further 
hardening of attitudes. In addition, NThIBY should not be confused with NIABY 
('not in anyone's back yard1) which is a more accurate tenn used for describing 
outright opposition to waste facilities.7 NIABY is usually the position taken by
environmental groups, peace ai;;tivists and others who often fonn local, national and 
international alliances to share infonnation and pool resources to maximise 
opposition. 
So what precisely are the motivators driving the NIMBY and NIABY response to 
radioactive repository proposals? There are a number of determining factors, 
including nuclear stigma,8 perception and social amplification of risk,9 a lack of 
confidence in the technology, a mistrust of govemment 10 and concentration of risk 
upon a particular population.11 This chapter advances the apparently obvious
� M. Gowing, Reflection�· on Atomic Energy History: The Rede Lecture. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1978 p7. 
5 Meaning, National Cooperative for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste. 
6 R. Kemp, The Politics of Radioactive Waste Disposal. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1992 p3. 
7 /bidpll. 
8 J. Flynn, "Nuclear Stigma," in The Social Amplification of Risk, edited by N. Pidgeon, R. Kasperson
& P. Slavic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p326. 
9 See R. Kasperson, "The Social Amplification of Risk: Progress in Developing an Integrative 
Framework," in Social Theories of Risk, edited by S. Krimsky & D. Golding. London: Praeger, 1992, 
tl53.O N. Lenssen, Nuclear Waste: The Problem That Won't Go Away. Washington: Worldwatcb Institute,
1991 p7. 
11 M. Kraft, "Public and State Responses to High-Level Nuclear Waste Disposal." Policy Studies
Review to (Winter, 1991192) p152. [hereinafter, Kraft, 1991/92]. 
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conclusion that the entire site selection process needs legitimacy. In order to achieve 
this, new and iru1ovative measures must be established for greater public 
involvement, to advance the necessary trust and gain acceptance for the site selection 
process. 12 Yet the clear failure of the UK and the US to achieve that basic objective 
over many decades is remarkable, and tha specific approaches that failed need 
documenting in order to prevent a repetition of past mistakes. Finally, some 
comparisons are made between the three nations under review and their closest 
counterparts in an attempt to draw out some broader conclusions. 
Radioactive Waste in the UK: an Intractable Problem 
Radioactive waste management has often been described as the Achilles heel of the 
nuclear industry. While it is just one of the many important aspects of the nuclear 
fuel cycle that needs to be adequately safeguarded, the management of HLW in 
particular has a long and troubled history. 13 A review of the literature reveals 
numerous studies, reports and analysis of the technical and political difficulties 
associated with radioactive waste disposal. While there are many different 
approaches and conclusions on the subject, there is at least a consensus that the 
industry focused on the problem much too late, 14 engendered deep suspicion and 
failed to gain public support. The main rem;on for this was that the nuclear industry 
was born out of the atomic era and scientific attention concentrated exclusively on 
the arms race and then later on limiting weapons proliferation. Because of this a 
number of problems such as radioactive waste management were not solved before 
nuclear power was introduced on a commercial scale. 
The commercial era of nuclear power began in the UK when the Atomic Energy 
Authority turned on the first nuclear power station at Calder Hall in 1956. One year 
later the US followed suit with their first commercial civil reactor at Shippingport, 
Pennsylvania, operated by the Duquesne Light Company. 15 The US did not remain 
12 Public involvement requires the establishing of proper communications procedures in order for a
transparent free flow of information to occur. 
13 Supra n 6 pl. Kemp, 1992. 
14 S. Albrecht, "Nuclear Gridlock." Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy 14 (1999) p96-
102. [hereinafter, Albrecht, 1999].
15 A. Blowers, D. Lowry & B. Solomon, The International Politics of Nuclear Waste. London:
Macmillan Academic and Professional, 1991 p4. [hereinafter, Blowers, Lowry & Solomon, 1991]. 
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behind for long and soon became the world's largest producer of nuclear generated 
electricity. Currently, out of 439 commercial nuclear reactors worldwide, 104 are 
operating in the US, compared to 59 in France, 54 in Japan, 30 in Russia and 33 in 
the UK.16 Because of the size of the US, that large number of reactors accounts for 
only 20.4 per cent of its total generated electricity, whereas Lithuania's two reactors 
account for 77.6 per cent of its total generated electricity, and France produces 77.1 
per cent of its total electricity from nuclear power. The bulk of the world's 
radioactive waste comes from electricity generation at nuclear power stat ions. Much 
smaller amounts are produced for medical treatment and in research reactors, and of 
course the waste arising from the nuclear military programmes also needs to be 
properly managed. 17 The use of nuclear power as a 'clean and reliable' energy source 
is significantly constrained by the lack of a long-term solution to the HLW problem. 
Arguably the first place to start for a study of the rise of nuclear power is the detailed 
historical account provided by British historian, Margaret Gowing. 1 s Her access to 
official sources produced two insightful volumes, which cover the period from the 
race to build the bomb in the late 1930s to the realisation of a commercial nuclear 
industry in the 1950s. 19 That 'Heroic Phase' was marked by a period of optimism and 
clear ideologically detennined views. Gowing also demonstrates the lack of political 
interest in the issue of radioactive waste in the early years.20 Radioactive waste was 
considered a technical problem and hardly got a mention in political debate until 
perhaps the Radioactive Substances Bill of 1948.21 In the US, the nuclear waste issue 
failed to achieve any scrutiny until the reorganisation of the Atomic Energy Act in 
1954:12 Furthennore, it took until the early 1980s for the radioactive waste issue to 
achieve the serious attention it deserved from the US Government and associated 
16 IAEA. "International Datafile." IAEA Bulletin 44 (2002) p33. 
17 S. Norris, "Managing Radioactive Waste." Chemistry and Industry (1999) p876.
18 Gowing, M. Independence and Dete"ence: Britain and Atomic Energy 1939-1945. Vol. 1. London: 
Macmillan, 1974. 
19 Gowing, M. Independence and Dete"ence: Britain and Atomic Energy 1945-1952. Vol. 2. London: 
Macmillan, 1974. 
20 Supra n 15 Blowers, Lowry & Solomon, 1991, p45. 
11 Supra n 19 Gowing, 1974, p92. 
21 E. Rosa & W. Freudenburg, "The Historical Development of Public Reactions to Nuclear Power:
Implications for Nuclear Waste Policy." In Public Reactions to Nuclear Waste: Citizens' Views of 
Repository Siting, edited by M. Kraft, R. Dunlap & E. Rosa. Durham: Duke University Press, 1993. 
p34. 
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agencies. � . .:t when the issue finally gained recognition as a policy problem the 
initial emphasis was heavily skewed in favour of technical and scientific solutions.23 
Between 1945 and 1975 radioactive waste policy was given a low priority. At this 
time, in the UK as in the US, the accepted method of dealing with low activity 
radioactive waste was to 1dilute and disperse' the waste into the oceans. The process 
of ocean dumping commenced in the UK in 1949, well before the widely publicised 
Windscale reactor fire in 1957.24 The duration of the ocean dumping policy can be 
illustrated by the fact that Windscale,25 now Sellafield, has been the single longest 
running contributor of radioactive pollution to the world's oceans. The dilute and 
disperse policy has been an ongoing issue of contention between the Irish and British 
governments for many decades. Following international concerns in the early 1970s, 
the sea disposal option was restricted by a number of treaties. Since 1993, the 
dwnping of high and intermediate level waste has been prohibited by a series of 
amendments to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping 
of Wastes and Other Matter 1972.26 Those amendments significantly strengthened 
that 1972 London Dumping Convention, but remarkably the dilute and disperse 
policy still continues for low level waste. Phillipe Sands argues that the main reason 
for the successful London Dumping Convention amendments was that the nation 
states were able to develop global norms outside the control of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency.27
While Frans Berkhout concedes that British waste management practice was 
relatively "coherent and effectively operated11 during the initial years, he also 
contends that there was a lack of commitment to solving the high-level waste 
disposal issue.28 He cites the well-documented criticism of this ambivalence by the 
23 R. Dunlap, M. Kraft & E. Rosa, Public Reactions to Nuclear Waste: Citizens' Views of Repository
Siting. Durham: Duke University Press, 1993 p3. 
24 F. Berkhout, Radioactive Waste: Politics and Technology. New York: Routledge, 1991 pl38,
�hereinafter, Berkhout, 1991]. s L. Carter, Nuclear Imperatives and Public Trust. Washington: Resources For The Future, 1987 
£251. [hereinafter, Carter, 1987]. 
6 Convention on /he Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1972, 
1046 UNTS 120. 
27 P. Sands, "Observations on International Nuclear Law Ten Years after Chernobyl." Review of
European Community and International Environmental Law 5 (1996) p201. 
n Supra n 24 Berkhout, 1991 pl38. 
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Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, chaired by Brian Flowers in 1976, to 
support his stance. 29 The Flowers report stated that:
There should be no commitment to a large progranune of nuclear fission power unti l it 
has b een demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that a method exists to ensure the safe 
containment oflong-Iived highly radioactive wastes for the indefinite future.30 
In addition, the report recommended that government establish an independent 
statutory advisory committee to provide expert advice on the management of nuclear 
wastes, and a separate national body responsible for radioactive waste disposal. The 
Callaghan Labour Government did not accept the recommendation that the advisory 
committee should be a statutory body, arguing that it would be better to allow it 
greater flexibility in the early years of its life.31 The government also failed to take
up the suggestion that the independent committee be given sufficient funding to 
enable it to direct geological and oceanographic research over two decades. When 
the Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee {RWMAC) was 
established in 1978, as a non-statutory independent committee of experts, it was 
made responsible for a much broader range of radioactive waste32 than originally 
intended.33 Later British Governments also failed to implement the recommendations 
of the Flowers report in its entirety. 
There was much criticism of the decision in 1982 to create the disposal zompany, 
Nuclear Industry Radioactive Waste Executive {NIREX), because of its close links to 
the nuclear industry.34 Again, this was not the independent body recommende1 by
the Flowers Royal Commission. NIREX35 was jointly owned by the four main 
nuclear organisations in the UK: BNFL, Nuclear Electric, 36 Scottish Nuclear37 and 
29 B. Flowers, (Chair) Nuclear Power and the Environment: Royal Commission on Environmental
Pollution, Sixth Report. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1976. [hereinafter, Flowers, 1976]. 
JO /bidp131. 
31 G. Beveridge, "The Work of a Radioactive Waste Management Watchdog: The Work of the
Radioactiw Waste Management Advisory Committee." Interdisciplinary Science Reviews 23 (1998) 
f09. 2 The responsibility included radioactive waste arising from hospitals and universities. 
ll /bidp209. 
3
' Supra n 15, 24 & 6 Blowers, Lowry & Solomon, 1991 p63; Berkhout, 1991 p139; Kemp, 1992 p38. 
35 NIREX became UK Nirex Ldt. in 1995. 
36 This was a successor organisation to the nuclear ann of the Central Electricity Ger,t'rating Board.
37 This was a successor organisation to the South of Scotland Electricity Board. 
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the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA). Of course the main reason for creating 
independent bodies is to encourage transparency, accountability and public 
consultation and thus reduce the potential for secrecy. Notably, the British Nuclear 
Industry has been criticised for its attempts to cover up38 even the most serious 
accidents. For example, Chris Cragg is scathing of the fact that it took over 20 years 
and a BBC documentary to uncover an explosion that occurred on 10 May 1977, in a 
shaft at Dounreay.39 The plant was run by the UKAEA, which back in the 1950s 
sought and was granted permission to dump intermediate solid wastes down a 
disused tunnel. It is not known what exactly was dumped there but it did react and 
Cragg expressed alann that no one outside of the industry knew about the explosion 
until the BBC documentary in 1996.40
The problem of secrecy was not confined to the UK: it permeated the entire nuclear 
industry from the early years and the race to build the atomic bomb. Luther Carter 
contends that the lack of public scrutiny and an unchecked optimism induced an 
"unrealistic perception of infallibility and technical brilliance", which prevented the 
industry from identifying adverse effects and developing management strategies to 
overcome them.41 That entrenched practice of secrecy allowed the industry to hide its 
mistakes and near misses, which engendered deep suspicion and distrust among the 
public. The lack of trust increased following the media exposure and controversy 
sur rounding the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl accidents.42 It became apparent 
that a nuclear accident anywhere had wide-reaching implications for all nuclear 
states. Such events have the potential to heighten the NIMBY factor and impact 
directly on radioactive waste policy or the site selection process. Intense community 
opposition driven by the widespread public anxiety of all things nuclear, especially 
the siting of ra..3:oactive waste, is a constant challenge confronting the nuclear 
industry and policy makers. 43
38 Kemp identified and confirmed a continual pmblem of secrecy surrounding the UK nuclear industry 
over a number of decades. See supra n 6 pp47, Sil, 86 and 95.
39 C. Cragg, "The UK's Nuclear Back End," E11ergy Economist (1998) pl-7.
40 Ibid 
41 Supra n 25 Carter, 1987, p44.
42 T. O'Riordan, "The Prodigal Technology: Nuclear Power and Political Controversy." The Political
f?",arterly 59 (1988) pl64.
4 Supra n 14 Albrecht, 1999 pp96-l02.
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In the UK during the 1970s, problems at Windscale were the catalyst for shifting the 
public focus on to the nuclear industry.44 The main driving force was an 
unsympathetic and extremely critical media that alerted the public and helped create 
a forceful opposition to nuclear waste disposal. In October 1975, for example, the 
Daily Mirror led with a front-page story under the enormous headline: "PLAN TO 
MAKE BRITAIN WORLD'S NUCLEAR DUMP".45 In 1977, the refusal by 
Cumbria County Council to approve a planning application by BNFL for a major 
expansion of reprocessing and waste-management facilities at Windscale led to a 
public inquiry into the reprocessing option. Yet the balance within the Callaghan 
Cabinet only tipped in favour of a full public inquiry following the reporting of a 
radioactive waste storage leak from a silo at the Windscale site.46 Two central themes 
dominated the inquiry: the justification for reprocessing, and operator safety and 
general public protection against radiation from radioactive waste.47 While the 
inquiry justified the reprocessing option in the UK, which was accepted by 
Parliament, the increased public scrutiny placed the issue of radioactive waste 
management finnly on the public agenda. 
Subsequently, in line with the earlier recommendations of the Flowers report, the 
UKAEA and government officials commissioned the Institute of Geological Sciences 
(IGS) to research into the geological suitability for underground storage ofHLW. In 
1979 the IGS identified 127 potential sites, with at least 12 of those suitable for 
further exploration drilling.48 The authors highlighted the difficulties involved in 
selecting the best geologic site and emphasised that preferences were necessarily 
based on subjective judgements due to the lack of available objective data.49 Public 
opposition to the drilling programme was intense and entirely sceptical of any 
scientific data. Later, most agreed that attempts to secure a HLW repository was 
precisely the wrong problem to tackle first, and those attempts may have 
« Supra n 15 Blowers, Lowry & Solomon, 1991 p57. 
45 S. Bonnett. "Plan to Make Britain World's Nuclear Dustbin." Daily Mirror21 October 1975, pl. 
46 Supra n 24 Berkhout, 1991 pl57. 47 lbidpp158-9. 
4
B J. Mather, D. Greenwood & P. Greenwood, "Burying Britain's Radioactive Waste." Nature 281 
11979) p332.9 Ibid p333. The authors concluded "the feasibility of the disposal ofhigh-level radioactive wastes within the geological framework of the UK still remains lo be demonstrated" p334. 
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significantly contributed to a much broader public fear of nuclear waste.5° Fo1lowing 
unrelenting public opposition, numerous delays and little progress, the drilling 
programme was abandoned in 1981. Upon announcing the decision, the Secretary of 
State in the Thatcher Conservative Government, Michael Heseltine, stressed that he 
was taking the advice of the RWMAC which stated in its second report that: 
Serious consideration should be given to the possibility that contairunent in an 
engineered storage system either above ground or sub-surface, for which technology 
already exists, might be the best way to deal with solidified high-level wastes for at 
least 50 years and possibly much longer,11 
Hence the decision to store highly active liquor (HAL) in surface tanks prior to 
vitrification, and placing the solidified HAL52 within steel canisters in a specially 
designed surface store has since become the accepted HLW policy of consecutive 
British governments. While this may be entirely appropriate in the shorter tenn, it is 
extremely concerning that no strategy for the long-term management of HL W has 
been implemented in the UK. Heseltine's decision to end the drilling programme was 
the first in a series of retreats on radioactive waste management policy in the UK. SJ
The strategy employed by government and industry following the abandonment of 
the search for a HL W repository and the creation of Nirex in 1982 was "the 
simultaneous development of a shallow repository site for LL W and short lived IL W 
and a deeper repository for long lived ILW".54 The two sites selected55 were both
subjected to intense public opposition, which prevented any detailed site 
investigation. This, and a review of radioactive waste management policy in 1986 by 
a House of Commons Environment Committee, led to a change in Government 
policy. Consequently it was decided that only LLW could be disposed of in a shallow 
repository, and Nirex was directed to focus on securing a deep repository for all IL W 
50 S. Openshaw, S. Carver & J. Femie, Britain's Nuclear Waste: Safety and Siting. London: Belhaven
Press, 1989. p51. [hereinafter, Openshaw, Carver & Fernie, 1989]. 
11 Cited in supra n 15 Blowers, Lowry & Solomon, 1991 p72. 
52 HAL is classified as high-level waste (HLW) in the UK. 
53 Supra n 15 Blowers, Lowry & Solomon, 1991 p74. 
s4 U. McLMichie, "Deep Geological Disposal ofRadioaclive Waste: A Historical Review of the UK
Experience." Interdisciplinary Science Reviews 23 (1998) p242. 
s5 Ibid, namely Elstow, north east ofHaiwell, for a possible shallow repository and a disused 
anhydrite mine at Billingham in the north east of England for a potential deep repository. 
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and some LLW. Despite this policy change and a willingness by Nirex to address 
previous criticisms, the demonstrated ability of environmental groups to mobilise 
protest, develop counter expertise and initiate legal and political challenges kept the 
nuclear industry and the governmental bodies on the defensive. 56 
The revised Nirex programme of 1986 concentrated on four potential sites for 
shallow disposal of LLW, which became known as the four-site saga. The 
advantages and disadvantages of each of the four sites in central and eastern England 
are illustrated elsewhere.57 However, the location of each site in Conservative held 
seats and the decision to withdraw all four sites just four weeks before the 1987 
general election, led to even more public scepticism. Of all the decisions concerning 
nuclear waste, this was the one most blatantly concerned with short-term political 
gain.58 The absence ofa disposal site for LLW led to a reappraisal of policy, and to 
what Harris describes as an "amazing decision" to jointly disposes ofILW and LLW 
in a deep repository. 59 Burying LL W deep underground is much more expensive than 
near surface disposal. Because of the low levels of radioactivity and a much shorter 
half-life for LLW, such an expensive option is unnecessary. In any event, the joint 
disposal option never materialised in the UK due to a lack of public support for the 
deep repository site. All LL W in the UK is sent to the disposal site at Drigg, which is 
about six kilometres south of Sellafield. 
When joint disposal was still an option, Nirex engaged in a national public 
consultation process, sending out 50,000 questionnaires in 1988. From the thousands 
returned, the public placed great importance on the need to be able to retrieve the 
waste should there be a desire to do so in the future. 60 The retrievable option would 
also alleviate public anxiety about an 'out-of-sight out-of-mind' approach. Yet despite 
this clear public preference, an intensive site investigation process began for deep 
'pennanent' disposal. In an effort to overcome the NIMBY factor, the search was 
eventually narrowed down to the two nuclear sites of Dounreay and Sellafield, with 
56 A. Blowers, "Nuclear Waste and Landscapes of Risk." Landscape Research 24 (1999) p24L
57 Supra n 50 Openshaw, Carver & Femie, 1989 ppl06-112.
58 Supra n 24 Berkhout, 1991 pl 75.
59 J, Harris, "Editorial: Nuclear Waste." Interdisciplinary Science Reviews 23 (1998) p187.
ll1-ereinafter, Harris 1998]. 
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the latter chosen in 1991. The decision was made without adequate public 
consultation and was a classic example of the 'decide announce defend' (DAD) tactic 
which has since proved to be extremely ineffective in achieving the desired 
outcomes. DAD is an approach whereby a specific policy is identified and developed 
without proper public consultation, and is then announced as a decision and defended 
against opposition interests. 61 The tactic has also been widely discredited in Canada 
and the US, particularly when used for decisions on the siting of hazardous facilities. 
Many organisations have learned that when they make decisions that affect the 
community, they must involve the community during the decision-making process 
and not afterwards. It is extremely difficult to achieve legitimacy for any policy 
when the DAD approach is applied, and it usually results in the community losing 
trust, which contributes further to the NIMBY response. 
A number of environmental groups and Britain's Royal Society criticised the 
selection of Sellafield on the grounds that the decision appeared to be based more on 
political rather than scientific reasoning.62 It is also highly improbable that Sellafield 
was chosen for the best geology in the entire mainland of Britain, but apparently the 
site met government criteria at that time.63 The decision corresponded, to some 
extent, with what Frank Popper describes as 1locally unwanted land uses' (LULUs), 
which is the tenn given to the hazardous facilities that generate vigorous opposition 
in local communities. Such facilities include landfill or other hazardous sites, 
prisons, radioactive waste sites, AIDS treatment centres and drug injecting rooms. 
Community opposition to the hazardous facility often defies differences of age and 
socioeconomic status to pursue a single unified objective. That integration of 
disparate groups into a single mobilizing force is extremely difficult to overcome. 
Andrew Blowers and Pieter Leroy extended the concept of LULU to the process of 
peripheralisation and the link to 'nuclear oases,' in an effort to help explain why 
61 B. Rabe, J, Becker & R. Levine, "Beyond Siting: Implementing Voluntary Hazardous Waste Siting
Agreements in Canada," American Review of Canadian Sludies 30 (2000) p479. 
62 Cited in "Dig Deep." The Economist (US) (3 December 1994) p99. 
63 Supra n 59 Harris, 1998. 
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radioactive waste disposal sites often end up at or near existing nuclear facilities.64 
Blowers and Leroy explain the concept of peripheral communities: 
The idea ofa peripheral community or area suggests that it is located on the edges of the 
mainstream. There is a geographical and spatial basis to the concept, the idea of 
conununities that are physically remote or inaccessible (though not necessarily distant) 
from the central, dominant region which is the focus of communications and 
development. The concept also owes something to the core and periphery and the 
relationship of political, economic and cultural domination and exploitation that has 
been developed as an explanation for processes of uneven development in these areas.65 
1Peripheral communities' tend to be remote, economically marginal ( dependent on a 
single industry or state welfare), powerless, defensive, and often reside on land that 
is envil'onmentally degraded. The local community in a nuclear oasis, such as 
Sellafield, depends on the nuclear employer to provide investment and jobs and is 
therefore unlikely to be able to resist radioactive waste disposal facilities.66 Thus 
Blowers and Leroy's central thesis asserts that: 
The power of mobilised coalitions to prevent the location of LULUs in some 
conununities, combined with the powerlessness of peripheral communities to resist 
them, narrows the locational options, making the location of LULUs in peripheral 
communities politically almost inevitable. 67 
It would, however, be incorrect to assume that public opposition was the only 
impediment confronting site selection and that there was unanimous agreement 
among the technical and scientific experts on radioactive waste disposal. Bob Burton, 
a fonner employee of the UK Atomic Energy Authority with over 25 years 
experience in the industry, was extremely critkal of the industry1s overall waste 
policy choices.68 He accused the industry of 11costly procrastination" and of 
11presiding over a long running farce".69 Burton was particularly critical of the 
method chosen by Nirex for deep disposal of IL W and warned of the dangers 
64 A. Blowers & P. Leroy, "Power, Politics and Environmental Inequality: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis of the Process of'Peripheralisation'." Environmental Politics 3 (1994) p202. 
M Ibid.
66 Ibid p222. 
67 Ibid p208.
68 R. Edwards, "Radioactive Waste Policy a 'Farce'." New Scientist 143 (17 September 1994) p8. 
69 Jbidp8. 
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involved in storing HAL in cooling tanks above ground.70 Perhaps not surprisingly,
due to conflicting expert opinion, government indecision and continued public 
opposition, the controversy continued following the selection of Sellafield as the 
potential site for a joint ILW/LLW repository. In 1994, Cumbria County Council 
turned down the planning application for the construction of a Rock Characterisation 
Faci1ity (RCF) at Sellafield. An RCF is an experimental research laboratory, which is 
an exten.sive process that involves deep excavation and exploratory drilling to 
conduct further research on the suitability of existing rock fonnations.71 
The subsequent appeal lodged by Nirex in 1996 was subjected to a full public 
inquiry, which lasted five months but failed. There were three reasons given why the 
Environment Minister, John Gummer, rejected the appeal in March 1997.n The main 
reason was that the planned development was technically deficient. Gwnmer stated 
that he was "concerned about the scientific uncertainties and technical deficiencies in 
the proposals presented by Nirex".73 In addition, the RCF would have damaged the
repository location. Thirdly, it would have an unacceptable impact on the 
surrounding National Park.74 In what was viewed by many as a cynical exercise, the 
announcement not to proceed was made on the same day that John Major called the 
general election. The decision was a major setback for the nuclear industry and in 
particular a devastating blow to Nirex, almost putting an end to the companis 
existence.75 There was much despair over the twenty years of radioactive waste 
policy failures, and many argued that with no disposal solution in sight all 
reprocessing should be cease.76 A series of illMdefined decisions highlighted the
inherent failure of the DAD approach and demonstrated the absolute need to regain 
public trust if any advancement is to be made in radioactive waste policy in the UK. 
70 Jbidp8. 
71 R. Morris & M. Folger, "Radioactive Wastes Responsible Management." Management Today
\April 1995) p8. 2 B. Burton. "Nirex: Where Now?" Nuclear Engi11eering International 42 (1997) p40.
73 Cited in E. Masood, "Planning Rejection Leaves British Nuclear Waste Plans in Disarray." Nature 
386 (3 April 1997) p423. 
74 Supra n 72 Burton 1997 p40, 
15 A. Blowers, "If You Know a Better Hole ... " New Scientist 154 (10 May 1997) p55,
16 Jbidp55.
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The rejection of the site at Sellafield left the Government without a practical plan to 
dispose of the majority of its nuclear waste and led to yet another government 
review. A House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology was 
established to inquire into the management of radioactive waste in the UK. The 
Lords report,77 published on 10 March 1999, was extremely critical of radioactive 
waste policy in the UK. In its executive summary it stated that: 
Present policy for nuclear waste management is fragmented. There are wastes for which 
no long-term management has yet been decided and there are a number of significant 
materials, for which no use is foreseen, which are not categorised as waste at all. Titls 
leads to uncertainties in the planning of future facilities and to the continued storage of 
hazardous materials in an essentially temporary state. Until the fate of these materials is 
settled, and the capacity of potential sites is identified and explored, it will not be 
possible to know whether one deep repository will suffice. 78 
In addition, among the main findings of the report was the recommendation for 
phased geologic disposal, involving widespread public consultation with greater 
parliamentary say on site selection. The committee also called for the creation of two 
new bodies, which would subsume the roles of Nirex and the RWMAC.79 These 
included a statutory Nuclear Waste Management Commission with the responsibility 
to develop a comprehensive strategy and a new radioactive waste disposal company 
responsible for the design, construction, operation and eventual closure of the 
repository. Interestingly, the recommendation for and structure of the two bodies was 
remarkably similar to those envisaged by the 1976 Flowers Royal Commission.80
Indeed, the Lords Committee supported the findings of the Flowers report, raised a 
number of significant questions and highlighted the failure of consecutive UK 
governments to implement effective radioactive waste policies over a number of 
decades.81 The Lords Report acknowledged the relatively new field of study relating 
to the public perception of risks. Yet it only provided a brief mention of Dr Nick 
Pidgeon's contention that the disposal of nuclear waste conjures up mostly negativity 
77 L. Tombs, (Chair), "House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology: Management of
Nuclear Waste." London, 10 March 1999, Executive Summary. [hereinafter, The Lords Report, 1999]. 
78 /bid. 
79 /bid. 
80 E. Masood, "Nuclear Waste Store Could Be Built within 25 Years, Say Lords." Nature 398 (25
March 1999)p271. 
81 Supra 77 The Lords Report, 1999 Chapter Five. 
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in tenns of perceived risks. 82 Dr Pidgeon is the director of the Centre for 
Environmental Risk, at the University of East Anglia in Noiwich. He has researched 
widely into the psychological and social processes underlying people's perception of 
risk, and into how that risk is subsequently communicated. 83
In 1999, the industry received another setback with further compelling evidence of 
the inappropriate and unacceptable methods used for the management of radioactive 
waste in the UK.84 In a report leaked to New Scientist the Nuclear Installations 
Inspectorate (NII) expressed its dissatisfaction with the current storage of over 1300 
cubic metres of HAL, in 21 cooled tanks at Sellafield.85 The NII set a target of2015 
for BNFL to empty the tanks, but it is unconvinced that the deadline will be met. 86
The inspectorate blamed the delay to solidify the waste into glass blocks on blocked 
pipes, faulty equipment and technical failure with new plant equipment. The NII also 
threatened legal action to compel BNFL to reduce the build up of HAL, which could 
if successful have the potential for slowing or halting reprocessing of spent fuel and 
the likely closure of some reactors. 
This failure to appropriately deal with high-level waste, coupled with a history of 
uncoordinated policy decisions, have narrowed the available options for radioactive 
waste management in the UK and has significantly eroded public trust. The challenge 
facing the industry to convince a sceptical public was compounded with the 
revelations in 1999 that workers had deliberately falsified safety records at the 
reprocessing plant in Sellafield. 87 As an added safety measure, the mixed uranium­
plutonium oxide (MOX) fuel pellets (consisting of a mixture of reprocessed uranium 
and plutonium) are manually checked and recorded for precise uniformity, which is a 
laborious but essential task that the workers had cheated on.88 Upon discovery,
Japan, Germany, Switzerland and Sweden suspended contracts with BNFL. 
82 The public perception of risk is disr.ussed in more detail below. 
83 N. Pidgeon, R. Kasperson & P. Slovic, The Social Amplification of Risk. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003. 
84 R. Edwards, "End of the Line? Liquid Waste Could Finally Kill Off Britain's Aging Nuclear
Plants." New Scientist 164 (4 December 1999) p5. 
as lbidpS.
86 JbidpS. 
s7 J. Walker, "Nuclear Industry in Meltdown." The Weekend Australia, 11-12 March 2000, pl3.
88 Ibid.
40 
Moreover, the UK encountered further international embarrassment in June 2000, 
when 12 out of the 15 parties to the Convention for the Protection of the Marine 
Environment of the North East Atlantic (the OSPAR Convention) called for an end 
to reprocessing. 89 An end to reprocessing would place increased demands on the 
industry to secure a 'permanent' repository and could result in increased pressure to 
find a multinational solution. 90
Despite the intense opposition, the UK Government did grant permission for the 
expansion of the MOX reprocessing plant at Sellafield in September 2001. The 
decision met with much criticism from a number of European states and has since 
been the subject of a series of legal challenges. The main issue of contention involves 
radioactive discharges into the Irish Sea, which it is alleged contravene the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.91 In its justification for the 
decision the UK Government weighed "the small radiological, and other, detriments, 
against the economic benefit of operating the plant". 92 The Government placed more 
emphasis on the "national economic interest11 than on the long-term social and 
environmental considerations. 93 The 'justification report' made only minor references 
to the radioactive waste issue. It failed to highlight the direct link between 
reprocessing and increased volumes of HAL, not to mention the problematic delays 
experienced in the UK in solidifying that waste. 94
The justification report did acknowledge the government commitment to embark on 
a consultation phase for the long-term management of solid radioactive waste. The 
government consultation paper "Managing Radioactive Wastes Safely" was part of a 
detailed attempt to stimulate debate and inspire public confidence in the decision 
making process. 95 The new policy direction was in response to the recommendations 
89 K. O'Sullivan, "Call to End Nuclear Reprocessing." The Irish Times, 30 June 2000, online version. 
90 Supra n 86 Walker, 2000 pl3. 
91 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, 21 ILM 1261. 
92 DEFRA, "Re BNFL's Mox Plant at Its Site in Sellafield, Cumbria: Justification for the Manufacture 
of Mox Fuel. Decision of the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and the 
Secretary of State for Health." October 2001, pl I. 
93 Ibid p21. Indeed it seems extraordinary that the revised economic analysis did not factor in the 
initial construction or overall capital cost of the plant, Ibid pt 1. 
94 See supra n 84 Edwards, 1999 p5. 
95 DEFRA. "Managing Radioactive Wastes Safely: Proposals for Developing a Policy for Managing 
Solid Radioactive Waste in the UK." September 2001 [herein'lfter, DEFRA, September 2001A}. 
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of the House of Lords Committee and signified its rejection of the failed DAD 
approach. It also concurred with the advice provided by the RWMAC, which stated 
that DAD should be rejected in favour of consensus building.96 The proposed 
national debate includes a number of questions most likely designed to invigorate an 
informative debate. These include, 11should the waste be put in an underground 
repository? or stored, until we know more about its risks and better ways of dealing 
with it? or some other option or combination?"97 Despite a history of benign neglect, 
it now appears that there are genuine attempts to engage the public in the decision 
making process for long-term radioactive waste policies in the UK. 
The United States' Dilemma over High-Level Radioactive Waste 
A number of other nuclear states have experienced similar difficulties with 
radioactive waste disposal, allhough most appear to be at a more advanced stage 
compared to the UK. In the US, at first the emphasis was purely on the weapons 
programme, and then on the development of effective breeder reactors for long-tenn 
fission energy use.98 The US Atomic Energy Acts 1946 and 1954 reflected the initial 
euphoria and unchallenged optimism of the nuclear industry by failing to provide 
explicit details of the nature and magnitude of the associated risks.99 Public concern 
with the waste management issue was raised following the liquid HL W leaks from 
the tanks at Hanford in the 1960s, and following the premature commitment to the 
salt mine facility in Lyons, Kansas, in the 1970s. 100 The nuclear industry experienced
another setback in the late 197Ji, with the Carter administration's decision to prohibit 
reprocessing indefinitely. 101 The 1977 study Nuclear Power Issues and Choices 102 is
widely viewed as the single contributing factor to that notable policy shift. The 
decision to end reprocessing because of proliferation concerns effectively brought an 
96 DEFRA. "The Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee's Advice to Ministers on the 
Process for Fonnulation of Future Policy for the Long Tenn Management ofUK Solid Radioactive 
Waste." September 2001, pB. 
97 Supra n 95 DEFRA, September 2001A p7. 
98 C. Walker, L. Gould & E. Woodhouse, Too Hot to Handle?: Social and Policy Issues in the
Management of Radioactive Wastes. New Haven: Yale University, 1983 p2. 
99Supra n 25 Carter, 1987 p44. 
100 J. Holdren, "Radioactive�Waste Management in the United States: Evolving Policy Prospects and
Dilemmas." Annual Review of Energy and the Environment 17 (1992) p245. [hereinafter, Holdren, 
1992].IOI /bid
102 S. Keeny, Nuclear Power Issues and Choices: Report of the Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group.
Cambridge Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1977. 
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end to the optimistic phase and increased demands for a more permanent solution to 
the radioactive waste issue. rnJ
In the rn, the preferred option for the long-term management of HLW is to dispose 
of the waste in underground geological repositories. While HLW104 is yet to be
placed in a 'permanent' repository in the US. the first underground repository for 
military transuranic waste (TRU) 105 became operational in 1999. Yet the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) near Carlsbad, New Mexico, took over 20 years and cost 
around $US I billion before it gained Environmenta! Protection Agency approval in 
1998. The agencies responsible for TRU experienr;ed controversy and opposition to 
site selection, similar to that in the UK and various other nuclear states. The long 
delays with the WIPP project clearly demonstrate the technical complexity involved 
with underground repositories, especially in salt formations, and highlights the high 
standard demanded by a sceptical public. However, Carter106 notes that the
stereotypical cliche of'not in my backyard' (NIMBY) did not apply in New Mexico, 
where local support for the project was high. 107 Indeed, the support seems to fit better 
with Blowers' analysis and CL'ncept of peripheralisation in either a nuclear oasis or, in 
the case of WIPP, as a 'greenfield' location. 
108 The latter phrase refers to a relatively
new development project with no previous experience of the industry; it has the 
advantage that it provides employment opportunities for the local community. 109
HL W repositories have yet to become operational in the US, as a result of various 
considerations. Prominent among these is the public anxiety about all things m1clear 
and the direct opposition to proposals for the siting of radioactive waste. Local 
opposition has proven difficult to overcome under a federal system of government, 
and it is perhaps even exacerbated by a history of conflict between the Department of 
103 D. Easterling & H. Kunreuther, The Dilemma of Siting a High-level Nuclear Waste Repository.
Boston: Kluwer, 1995 pl94. 
IO' As stated previously, without reprocessing in the US, spent fuel rods are classified as HLW. 
ios Transuranic wastes are wastes other than HLW that contain more than 10 nCi/g ofradionuclides
with an atomic nwnber greater than 92. Supra n 100 Holdren. 1992. In tenns ofradioactivityTRUs 
are similar to long-lived intermediate level waste (ILW) in the UK. 
106 Supra n 25 Carter, 1987 pl4S. 
107 See also D. Charles, "Will America's Nuclear Waste Be Laid to Rest?" New Scientist (14 
December 1999) pl3. 
108 Supra n 56 Blowers, 1999 p242. 
109 Ibid. 
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Energy (DOE), the wider public and various interest groups.110 Tlw DOE is the 
leading Federal Government Agency that manages and oversees radioactive waste 
programmes. It has evolved from the Atomic Energy Commission and has 
continually suffered from criticisms of its secrecy and for its disregard of state and 
public participation in the decision making process. 111 It had to contend also with a 
history of federal-state conflicts over the search for repository sites. These conflicts 
intensified in the 1970s when the federal agency embarked on an extensive push for 
site selection without a fonnal role for the states. Notably, CongrP.ss failed to pass 
any nuclear waste policy legislation throughout the entire 1970s because those 
conflicts could not be resolved. 
After much debate involving state concerns, vested interests and some environmental 
groups, Congress finally passed the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1982.112 Under the
Act the Federal Government retained responsibility for HLW management and 
narrowed its options to a commitment to finding a geologic repository. To assist with 
this objective, the Act established a nuclear waste fund and set a target for an 
operating repository by 1998. 113 The DOE was given the responsibility for site 
investigation and eventual construction of the repository. The Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC) would licence the proposed facility, while the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) was required to set relevant safety standards.114 The Act
completely rejected the DAD approach, which had failed so badly at Lyons, Kansas 
in the 1970s, and the Act was clearly designed to gain greater public understanding 
and support. 115 In an attempt to achieve fairness and equity, at least two sites, one in 
the east and one in the west, were considered necessary. Yet critics argue that the 
general public was not adequately consulted before Congress passed the 1982 Act. In 
their view the decision making process was captured by the "technological and 
110 J. Flynn, J. Chalmers, D. Easterling, R. Kasperson, H. Kunreuther, C. Mertz, A. Mushkatel, D.
Pijawka & P. Slovic, One Hundred Centuries of Solitude: Redirecting America's High-Level Nuclear
Waste Policy. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995 p50. [hereinafter, Flynn et al., 1995]. 
111 Supra n 11 Kraft, 1991/92 pl53. 
112 Public Law 97-425, 42 U.S.C. 10134. 
113 Supra n 100 Holdren, 1992 p247. 
114 For a detailed account of the 1982 Nuclear Waste Policy Act, See supra n 25 Carter, 1987 Chapter 
6 ppl95-230. 11 J, Flynn, R. Kasperson, H. Kunreuther & P. Slovic, "Overcoming Tunnel Vision: Redirecting the 
US High-Level Nuclear Waste Program." Environment 39 (1997) p6. 
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· policy elites" and did not extend to the people who would be most affected by the
facility. 116
Consequently, public opposition was intense and the responsible agencies failed to 
achieve any fonn of consensus towards a suitable site. In 1983, for example, the 
DOE listed nine potential sites, but this was narrowed to three by 1986 because of 
resistance from local opposition groups. 117 The three remaining sites were Deaf 
Smith County in Texas, Yucca Mountain in Nevada, and the Hanford nuclear 
reservation near Richland in Washington.118 Despite the restriction to three sites, 
public pressure continued and, in December 1987, Congress abruptly abandoned its 
original plan for geographical equity by ending site investigation in the eastern states. 
With an election pending many had called for a complete review of policy, but others 
such as Senator Bennett Johnston led the way and insisted that the DOE should press 
ahead. 119 He was greatly influenced by Carter's study,120 which he frequently referred 
to during his questioning of former Nevada Governor Grant Sawyer at a Senate 
hearing. 121 Carter recommended a single primary-candidate site, with Yucca 
Mountain as his preferred choice. 122 Subsequently, amendments to the Nuclear 
Waste Policy Act were passed as part of the complex Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1987. The Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act 198?123 
directed the Department of Energy to focus on Yucca Mountain as the sole HLW 
candidate repository site. 124
The 1987 amendments initially appeared to have a number of advantages, such as 
removing political pressure at the national level. It was also envisaged that a single 
116 Supra n 103 Easterling & Kunreuther, 1995 p198. 
117 "Repository Deep, Mountain High." New Scientist 119 (11 August 1998) p26. 
118 C. Norman, "Three Sites Short-Listed for Nuclear Waste Dump." Science 227 (4 January 1985)
�37. 19 E. Marshall, "Nevada Wins the Nuclear Waste Lottery: Congress Ends the Long RunningControversy over a Reactor Fuel Dump by Sticking a Pin in the Map at Yucca Mountain." Science239 (I January 1988) pt 5. 
120 Supran25Carter, 1987. 
121 This was a :.:ummary of Carter's work published in (1987) 3 Issues in Science and Technology pp 46-61, and reprinted in a Senate hearing report, S. HRG. 100-230 Pt l.
122 See D. Isherwood, "Nuclear Imperatives and Public Trust: Dealing with Radioactive Waste, Book Reviews." Science 239 (11 March 1988) pi 321. 
123 Public Law, 100-103. 
124 P. Slovic, M. Layman & J, Flynn. "Perceived Risk, Tmst, and the Politics of Nuclear Waste."
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site would significantly reduce costs and be more manageable from a technological 
perspective. 125 Yet critics argued that the single site selection process  was a return to 
the previously rejected DAD principle and condemned the government for making 
the decision purely on political grounds. A nwnber of factors supported this 
contention, including Nevada's low population and weak political representation in 
Congress. 126 The Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the 
Senate were Texans, the House Whip was from Washington, while Nevada lacked 
any significantly placed representatives. 127 Mary Louise Wagner, an associate of 
Senator Johnson, reportedly told Nevada Governor Milier that "the dt.cision was 
politically motivated". 128 The decision removed any semblance of geographical 
equity by placing the enlire burden of risks from the nation's HLW onto the state of 
Nevada. Finally, it is difficult to argue, as some have done, that technical 
considerations were prominent, when Congress rather than the DOE made the 
decision to select Yucca Mountain as the sole site for the repository. It was therefore 
not surprising that the decision met considerable opposition in the state of Nevada, 
and the 1987 amendments became know locally as the "Screw Nevada Bill" .129
Public Perceptions of Risk 
Attempts to understand the links between risk perception and public opposition to the 
siting of nuclear waste facilities appear more advanced in the literature relating to the 
US compared to that for many of the other nuclear states. The public perception of 
risk i s  a major obstacle to site selection, and must be overcome if the HLW problem 
is to be resolved. Risk appears to evoke vastly different interpretations, meanings and 
responses among technocrats and social groups. The technocratic concept of risk is 
based on the assumption that "risks" can be objectively quantified by various risk 
assessment methods.130 The techniques of measurement used are grounded in a 
125 Supra n 110 Flynn et al., 1995 p4l. 
126 Ibid Nevada has only two congressional districts and as such has the lowest number of 
re.presentatives in Washington. 
12 J. Davenport, "The Federal Structure: Can Congress Conunandeer Nevada to Participate in Its
Federal High.Level Waste Program?" Virginia Environmental Law Journal 12 (1993) p-549. 
128 C. Shetterly, "Scientists Find Two Volcanoes at Yucca." Las Vegas Review.Journal (1988): Sb.
Cited in supra n 110 Flynn et al., 1995 p42. 
129 /bidp42. And supra n 127 Davenport, 1993 p540. llO P. Slovic & E. Weber, "Perception of Risk Posed by Extreme Events." Paper presented at the Risk
Management Strategies in an Uncertain World, Palisades, New York, 12-13 April 2002 p4. 
[hereinafter, Slovic & Weber 2002). 
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positivist empirical perspective, similar to some of the methods used in mathematical 
or economic theory. These methods focus narrowly on estimating the probability of 
events such as an earthquake, a nuclear plant accident or a fatal aviation collision 
occuning. The number of deaths, injuries or illness resulting from the hazardous 
event are compiled and statistically analysed, to predict the likelihood of such future 
undesirable events occurring.131 A technical risk analysis can be beneficial in 
recognising specific problems and can help improve the reliability and safety of 
technological installations. However, those methods have been criticised by many in 
the social sciences for reducing the complexity of human nature to a mere numerical 
value. 
Social scientists tend to focus instead on the effects a hazardous event may have on 
people who experience them. Under this framework, risk is not seen as existing "out 
there" waiting to be measured but as a concept invented by humans to help them 
understand and cope with the dangers and uncertainties oflife.132 Slovic and Weber, 
for instance, argue that: 
There is no such thing as "real risk" or "objective risk". The nuclear engineer's 
probabilistic risk estimate for a nuclear accident or the toxicologist's quantitative 
estimate of a chemical's carcinogenic risk are both based on theoretical models, whose 
structure is subjective and assumption laden, and whose inputs are dependent on 
judgment. Ill 
The social concept of risk is much broader than the technocratic concept, and 
experience, values, attitudes, media exposure, and cultural identity can influence 
perceived levels of risk. Indeed, the social perception of risk often extends way 
beyond the hann caused in the geographical area where the event or accident 
occurred. Perceptions of risk resonated throughout the world following the nuclear 
accidents at Three Mile Island and especially after the nuclear reactor accident at 
Chernobyl in 1986. The public's perception of risk is underpinned by social and 
ethical considerations and can include issues ranging from short-term and long-term 
Dl 0. Renn, "Concepts of Risk: A Classification," in Social Theories of Risk, edited by S. Krimsky &
D. Golding. London: Praeger, 1992, p59.
132 Supra n 130 Slovic & Weber, 2002 p4.
m Ibidp4. 
47 
concerns over environmental degradation to civil libertarian values such as the right 
to know and freedom to choose. 134
These diverging perspectives stem from the belief that on the one hand technology 
can continue to advance wealth creation and provide solutions to associated risks 
while on the other hand the conviction remains that some technologies such as 
nuclear energy are part of the problem.13s The debate often becomes polarised to 
such an extent that ideological beliefs predominate over any serious attempt to 
resolve the different perceptions of risk. Because of the long-tenn potential 
consequences associated with nuclear activities it is virtually impossible to predict 
safety with any quantifiable degree of certainty. 136 Yet this task is left to the nuclear
'experts' who can only use probable safety as a guiding tool. Under the probability 
theorem, Ulrich Beck states that even if two or three nuclear reactors were to blow 
up tomorrow, the expert's statements would remain true. 137 Effectively Beck argues 
that one or two accidents are unlikely to significantly change the probable safety 
statistical predictions, usually carried out in the 1aboratory, but events such as the 
Chernobyl reactor accident can result in devastating consequences that are 
pennanently etched in the public memory. Efforts to downplay the risks to the 
public, or to delay the reporting of accidents, as happened following the accident at 
Chernobyl, can seriously erode public trust. In such circwnstances it is not surprising 
that many community members reject the expert analyses, associate fear and dread 
with all nuclear activities, and adopt a NIMBY stance. This in turn can lead to the 
public being branded as emotional or irrational, which further polarises the debate, 
and can be a signifo::ant impediment to any lasting solution for HL W management. 
In the initial years of the technological risk debate, and despite much research, little 
progress was made in resolving the disjunction between the various concepts of risk 
analysis. This changed in 1988 when Kasperson and coUeagues developed a 
134 K. Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality: Philosophical Foundations for Populist Refonns. Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1991 pi 9. 
135 U. Beck. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage Publications, 1992 ppl77-8. 
136 F. Short & E. Rosa, "Some Principles for Siting Controversy Decisions: Lessons from the US
Experience with High Level Nuclear Waste." Journal of Risk Research 2 (2004) pl41. 
137 U. Beck, "From Industrial Society to the Risk Society: Questions of Survival, Social Structure and
Ecological Enlightenment." Theory Crilture and Society 9 (1992) ppl07-8. 
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theoretical framework that specifically sought to fuse the technical and social 
conceptions of risk. 138 The "social amplification of risk" (SAR) thesis is based on the 
premise that events pertaining to hazards interact with psychological, social, 
institutional and cultural processes in ways that can heighten or attenuate individual 
and social perceptions of risk and shape risk behaviour. 139 An increase in perception 
of risk can result in a range of secondary behaviour patterns and consequences, from 
demands for additional information and govenunent intervention to issues of 
liability, higher insurance costs and loss of trust in institutions. 140 In the SAR 
framework, risk is conceptualised partly as a social construct and partly as an 
objective property of a hazard or event. Its main advantage is that it seeks to avoid 
total relativism on the one hand and technological determinism on the other. 141 In the 
area of nuclear waste management, it is perhaps the only theoretical framework that 
can help bridge the gap between the vastly different perceptions of risk between the 
technocrats and the wider community. 
The social amplification of risk usually begins with an adverse event such as an 
accident or the reporting of plans to locate a potentially hazardous undesirable 
facility or LULU. A proposed HLW repository is one such example that generally 
raises public concerns and induces fears of potentially dangerous accidents and/or 
long-term health or environmental consequences. These fears can either be amplified 
or attenuated, depending on a range of factors, including the rationale for the 
repository, the persuasiveness of the technical, safety and social arguments, trust in 
institutions and an adequate communication and consultation process. The SAR 
theory posits two major stages, tenned 'amplification stations', which are the transfer 
of information about the risk event or potential hazard, and the cultural response 
mechanisms within the relevant society. As significant studies show, positive or 
negative media exposure can have a considerable effect in helping shape public 
tJa R. Kasperson, 0. Renn, P. Slovic, H. Brown, J. Emel, R. Goble, J. Kasperson& S. Rarick, "The 
Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework," in The Perception of Risk, edited by P. 
Slovic. London: Earthscan Publications Ltd, 2000, pp232-45, 
139 R. Kasperson, "The Social Amplification of Risk: Progress in Developing an Integrative
Framework," in Social Theories of Risk, edited by S. Krimsky & D. Golding. London: Praeger, 1992, 
fl:157-8.
0. Renn. W. Bums, J. Kasperson, R. Kasperson & P. Slovic, "The Social Amplification ofRisk:
Theoretical Foundations and Empirical Applications." Journal of Social Issues 48 (1992) pl40. 
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perception of risk. This in turn may be greatly influenced by either trust or mistrust 
of the technical experts and or the responsible institutions. Thus, for a geological 
repository to become a reality, the decision-makers have to choose between either 
overriding public concerns, which is likely to be problematic, or somehow alleviating 
community anxiety about nuclear waste to engender trust and achieve sufficient 
public acceptance. 
A large number of psychometric studies in the US and elsewhere have been 
conducted to help gain an understanding of the different attitudes, perceptions and 
behaviours towards nuclear and other hazardous activities. One such study, by 
Fischhoff, Slavic, Lichtenstein, Read, and Combs, demonstrated that public attitudes 
to radiation differ markedly from the attitudes of risk assessment experts.142 The 
layperson groups rated nuclear power as a much higher risk than did the experts, 
whereas the opposite occurred when it came to rating potential danger associated 
with medical X�rays. Psychometric studies were also used to gauge the public's 
reaction to the proposed HLW repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. Two 
t elephone surveys were conducted, using a national sample of 1201 and a sample of 
1001 residents of Nevada. 143 A wide range of questions were posed to determine the 
participants' opinions of the repository concept, their perceptions of risk, 
compensation and behavioural changes in relation to vacation, work or where they 
may choose to live after repository approval. One discovery was that 53 per cent of 
Nevada respondents and almost 49 per cent of national respondents agreed that a 
repository is the best way of storing HLW permanently. Yet, sUiprisingly, 11both sets 
of respondents viewed the risk of nuclear power plants to be less serious than that of 
a high�level nuclear waste repository". 144 Over 70 to 80 per cent of respondents from 
both samples rated all questions designed to characterise their perception of risks at 
142 B. Fischhoff, P. Slovic, S. Lichtenstein, S. Read & B. Combs, "How Safe Is Safe Enough? A
Psychometric Study of Anitudes Towards Technological Risks and Benefits." Policy Sciences 9 
(1978) pl27. 
141 H. Kunreuther, W. Desvousges & P. Slavic, "Nevada's Predicament." Environment 30 (1988) p18.
l« Jbidp20.
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the high end of the scale. In addition, some 63 per cent of Nevada's respondents 
disagreed that their state is the best place for the repository because the nuclear 
weapons test site is already there. 
The results from the telephone srnveys reveal high public perceptions of risk, and the 
opinion polls in Nevada confirm high levels of opposition to the repository siting. In 
1989 the Nevada legislature responded to the resounding public resistance by passing 
two resolutions, which it later claimed exercised its veto over the repository under 
the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. 145 The two resolutions were presented to the President 
and both Houses of Congress, sending the strongest message possible of Nevada's 
opposition to the repository. Also in 1989 the Nevada Governor, Bob Miller, signed 
into law Assembly Bill 222 which stated that "it is unlawful for any person or 
governmental entity to store high-level radioactive waste in Nevada" . 146 A state poll 
of Nevada residents revealed a 74 per cent support for this law and an 80 per cent 
backing for the State to do all it could to stop the repository. When Congress failed to 
respond to the resolutions and following legal advfoe from the Attorney General, 
Governor Miller advised Congress that Nevada had effectively vetoed the selection 
of the Yucca Mountain site. The Secretary of the Department of Energy, James 
Watkins, did not agreed with Nevada's interpretation and advised Congress to 
proceed with the characterisation of Yucca Mountain as planned. 147 Subsequently, 
the State of Nevada felt it had no option but to seek a legal resolution to the political 
impasse. 
Nevada took its case to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, where it sought a review 
of the Secretary's decision. In its submission, Nevada raised a number of legal 
objections but the main contention was that Congress did not have the constitutional 
145 Assembly Joint Resolution 4, passed on 17 January 1989 expressed Nevada's "adamant opposition
to the placement of a high-level nuclear repository". Assembly Joint Resolution 6, passed on 23 
January 1989 prohibited repositories at Yucca Mountain "without the prior consent of the Nevada 
Legislature or a cession of jurisdiction". 
u6 Nevada Revised Statutes SS 459-910 (1989). 
147 S. Swazo, "The Future of High-Level Nuclear Waste Disposal, State Sovereignty and the Tenth
Amendment: Nevada V Watkins." Natural Resources Journal 36 (1996) p134. 
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authority to amend the Nuclear Waste Policy Act in 1987. 148 In Nevada v Watkins149 
the court ruled that Congress did exercise legitimate authority under the property 
clause of the constitution because Yucca Mountain was Federal owned land. 
Furthennore, the Court detennined that the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act 
of 1987 pre-empted Nevada1s attempt to veto the Federal government's choice. The 
main reason given was that Nevada's statute "had the actual effect of frustrating 
Congress's intent". 150 The Watkins Court relied on the Supreme Court ruling in 
English v General Elec. Co., 151 which stated that: 
while part of the pre-empted field is defined by reference to the purpose of the state law 
in question, another part of the field is defined by the state law's actual effect on nuclear 
safety. m 
It appears in this instance that effect outweighed purpose, and state law was 
overridden by Federal responsibUity for nuclear waste management. Following the 
decision, the DOE, as the responsible federal agency, resubmitted its application with 
Nevada for envirorunental permits to evaluate the Yucca Mountain site. 
Despite the setback, opposition remained strong in Nevada and the state political 
leaders vowed to undertake every measure possible to prevent the repository going 
ahead.153 The State of Nevada lodged an appeal in the Supreme Court in 1991 but 
lost when the circuit court decision was upheld. Nevada continued to frustrate DOE 
attempts and denied requests for the necessary water pennits for site evaluation 
procedures.154 The DOE subsequently sought redress in the federal courts and was 
eventually granted the pennits to proceed. The relationship between the DOE and 
Nevada remained contentious throughout, with continued legal challenges at various 
stages of the entire process. Among the many legal challenges, Nevada petitioned the 
10 W. Mabry, "Can You Say 'N'?: NIMBY, NWPA and Nuclear Preemption." Natural Resources
Journal 33 (1993) p497. 
149 Nevada v Watkins, 914 F2d 1545 (9th Cir 1990) pp1552-53. 
150 Ibid pt 561. 
151 English v General Elect. Co., 496 US 72 (1990). 
152 ibid p 80. in Supra n 100 Holdren, 1992 p248.
15� Supra n 110 Flynn etal., 1995.
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courts for a review of numerous funding decisions made by the Secretary. 155 Nevada 
also challenged a number of siting guidelines, one of which was lodged by the 
Attorney General on 17 December 2001. In its submission Nevada claimed inter alia
that the DOE guidelines were inconsistent with the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. 156 
Hence legal arguments surrounding site selection still continue some twenty years 
after the 1982 Act. 
The goal of an operating repository at Yucca Mountain advanced a step closer to 
fruition on 9 July 2002, when Congress passed a resolution to override the State of 
Nevada's veto on the earlier recommendation to proceed with the next stage of the 
process. House Joint Resolution 87 was passed by 60 votes to 39 in the Senate, 157
and was signed into law by President George Bush on 23 July 2002. 158 That 
congressional approval was in response to the Secretary of Energy, Spencer 
Abraham's letter of recommendation to the President, on 14 February 2002. In his 
letter Secretary Abraham said, 
the results of this investigation have been openly and thoroughly reviewed by the 
Department and oversight entities such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 
the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board, and the US Geological Survey, as well as 
having been subjected to scientific peer reviews, including a review undertaken by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. The Department also has made available the 
scientific materials and analyses used to prepare the technical evaluations of site 
suitability for public review by all interested parties. The results of this extensive 
investigation and the external technical reviews of this body of scientific work give me 
confidence for the conclusion, based on sound scientific principbs, that a repository at 
Yucca Mountain will be able to protect the health and safety of the public when 
evaluated against the radiological protection standards adopted by the Environmental 
Protection Agency and implemented by the NRC in accordance with Congressional 
direction in the Energy Policy act of 1992.1s�
us For a successful outcome for Nevada, sel! Nevada v He"ington, 827 F2d 1394 (9tb Cir. 1987)
whereas the State failed to convince the court in Nevada v United States Dept of Energy, 133 F3d 
1394 (9th Cir. 1998). 1s6 See Nevada Governor Kenny Guirm, "Nevada Files Chailenge to Revised Yucca Mountain
Guidelines." Press Release 17 December 2001, and "petition for review State ofNevada v United 
States Department ofEnergy", both available: http://www.state.nv.us/nucwaste/policy.htm 
m SJ.RES.34, 9 July 2002, Vote No 167. 158 Public Law, 107�200.159 The Secretary of Energy. "Letter to the President of the United States." 14 February 2002, 
Washington, D.C. 20585. 
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The Secretary continued with additional reasons for approving the site including the 
need to maintain energy security and environmental protection, and specific mention 
was made about the 100,000,000 ga1lons of high-level liquid in storage awaiting 
solidification and eventual disposal. National security was also prominent among the 
reasons for recommending approval of the Yucca Mountain site. The letter 
highlighted that 40 per cent of the US combat fleet's vessels are nuclear powered and 
those submari:aes and aircraft carriers need to be periodically refue1led. The extracted
spent-fuel rods are currently stored above ground. Secretary Abraham emphasises the 
need to improve homeland security by outlining the fact that HL W and excess 
plutonium is stored at 131 sites in 39 States across the US.160 Despite these 
compelling arguments and the congressional resolution, Nevada Governor Kenny 
Guinn has promised to continue the legal cha1lenges in the courts.161 The lawsuits 
will lead to further delays but it is expected that the Yucca Mountain repository will 
eventually open, albeit beyond time and significantly over budget. 
Nuclear Energy and Radioactive Waste Policy in Switzerland 
Switzerland is another state with substantial experience in nuclear energy and 
radioactive waste management. It is a small nation both in size and population, yet its 
energy consumption has increased dramatically in recent decades in line with other 
industrialised nations. It is a prosperous country, but has few natural resources, and 
must import about 80 per cent of the fuel it needs for energy generation.162 Electricity 
accounts for 20-25 per cent of Switzerland's overall energy demands, and five 
nuclear power plants supply 40 per cent of that energy. Another 53 per cent is 
supplied by hydropower, but further expansion is limited due to environmental 
considerations. 163 Alternative sources such as solar and wind play an extremely 
limited role. One of the main reasons for this is that the alpine landscape is 
160 Ibid. 
161 S. Blankinship, "Senate Approves Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Site," Power Engineering 106
12002) pl2. 62 I. McKinley & C. McCombie, "Switzerland Plans to Bury Nuclear-Waste Problem." Forum/or
Agplied Research and Public Policy 9 (1994) pll6, [hereinafter, McKinley & McCombie, 1994]. 
1 3 S. Dickman, "Power to the Relucant People." Nature 336 (1988) p329. [hereinafter, Dickman,
1988]. 
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unsuitable for wind power and solar is yet to become commercially viable.164 In
order to guarantee supply, electricity operators have signed contracts with their 
foreign counterparts. Hence Switzerland has access to 2.5 Gigawatts (GW) of nuclear 
generated electricity from France should it be required. Interestingly, the Swiss have 
been able to take advantage of peaks and troughs on the European grid and has 
become a major trader in electricity. In 1995, for example, its electricity exports 
totalled 36.2 GW, compared to a total import of28.9 GW.165
Despite sometimes trading in their favour, the overa11 dependence on foreign energy 
imports166 is not entirely consistent with the Swiss tradition of self-sufficiency. 
Indeed, in part because of this tradition, the Federal Government was able to 
convince the community of the benefits of nuclear power in the late 1950s. 
Following a referendum in 1957 which was passed by the Parliament and all the 
cantons, the Federal Government assumed responsibility for nuclear legislation.167 
Under this ame::ndment to the constitution, the cantons retained control for the 
licensing of nuclear installations. Switzerland has a long tradition of participatory 
democracy and leads the world with the largest number of referenda held at the 
national level. 168 The referendum has become a significant part of the decision 
making process since Swiss federation in 1848. While it has the advantage of 
inclusiveness and provides the ultimate legitimacy for decisions, it can lead to 
uncertainty for industry, when circumstances surrounding an issue subsequently 
change. 169 As in the US, the nuclear industry has to contend with a Federal system of 
governance, which provides the community with additional avenues of influence. 
The public in Switzerland appear to have more input in decisions concerning nuclear 
activities than is the case in most countries. 
164 G. Beveridge, (Chair). "The Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Conunittee's Report on
Radioactive Waste Management Practices in Switzerland." 1-64. London: Department of the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions, 1998 p5. [hereinafter, Beveridge, 1998). 
165 lbidp6. 
166 Indeed any further expansion of electricity is also likely to come from French nuclear power, See 
srr,ra n 164 Beveridge, 1998 p7.16 E. Bertel, "Energy Policies ofIEA Countries, Switzerland 1999 Review." Chapter 7, pplOl-07.
Paris: International Energy Agency, 1999. [hereinafter, Bertel 1999]. 
168 Y. Papadopoulos, "How Does Direct Democracy Matter? The Impact of Referendum Votes on
Politics and Policy Making." West European Politics 24 (2001) p35. 
169 Supra n 164 Beveridge, 1998 p4, 
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The Swiss community has taken the opportunity to influence nuclear policy on 
numerous occasions since the first nuclear power plant began operation in 1969. 
Initially, nuclear power seemed a viable option to meet the growing energy demands 
without compromising the nation's autonomy. 170 As in other industrialised countries,
opposition to nuclear power grew in Switzerland in the 1970s, in line with a general 
increase in envirorunental awareness. In 1975, the first public action against nuclear 
activities occurred with the occupation of a site for a new nuclear reactor in 
Kaiseraugst, in the canton of Aargau. Public opposition continued, even though two 
anti-nuclear popular initiatives were lost in 1979 and 1984. The resistance to nuclear 
power was reinforced following the Chernobyl accident in 1986.171 Subsequently, a 
planned 1,000 MW reactor for Kaiseraugst near Basel was abandoned.172 Public
opposition was further demonstrated in 1990 by a referendum, which placed a 10-
year moratorium on the expansion of commercial nuclear power in Switzerland. 173 
Among the factors highlighted during that debate was the problematic management 
of radioactive waste. 
The five nuclear reactors are the main source of radioactive waste in Switzerland. 
Under Swiss law the owners and operators of the plants are responsible for the safe 
management of all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, including spent-fuel storage and 
radioactive waste. 174 The nuclear power plants generate about 90 metric tons of 
spent-fuel annually. Switzerland has no reprocessing facilities and sends its spent­
fuel overseas to Cogema in France and BNFL in the UK. It recycles the returned 
MOX in three reactors, namely Beznau I and 2 and Gosgen. 175 The Swiss have 
endeavoured to find solutions to effectively manage their nuclear waste. In 1972 the 
National Co-operative for the Storage of Radioactive Waste (NAGRA) was 
established as one of the first such organisations in Western Europe.176 NAGRA is 
responsible for the disposal of all types of radioactive waste and is engaged in 
ongoing research into the various alternative methods. In January 1985, NAGRA 
170 "Energy Policy after the Second World War: Nuclear Power". The Swiss Federal Archives, online 
version. Available: http://virtor.bar.admin.ch 
171 Ibid. 
172 Supra n 163 Dickman, 1988 p329. 
173 Supra n 162 McKinley & Mccombie, 1994 pi 16. 
174 Supra n 167 Bertel 1999. 
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produced a comprehensive eight-volume safety assessment report for a hypothetical 
repository, titled Project Gewahr177 (Project Guarantee). It was submitted to the 
Federal Council who presented its evaluation of the report in June L 38. 
Among its conclusions, the Federal Council accepted all aspects of the feasibility 
study for disposing of low and intermediate level waste. It also accepted the viability 
of HLW disposal, but requested further evidence of specific site suitability for 
Switzerland. Hence, NAGRA was required by the Federal Council to commence an 
investigative programme in sedimentary rock.178 From two preliminary studies, 
NAGRA selected the Opalinus Clay of the Zilrcher Weinland, in Northern 
Switzerland, as the preferred option, and commenced its assessment in 1991. Phase 
one179 was completed by 1994, and progress is continuing during phase two180 with 
intensive investigation in localised areas.181 The focus of "concentration is an area of 
some 50 km2 of sedimentary rock in the Zurcher Weinland where Opalinus Clay 
occurs at a depth of 400 to 1000 metres".182 Opalinus Clay is considered suitable as a 
host rock for long-lived HLW because of its extremely low permeability. NAGRA 
has constructed an underground research laboratory in the Opalinus Clay, at Mt Terri 
in the Jura Mountains, and is also engaged in underground test site evaluation at Ute 
Grimsel Pass in the Swiss Alps. 183 Neither site is intended for disposal and both are 
used specifically to advance knowledge and optimise methodology options. 
Under the guidance of NAGRA, Switzerland appears to be well advanced in the 
technological aspects of geologic disposal. It is also involved in significant 
international research, cooperation into repository design and feasibility studies.184
177 Sixth Rtport to the US Congress and the US Secretary of Energy, (December 1992) Nuclear Waste 
Technica l Review Board, Appendix F, p f-18. See also supra n 6 pi 13. 
178 W. Wildi, (Chair) Disposal Concepts for Ra,Jioactive Waste, (January 2000) Final Report of the
Expert Group EK.RA, Swiss Federal Office of Energy, p8. [hereinafter, Wildi 2000]. 
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Nationally, it appears somewhat constrained in finding a suitable HLW repository, 
not only because of its size but also because of the particular geological fonnations 
in Switzerland. The entire south of the country is ruled out because the Alps are 
being pushed upwards by about Imm each year.185 The Opalinus Clay in the Zurcher 
Weinland is potentially the optimal location for a high-level waste repository in 
Switzerland. Results from the Benken borehole tests in 1998/99 continued the 
positive expectations of low seismic activity. 186 As part of Switzerland's stepwise 
repository implementation process, NAGRA completed a safety assessmeri.t of a 
proposed deep geological repository for HLW and long-lived intermediate level 
waste in 2002. The assessment was undertaken as part of the Entsorgungsnachweis 
project, which is concerned with siting, engineering and safety, and overall 
feasibility of geological disposal in Switzt:rland. Details of the comprehensive safety 
as3essment are contained in the NAGRA Technical Report 02-05. 187 The safety 
assessment revealed a suitable host rock that provides robust secure isolation from 
the human environment; an engineered multi-barrier system to ensure long-tenn 
confinement and radioactive decay withi!: its confines; and an overall structure that 
allows for slow attenuation of radionuclides n:!ease to the environment within safe 
accepted standards. NAGRA's post-closure safety assessment was internationally 
peer reviewed and its findings validated, based on sound science complete with an 
appropriate balance of quantitative and qualitative evidence. 188 
The International Review Terun took account of the fact that the post-closure safety 
assessment is only one stage in the stepwise decision making process, with much 
more research required before a suitable site can be identified. 1g One area requiring 
further study is the structural suitability of the rock in the Opalinus Clay for the 
excavation and mining of tunnels. It is unclear at this stage if the usual methods of 
iss Supra n 164 Beveridge, 1998 p43.
186 Supra n 178 Wildi, 2000 p22. 
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rockbolting and tunnel reinforcement will suffice, and this can only be detennined 
based on site-specific geological data. 190 During their visit to Switzerland, in 1996, 
the R WMAC group gained the impression from some Swiss professionals that a 
suitable dh;posal site "may simply not exist" at the national level.191 Hence, 
Switzerland may yet pursue the option of utilising a multinational HL W repository 
should one become available. In keeping its options open, however, by actively 
engaging in both national and international research, Switzerland is well positioned 
to avail of the most suitable choice for its specific needs. Its ultimate choice will also 
depend upon achieving the necessary public acceptance. 
Comparable International Experiences with HL W Policy 
Other nuclear states with varying degrees of success in radioactive waste disposal are 
Sweden, France and Canada. While there are difficulties associated with comparing 
approaches and experience across nuclear states, such an exercise can help advance 
knowledge of the technical and non-technical a spects of nuclear waste disposal. 192 
Many similarities exist between the Swedish and Swiss nuclear energy programmes, 
with both placing a high reliance on nuclear power to produce energy. Currently, 12 
nuclear reactors produce half the electricity consumed in Swedi:::;:.193 In 1972 the 
Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB) wa•; established, 
with responsibility for the transport, disposal and management of all Sweden's 
radioactive waste. In addition to its technical capabilities, SKB works closely with 
local municipalities to convey information and to foster cooperation between itself 
and the public. 194 In contrast to the DAD decision making approach for radioactive 
waste policy in the UK and the US, Sweden like Switzerland has a long tradition of 
local participatory democracy. Sweden quickly learned that it was important to carry 
public opinion rather than adopt a top down approach such as DAD, which in many 
cases ovenides local concerns. 
190 Supra n 183 McKinley & Mccombie, 1996p227. 
191 Supra n 164 Beveridge, 1998 p43. 
192 Sixth Report to the US Congress and the US Secretary of Energy, (Dc.:ember 1992) Nuclear Waste 
Technical Review Board, Chapter 3 NWTRB visit to selected countries insights into the U.S. nuclear 
waste management program, p39. {hereinafter, NWTRB 1992]. 
191 S. Bjursstom, Nuclear waste can be managed. (4 November, 1996) 245 Industry Weekpl7.
i,u Ibid.
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Largely because of its more open approach, Sweden is often cited for its 'outstanding' 
accomplishments in managing nuclear wastes. 195 Among the most documented 
example of successful radioactive waste disposal is the LL W and IL W repository 
near Forsmark, on the east coast of Sweden. This facility has been operating since 
1988 and is located under the Baltic Sea, near the Forsmark nuclear power station. 
So what lessons can be drawn from the Swedish experience? As elsewhere nuclear 
power and radioactive waste are intertwined with politics. Yet there are significant 
differences in the way Sweden has managed its nuclear activities compared to the 
other nuclear states. Initially nuclear power was embraced and aggressively purnued 
in the earlf 1970s in Sweden, but opposition to nuclear facilities increased towards 
the end of the decade. 196 Electoral tunnoil saw two national governments fall before 
the end of the decade, and public discontent surrounding nuclear safety only 
diminished following a national referendum in 1980. Despite falling shor t of a clear 
majority, the government responded to the high no vote, and established a policy 
framework to phase out nuclear power by 2010. 197
The phase out policy ensured that nuclear power became a less divisive issue, 
especially when added to the impact of legislation in 1977, which made nuclear 
operators responsible for the handling and final disposal of radioactive waste. 
Moreover, Sweden (unlike Switzerland and the UK) chose not to recycle its spent 
fuel, which removes the problem of having to vitrify HAL and ultimately dispose of 
the vitrified waste. 198 In 1985 Sweden constructed a central interim storage facility 
(CLAB) to house its spent·fuel rods. The facility is located 30 metres below the 
surface, near the Oskarshamm nuclear power station, and the spent rods are stored in 
deep-water ponds to cool the waste. Sweden maintains a cautious approach to HLW 
policy and the interim store is part of the overall plan to remove excessive heat from 
the rods, before placing them in a permanent repository. 199 The other nuclear states 
could learn from Sweden, which recognised the importance of a two-way flow of 
195 Supra n 110 Flynn et al., 1995 p88. 
196 T. Gerholm, The atomic age is not over yet. (25 September, 1998) 11 New Statesman, p22.
197 S. Lirdstrom, S. "The Brave Music of a Distant Drum: Sweden's Nuclear Phase Out." Energy
Policy 20 (1992) p623. 
198 Supra 77 The Lords Report, 1999. Chapter Three: Some Options and their Advocates: Recent 
International Experience. 
199 Supra n 192 NWTRB, 1992 p49. 
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communication. Swedish governments have responded to community wishes and 
have sought to involve the public in the decision making process for radioactive 
waste. 200 Arguably, the emphasis on providing unrestricted infonnation and seeking 
public involvement in the HLW management process were central to eventually 
achieving the policy outcomes. 
France is another nuclear state with reasonable success in the management of 
radioactive waste. There are similarities between the French and British experience, 
in the initial years in particular.201 Yet it appears that the French quickly learned from 
early mistakes and now enjoy a greater political commitment to nuclear waste 
disposal.202 With France generating over 70 per cent of its electricity from 51 nuclear 
power plants, public acceptance of nuclear activities is greater than in most other 
nuclear states. A study by Slovic, Flynn, Mertz, Poumadere and Mays of French and 
US attitudes, perceptions and behaviours associated with nuclear power and other 
technological risk areas found some similarities as well as some notable 
differences. 203 Both sets of citizens viewed the risks from radioactive wastes as more 
hazardous than those from nuclear power plants, and for both groups medical X-rays 
were among the least risky. Those particular fi'ldings replicated earlier studies. The 
low public perceptions of risk from medical X-rays suggest perceptions are 
influenced by perceived benefits, familiarity, and trust in the medical profession.204 
Furthennore, the French placed greater trust in scientists, industry, government 
officials and nuclear experts, compared to the US sample.205 The French also fanned
the view that decisions on nuclear installations should reside with the experts and 
government authorities rather than the people. 
While the perceived risks from nuclear activities are similar in the US and France, 
the acceptance of those risks is higher in France, and that acceptance seems to be 
200 Supra n 110 Flynn et al., 1995 p89. 
201 Supra n 6 Kemp, 1992 pp84-99. 
202 Ibid. 
201 P. Slovic, J. Flynn, C. Mertz, M. Poumadere & C. Mays, "Nuclear Power and the Public: A
Comparative Study of Risk Perception in France 11nd the United States.," in Cross-Cultural Risk 
Perception: A Survey af Empirical Studies., edited by B. Rohnnann & 0. Renn. Dordrecth: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2000, pp55-l 02. 
20l /bidp63. 
205 /bidp98 
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influenced by a much higher level of trust. Consistent public confidence in technical 
expertise has enabled France to vigorously pursue a nuclear fuel production cycle, 
which includes a full commitment to reprocessing.206 France has also secured 
contracts for reprocessing spent fuel from a number of other cowitries. Indeed, 
because of this experience France has been deemed the world leader in developing 
reprocessing and related waste-handling facilities. Unlike the UK, the French 
Government appears to have embarked on a more flexible approach to radioactive 
waste management. The Lords report207 observed that France has the advantage of 
using just one type of reactor, the pressurised water reactor, and as such has fewer 
types oflLW to contend with. 
France is further advanced than the UK in the site selection process and has disposed 
of its LLW and ILW in near surface engineered facilities. While it has yet to achieve 
a repository for HLW it has made good progress, and has left open the option of a 
retrievable or non-retrievable repository in deep geological fonnations. 208 By 
keeping their options open and by not setting unrealistic deadlines, the French 
government has considerably more flexibility and discretion when compared to the 
US with its emphasis on a single site at Yucca Mountain. Indeed, France has been 
investigating deep geological disposal since the 1970s. Yet their initial investigation 
of four sites was halted in 1989 after only two years' studJ, because of direct public 
opposition. This led to a government review of management strategies for HLW and 
long-lived ILW, which included a number of public hearings.209 In 1991, following 
th,., review, France passed a law outlining a framework of research and development 
for the management and disposal ofHLW over a fifteen-year period. The framework 
placed a strong emphasis on the participation of local communities in the site 
selection process. 
While it is more likely to achieve the desired outcomes for site selection with greater 
public involvement, there are of course no guarantees. The French Green parties and 
206 Supra n 110 Flynn et al., 1995 p85. 
207 Supra n 77 The Lords Report, 1999. 
20H M. Rayna!, "Status of Research on Geological Disposal," in Geological Problems in Radioactive
Waste Isolation: Second Worldwide Review, edited by P. Witherspoon. Berkeley, California: 
University of California, 1996, pp95-104. 
209 Supra n 77 The Lords Report, 1999. 
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associated groups oppose nuclear power and argue against the deep disposal option. 
It remains to be seen whether these groups can generate enough opposition to impede 
the government plans for a HLW repository. In 1998 the French Government 
announced its decision to build an underground laboratory at the Est clay site at Bure 
in Meuse department.21° France is also conducting research at another clay site at 
Gard, near Marcoule. It was envisioned that a final decision on the chosen repository 
would be made by 2006, but it is now likely that this deadline will have to be 
extended. France does however have the advantage of a large civil nuclear 
programme, which enjoys considerable public support. It has recognised the 
importance of retaining this support and has adopted a more flexible and open 
approach than many other nuclear states.2n The 1991 legislation also advanced this 
objective by separating the National Agency for Management of Nuclear Wastes 
(ANDRA) from the French Atomic Energy Commission, thus ensuring a greater 
degree of independence from the nuclear industry.212
Canada is another nuclear state often cited for its efforts towards greater public 
participation in the decision making process for HL W disposal. Comparisons can be 
made with the United States. While there are many similarities in the design and 
management of radioactive waste between Canada and the United States, there are 
some notable differences in approach. Both nations chose the once through fuel­
cycle without the reprocessing option.213 Canada also prefers geologic disposal as the 
most appropriate solution to the HLW dilemma, and the structure of the Federal 
agencies responsible for radioactive waste management is similar. Kraft identifies the 
main difference in approach as Canada's commitment to gaining public acceptance 
for the repository concept before considering specific Iocations.214 Another 
significant difference is the deadlines imposed on the DOE in the US compared to a 
more measured approach in Canada. Perhaps in part this elusive deadline may have 
forced the US Government and the DOE to embark on the classic 'decide announce 
defend' approach, which historically has been extremely unsuccessful. The Canadian 
210 Ibid. 
211 Supra n 110 Flynn et al., 1995, p85.
212 Ibid 86. 
213 p Supra n 77 The Lords Report, 1999. 
214 M. Kraft, "Policy Design and the Acceptability of Environmental Risks," Policy Studies Journal 28
(2000) p212. [hereinafter, Kraft 2000]. 
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approach appears more in line with the recent international consensus on the need for 
voluntary siting.215
Canada has recognised the policy failures inherent in DAD and has strategically 
moved towards a more open deliberative process. It has experienced some success 
with this approach, most notably with the siting of hazardous waste treatment centres 
in the provinces of Alberta and Manitoba.216 In both cases, a history of conflict and 
public opposition was replaced with an extensive process of public deliberation. 
While these examples of success are modest, the basic principles can be transferred 
to the more troublesome area of radioactive waste repository siting. In a study 
involving LLW in Deep River, Ontario, Gunderson and Rabe note that the volunteer 
principle can play a constructive role in site selection but actual implementation 
depends on a range of suitable circumstances.217 What is apparent from the 
experience in Canada is that an open and honest information process combined with 
the 'bottom up' voluntary approach remains the best option for successful siting of 
repositories. Support for the waste treatment plant in Alberta dropped considerably 
when the facility managers withheld information pertaining to a series of incidents at 
the plant.218
The importance of engaging in a cooperative community based siting approach in 
Canada is in stark contrast to radioactive waste policy in the US where efforts to 
acquire trust and public participation in the decision making process were deemed 
insufficient. To assist with the cooperative initiative, the Atomic Energy agency of 
Canada Limited (AECL) has adopted five key principles to guide its siting process: 
(I) a commitment to safety and environmental protection; (2) voluntarism in acceptance
by a host community; (3) shared decision-making at each stage of deciding whether and 
how to proceed; (4) open communication of information to the interested public about 
215 Management, Board on Radioactive Waste. One Step at a Time: The Staged Development of 
Geological Repositories for High.Level Radioactive Waste. Washington: The National Academies 
Press, 2003 p47. 
216 B. Rabe, J. Becker, & R. Levine, R. "Beyond Siting: Implementing Voluntary Hazardous Waste
Siting Agreements in Canada." American Review of Canadian Studies 30 (2000) p455. [hereinafter, 
Rabe, Becker & Levine, 2000]. 
217 W. Gunderson, & B. Rabe, "Voluntarism and Its Limits: Canada's Search for Radioactive Waste·
Siting Candidates." Canadian Public Administration 42 (1999) pt 93. 
21s Supra n 216 p455. [Rabe, Becker & Levine, 2000].
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plans, procedures, activities, and progress from the earliest stages in the process; and (5) 
fairness to the host community in provision of benefits in recognition of its service to 
the nation.219 
These principles appear to support the view by Ballard and Kuhn of an emerging 
"open approach to the siting process in Canada".220
The cooperative community based approach has brought success for the clean up of 
low-level radioactive waste in the Port Hope area of Southern Ontario. A legal 
agreement was reached in 2001 between the Government of Canada and the local 
people of Port Hope and Clarington.221 Two earlier attempts at siting a low-level 
radioactive waste facility, during the 1980's, failed because of insufficient 
community involvement. As the second attempt ended with the failure to progress 
the Deep River option, the communities where the wastes are located came fotward 
with their local solution. Port Hope and Clarington had been involved in the process 
for at least two decades, and were two of the 850 municipalities consulted by the 
Siting Task Force in 1998. The latest initiative began when the two local Municipal 
Councils passed resolutions seeking discussions with the Federal Government for a 
locally based solution. Local committees were fonned and the Federal Government 
provided funding and facilitated the process including the hiring of technical 
consultants. The Government's willingness to enter into a legal agreement illustrates 
its commitment to community participation in the design of the project. Property 
value protection and host community grants became part of the agreement in direct 
response to the community wishes. The agreement also involves a commitment of 
$CAN 260 million by the Federal Government and comru.its the parties to cooperate 
toward the development and implementation of the Initiative.222 The success of the 
Port Hope Area Initiative in Canada was due to the step by step community driven 
approach that culminated in a legal agreement. It is unclear whether Canada will 
219 Supra n 214 Kraft, 2000 p212.
220 K. Ballard, & R. Kuhn, "Developing and Testing a Facility Location Model for Canadian Nuclear
Fuel Waste." Risk Analysis 16 (1996) pp821-32. 
221 P. Brown & D. McCauley, "Port Hope Area Initiative." Paper presented at the 9th International
Conference on Environmental Remediation and Radioactive Waste Management, Oxford, 21-25 
September 2003 p4. 
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achieve similar success for a HLW repository, but Kraft223 is optimistic that it will do 
so over the next few decades. However, he does caution that much will depend on 
how the recommended policy is ultimately implemented. 
Conclusion 
There are some vast differences and many similarities in the ways nation states have 
managed their radioactive waste. The more successful policy outcomes were found 
in the nuclear states with the capacity to fully engage the public in the site selection 
process. Of the three main states reviewed here, Switzerland has a long history of 
referenda and the public is able to play a direct role in the decision making process. 
Switzerland may be somewhat constrained by its geology and is extremely unlikely 
to attempt to force an unwanted repository on its populace. The responsible agencies 
in Switzerland have actively engaged the community in all aspects of the 
consultation process, and have well advanced radioactive waste policies for low and 
intennediate level waste. Switzerland has established exceHent technical capabilities 
and is working towards a comprehensive solution for its HL W, which may involve a 
multinational solution. Sweden, France and Canada have also implemented 
substantial radioactive waste policies. Both Switzerland and Sweden have long 
traditions of participatory democracy and have embraced the concept of consensus 
decision-making. Both nations embarked on a meast.red approach and have shown 
an ability to adapt to public sentiment. Sweden for example responded to public 
concerns in 1980, and agreed to phase out nuclear power by 2010. This may have 
assisted their ability to enact more effective radioactive waste policies. More 
recently, support for nuclear power has risen considerably in Sweden and that phase 
out option may yet be reversed. 
France and Canada have also enjoyed reasonable success with the management of 
radioactive waste. France in particular enjoys widespread public support for nuclear 
power and has achieved disposal facilities for LL W and IL W. It has kept open both 
the retrieval and non-retrieval disposal option for HLW, which allows for greater 
flexibility and may potentially alleviate the public fear of 'pennanent' disposal. 
Canada has recently adopted a more open process ofHLW site selection based on the 
223 Supra n 180.
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voluntary concept. It has also recognised the need for a measured deliberative 
approach underpinned by the necessity to maintain public trust and confidence. 
Canada had some success with the voluntary site selection for other hazardous 
wastes and it remains to be seen if it can enjoy the same level of success for the more 
troublesome HLW. What is obvious from this review is that the states with a more 
community participatory process appear more likely to achieve the desired policy 
outcomes for the overall management of radioactive wastes. 
It seems somewhat ironic that two leading nuclear states, namely the UK and the US, 
have struggled so comprehensively to implement effective radioactive waste policies. 
The culture of secrecy employed by both nations during the Atomic Age (during the 
race to build the nuclear bomb) appeared to linger for decades and to impact upon 
later policy initiatives. A successful site selection process for HLW relies profoundly 
on achieving public trust and confidence. The culture of secrecy, combined with poor 
public consultation initiatives, have had the effect of eroding public trust. Both 
nuclear states have relied on the top down DAD approach to site selection. This 
method increases public distrust, which enables adversaries and environmental 
groups to mobilize massive opposition to the selected site. This directly transfers to 
political pressure, which can have the effect of reversing the original decision. The 
decision to abandon the RCF for Sellafield in 1997 symbolises the failure of the 
DAD approach adopted by Nirex throughout the 1980's. The UK is yet to adequately 
dispose of its ILW, let alone the more controversial HLW. 
In many respects the UK is commencing the entire process again with its latest 
initiative for public consultation. While this is a welcome development it must be 
supported with a genuine commitment for change and an absolute desire to achieve 
and maintain public trust. BNFL has developed excellent technology for managing 
its radioactive waste on site. Its third vitrification line if successful should help 
reduce the stockpile of HAL to more acceptable levels, which should also assist with 
building public trust. Likewise the US appears likely to gain the necessary public 
trust for its nuclear activities and radioactive waste management in particular. After a 
long process and huge expense, it has established a successful operating underground 
repository for military transuranic waste (TRU) at the WIPP plant in New Mexico. 
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Although still struggling to implement its preferred HLW repository at Yucca 
Mountain in Nevada, because of intense opposition from the host state, the repository 
is increasingly likely to become operational m the not too distant future. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE PANGEA PROPOSAL FOR A HLW REPOSITORY IN 
AUSTRALIA 
In December 1998 the Australian public was alerted to the Pangea 'proposal' to locate 
the world1s first 'voluntary host' HL W multinational repository somewhere in the 
Australian outback. The concept was revealed when the UK environmental group. 
Friends of the Earth, obtained a leaked promotional video made by British Nuclear 
Fuels Limited (BNFL), which they sent to an Australian environmental group who 
passed it on to the Australian media. 1 The untimely release of the project combined 
with the non-disclosure of meetings between PRA and some government ministers 
placed PRA and its supporters on the defensive and enabled their opponents to 
advance a 'secret agenda' argument. Pangea Resources Pty Ltd International (PRI) 
had been established in March 19972 to examine the feasibility of locating a geologic 
repository for the disposal of some of the world's radioactive waste in a voluntary 
host state. The companies behind PRI were BNFL, the Swiss cooperative for nuclear 
waste management (NAGRA), and a US engineering firm known as Golder 
Associates. PRI set up a subsidiary body called Pangea Resources Australia Pty Ltd 
(PRA) on 12 January 1998.3
The Australian Federal Resources Minister, Senator Nick Minchin, responded 
quickly by rejecting the PRA plan, and his spokesperson stated that no fonnal 
proposal had been lodged with the Federal Govemment.4 Following extensive public 
opposition, which resulted in the enactment of two State Acts prohibiting the storage 
of HLW in Western Australia and South Australia and a Federal Senate motion 
I R. McGregor, "Black Stump Nuke Dump." The Australian, Wednesday 2 December 1998, p5; M.
Hogarth, "US Finn Wants to Send Nuclear Waste to Us." The Sydney Morning Herald, Wednesday 2 
December 1998, p5; "Australia Deemed to Have Suitable Sites for Pennanent Nuclear Waste 
Disposal." Engineers Australia 71 (1999) p26. 
2 The company registered under Pangea Resources Pty Ltd. in Australia on 28 November 1997. 
3 See the Australian Security Commission's website, http://www.search.asic.gov.au 
� In light of the revelation that PRA never put a fonnal proposal to the Australian Federal 
Government, the tenn 'project' or depending on the context the 'Pangea Concept' is used in preference 
to 'proposal' throughout the thesis. 
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opposing the project, PRA formally withdrew its operations from Australia in 
January 2002.5 Soon after, some of the main people involved with PRA helped 
establish a non-commercial organization called the Association for Regional and 
International Underground Storage (ARIUS), whose focus is now on finding a 
regional repository for Europe. 6 As PRA was the first major attempt to find a 
'voluntary host' state to accept HLW from other nation states, it is important to 
examine the reasons for the overwhelming public resistance that led to the fonnal 
political rejections in Australia. This requires both an exploration of the Pangea 
project and an analysis of the subsequent debate, which spanned the Australian 
continent over a two-year period. 
Upon learning of the preferred repository locations the Australian public initially 
reacted with dismay, but this response, according to the Westem Australian Labor 
Party7 leader Dr Geoff Gallop, quickly turned to unequivocal opposition.8 The 
reaction of environmental and conservation groups was predictable, but the level and 
extent of outright public hostility to the plans took the proponents and some of its 
supporters by surprise. The public opposition was driven, in part, by the premature 
disclosure of PRA's plans and by fears of an extensive secret attempt to 'dump'9 a 
significant amount of the world's radioactive waste in Australia. 10 PRA later admitted 
that it would have preferred a more orderly disclosure ofinfonnation, and that it had 
not intended to reveal its plans until the end of 1999 11 or perhaps even late-r. 
Unfo1tunately for PRA, its capacity to counteract the adverse claims was made more 
difficult when it was revealed that, as far back as 1993, those later associated with 
PRA had commenced a g lobal feasibility study that included Australia. 12 
s R. Martin. "N-Waste Dump in Tenninal Decline." The Australian, Wednesday 23 January 2002 pl. 
6 See http://www.arius-world.org 
7 The Labor Party were in opposition at that time. 
8 "Legislative Assembly." Western Aus.'ralian Parliamentary Debates, Wednesday 8 September 1999 
rsss. 
The word 'dump' was widely used by the anti nuclear lobby and is used throughout as published in 
the media to highligh.: the negative connotations associated with helping to create particular 
rierceptions.O L. McGregor, Critical Mass, Four Comers, Australian Broadcasting Corporation (Television
Programme Transcript, 19-04-1999). Available: http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/stories/s23893.htm 
11 This was admitted at the first presentation of the Pangea concept in Australia. See C. Mccombie, 
"Developments in the Disposal of High Level Wastes." Paper presented at th e Third Australian 
Uranium Summit, Darwin Australia, 30 March 1999. [hereinafter, McCombie, March 1999]. 
12 Pangea Resources. "Project Background." Pang ea Booklet, Leading a Global Solution for the 
Disposal of Nuclear Materials (1998) p5. 
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Despite the ill-timed revelations and the political controversy surrounding the 
project, PRA initially seemed unfazed and began its extensive campaign to convince 
a highly sceptical public. To assist them with this tac;k, the company recruited a 
number of high-profile respected Australians to their Scientific Review Group 
(SRG). These included Dr. Peter Cook, a senic.,r geologist, who was appointed 
chainnan, and renowned immunologist Sir Gustav Nossa!, along with geologist Dr. 
Phillip Playford, engineer Brian Anderson, and Roy Green, a physicist with the 
COmmonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO). JJ Nossal 
in particular advanced the Pangea concept in the public arena by calling for an 
infonned debate and for the concept to be reviewed by the "best Australian 
scientists". 14 His article in a national newspaper revealed his support for the proposal, 
which was summed up with his expression that 11we have the opportunity to offer the 
world an Australian solution to a global problem". 15 Nossal was heavily criticised for
his stance mostly by environmentalist groups. 16 In August 1999 at a seminar at the 
University of Western Australia, 17 Nossa! stated that he was not endorsing PRA but 
he continued his call for an "emotion free debate". 18 
In this chapter the merits of the Pangea project will be assessed using the 'triple 
bottom line' criteria of economic, environmental and social considerations. There are 
many justifications for using this approach, ranging from broad political and 
international law acceptance of the concept of sustainable development (SD), to 
specific references to SO principles in the radioactive waste management literature. 19
The SD principle was advanced in the UK during a 1995 government review of 
radioactive waste policy. The review concluded that 11radioactive waste management 
policy should be base<l on the same basic principles as apply more generally to 
ll P. Cook, (Chair). Annual Report: Pangea Sdentific Review Group. Pangea Resources Australia Pty.
Ltd. Pangea Scientific Review Group, Perth. 1999·2000. 
1� G. Nossa!_ "N.Dumps: Why Waste a Chance? An Australian Solution for a Global Problem." The
lUStralian, Friday 11 December 1998 pl5. 
15 Ibid pl5.
16 Sec H. Caldicott, "If Nossa! Is Concerned, Let Him Show It." The Australian, Thursday 17
December 1998 r,15. 
17 Nuclear Waste Isolation Seminar(1l August 1999) Perth: University of Western Australia.
11 C. Manley, "Nuclear Dump 'Will Be Safe'." The Sunday Times, 22 August 1999 pp8·9.
IQ J, Lang.Lenton Leon, "Radioactive Waste Management and Sustainable Development." NEA News 
19 (2001) pp18-20. 
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environment policy and in particular on that of sustainable development".20 The SD
concept has its critics and has been subjected to extensive debate and much 
disagreement over its precise meaning and definition among professional groups and 
within academia.21 More recently, however, somewhat of a consensus has emerged 
on the imperative to develop policies based on integrating the triple bottom line. 
Considering the very long timeframes for the radioactive materials in the HLW to 
decay to safe accepted levels, it is vital that any management plan must be 
simultaneously ecologically viable, economically feasible and socia1ly {or publicly) 
acceptable. 22 The chapter will therefore also explore how well PRA handled the issue 
of risk perception and how well prepared it was to promote public trust, which is 
important for gaining public acceptance for the disposal of hazardous material, and 
especially nuclear waste. Studies show that once an institution loses public 
confidence it is nearly impossible for it to regain it.23
Economic Benefits 
The origins of the Pangea concept can be traced to the Synroc Study Group {SSG), 
which commenced its research in December 1988. The Australian Federal 
Government established the SSG to examine the commercial prospects for Synroc in 
a global context.24 It consisted of four Australian resource companies,25 assisted by
the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO) and the 
Research School of Earth Sciences at the Australian National University (ANU). 
Synroc, an acronym for synthetic rock, was invented in 1978 by Ted Ringwood of 
the ANU.26 It consists of a titanate ceramic waste-form made from four principal
minerals, and was specifically designed to immobilise HLW elements. Synroc offers 
an alternative to borosilicate glass and, when complete, constitutes a solid in which 
20 UK Government, White Paper. Re1•iew of Radioactive Waste Management Policy. London: HMSO 
Cm 2919. 1995 pl4. Emphasis added. 
21 M. Kane, "Sustainability Concepts: From Theory to Practice," in Sustainability in Question: The
Search for a Conceptual Framework, edited by J. Kohn. J. Gowdy, F. Hinterberger & J, van der 
Str.iaten. Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar, 1999, pp!S-31. 
u C. Campbell & W. Heck, "An Ecological Perspective on Sustainable Development," in Principles 
ff.Sustainable Development, edited by F. Muschett. Florida: St Lucie Press, 1997 p55.
T. Porte & D. Metlay, "Hazards and Institutional Trustworthiness: Facing a Deficit of Trust." Public
Administration Revh!w 56 (1996) p342.
24 Ibid. 
25 The companies were BHP, CRA Limited, Energy Resources of Australia Limited and Western 
Mining Corporation Limited. 
26 Synroc Study Group. "Progress Report." Australia, 1991 (hereinafter, SSG 1991 ]. 
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the radionuclides are held within the latt ice of crystals.27 Studies have shown that 
Synroc offers superior resistance to groundwater leaching compared to borosilicate 
glass "by factors of SOO to 2000 for univalent and divalent elements".28 The SSG's 
research supported the earlier findings. Synroc's ability to withstand high 
temperatures offers the potential for deep drill-hole burial of HLW some four 
kilometres underground, rather than in mined repositories half a kilometre below the 
surface. 29
PRA was established as a commercial venture and the Pangea concept evolved from 
some of the SSG's conclusions and recommendations. 30 The potential use of Synroc
opened up the possibility of Australian involvement in nuclear waste disposal. The 
SSG stated that the ''rewards would be even more substantial if Australia were to 
take pennanent title to foreign HLW (as Synroc) and to bury it irretrievably in a 
suitable geological environment in the Australian shield".31 It is unclear how much 
importance PRA placed on those comments, but David Pentz, Chairman of PRA, 
made the following remarks at the 1999 waste management conference in Tucson. 
After describing the history of Pangea and the links with Synroc, he stated: 
In 1992 a public announcement by the then-responsible minister in the Federal 
Government in Canberra did not elicit the usual negative response that many other 
nations have experienced towards a proposal for a nuclear disposal facility. In fact its 
announcement was virtually unnoticed by the media and the public.32 
If PRA did assume that there would not be much public opposition, that assumption 
was seriously flawed. 
PRA relied heavily on technical arguments to convince the public of the robust safety 
features inherent in the project. The Pangea project began with a six-stage site 
27 F. Barnaby, "The Management of Radioactive Wastes and the Disposal of Plutonium." Paper 
ftresented 111 the MAPW 2000, Canberra, 4-6 Augusl 2000. [hereinafter, Barnaby, 2'100].8 A. Ringwood, Nuclear Waste lmmohilisalion in Synroc. Canberra: Australian National University,
1985 p8. [hereinafter, Ringwood, 1985]. 
29 Supra n 26 SSG 1991 pp t-2. 
30 D. Pentz, "Pangea an International Repository." Paper presented at the Waste Management '99
Conference, Tucson March 1999, [hereinafter, Pentz, 1999]. 
31 Supra n 28 Ringwood, 1985 p20. 
32 Supra n 30 Pentz, 1999.
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selection process, with stage one a global search for suitable locations commencing 
in 1993.33 The Pangea concept placed "most emphasis for assuring long-term 
radiological safety on the properties and stability of the rock-groundwater system, 
rather than relying heavily on the system of engineered barriers that are constructed 
within a deep repository."34 PRA's view was that the emphasis on geology provides a 
more understandable disposal system, with clear demonstrable safety standards and 
easier evaluation techniques, and that it also ensures a more economically viable 
repository. The initial stage of the process involved an extensive desktop study to 
identify arid or semi-arid geologically stable regions of the wortd.35 The preferred 
location would provide a natural safe containment system that would remain stable 
for hundreds of thousands of years. The specific site criteria involved high-isolation 
characteristics with low relief topography, low rainfall, high evaporation, stable 
geology and hydrogeology, absence of important mineral resources, and remoteneris 
from centres ofpopulation.36 Following these criteria, PRA identified parts of South 
Africa, Argentina and Australia as the most favourable areas. Some parts of China, 
Southern Russia and Kazakhstan rated well but contained regions that bo rdered on 
high seismic hazardous activity. 
The economic benefits for Australia were expected to be considerable. In November 
1999 PRA commissioned Access Economics to investigate the potential economic 
impacts of the multinational repository project for Australia.37 The economic strength 
of the repository development was illustrated with the requirement of a $10.5 billion 
investment (in 1998 dollars) over the 40-year lifespan of the project. It was estimated 
in return that the repository would earn $200 billion in export revenues38 and 
11 J, Black & N. Chapman, Siting a High-Isolation Radioactive Waste Repository: Technical 
Approach to Identification of Potentially Suitable Regions Worldwide. Pangea Technical Report 
Series 01-01. 2001. [hereinafter, PTR 2001 ]. 
34 lbidpl. 
3' lbidp3.
36 C. McCombie, G. Butler, M. Kurzeme, D. Pentz, J. Voss & P. Winter, "The Pangea International 
Repository: A Technical Overview." Paper presented at the Waste Management '99 Conference, 
Tucson 1999. [hereinafter, McCombie, et al., 1999]. 
31 Access Economics. "The Economic hnpact of the Nuclear Waste Repository Project." Canberra: 
Draft Report, prepared for Pangea Resources by Access Economics, 1998 pp! & 8. [hereinafter, 
Access Economics, 1998]. 
n Ibid. While thr: HL W would be imported to the host state, Australia would have been in effect 
exporting the 'service' which is why the $200 billion was classified as export revenues. 
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contribute around $90 billion directly to Australian governments in the fonn of 
royalties and payroll and company taxes over the same forty years. 
The Pangea project envisaged a dedicated port and rail link to an inland repository 
site extending over an area seven kilometres by two kilometres on the surface and to 
a depth of several hundred kilometres underground.39 The HLW and spent fuel 
would be shipped to Australia in heavy steel casks in purpose-built ships. It was 
estimated that over the 40-year life of the repository 3,000 transport casks and 70 
ships would be required, aU of which would be manufactured in Australia.40 The 
project would provide direct employment for around 2,000 people, including 600 
jobs in the international shipping operations. The projected employment figures were 
even more encouraging, according to the Access Economics modelling, with an 
estimated 6,000 jobs per year in Australian industry during the operational phase. 
The mode! on investment and employment was based on the classic Keynesian 
stimulus to aggregate demand complete with multiplier effect.41 Hence when the 
induced consumption expenditure is factored into the model the projected 
employment almost doubles. Considering the very great economic investment and 
employment potential, it is not surprising that some industry groups openly 
supported the project. In December 1998 the executive director of the Institute of 
Public Affairs, Dr Mike Nahan, said, "Australia should seriously examine the case 
for large scale waste disposal".42 He claimed that the project would be equivalent to 
the size of the gold industry in Australia. 
Access Economics also used macroeconomic simulation to gauge the potential 
impact of the proposal on the Australian and Western Australian economies. The 
model used, b ased on neoclassical economic assumptions, involves comparing two 
long-tenn simulations.43 First the standard projection was run to establish a base 
39 Dupont and Associates, and Bergin and Associates. "Advancing Australia's Security lnterests­
Hosting a Common Nuclear Waste Facility for the Asia-Pacific Region." Canberra: Paper prepared for 
Pangea Resources by Dupont and Associates and Bergin and Associates, 1999 Appendix 8 p44. 
{hereinafter, Dupont, 1999]. 
O Supra n 37 Access Economics, 1998 pS. 
41 A. Heywood, Political Ideologies: An Introduction. London: Macmillan, 1992 p48.
42 M. Nahan, "Opportunity Too Good to Waste," The West Australian, Wednesrlay 9 December 1998 
r16. 
J Supra n 37 Access Economics, 1998 pl3. 
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scenario and then the Pangea repository project was added to produce a likely set of 
outcomes. The two main impacts were on business investment between 2004 and 
2014 and on exports from 2009 onwards.44 The biggest impact in the project's peak 
investment year of 2008 was found to equal almost 1.5 per cent of aggregate business 
investment, or 0.2 per cent of GDP. Furthennore, the Access Economics Report 
predicted that the project would produce a full one.per cent increase in GDP above 
the level in the base simulation at the height of the upswing in 2021.45 Interestingly 
the projected stimulus in demand increased employment by 17,000 by the year 2008. 
In addition, after the initial peak and fall, anticipated export revenue remained 
consistent at $5.5 billion from about 2022 onwards.46 As with any economic
modelling it is impossible to empirically validate the findings because of the need to 
rely on the particular assumptions used. This limitation does make broad public 
acceptance of the economic claims difficuJt to achieve but this type of modelling is 
widely used among economic theorists and govenunents throughout the Western 
world. 
This projected level of investment and employment opportunity would be tempting 
to any government, which may help explain the initial mixed messages from the 
Australian Federal Government. Senator Minchin, the Resources Minister, publicly 
rejected the proposal from the outset,47 yet his public comments were not matched 
with unequivocal legislative backing. The opportunity to legislate against the 
proposal and alleviate growing public concern was presented to the government as 
early as 10 December 1998, but it refused to do so. During the Committee stage in 
the Senate, a proposed amendment by Greens Senator Dee Margetts to the 1998 
Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Bill sought to prohibit the 
construction of a large nuclear waste disposal facility anywhere in Australia.48 This 
initiative gained the support of the Labor Opposition but (with the help of an 
independent Senator) the Coalition Government defeated the amendment by a 
majority of one. During the debate Senator Grant Tambling, on behalf of the 
°" lbidpl4. 
45 lbidpp2 & 17. 
,46 lbidppl4 & 15. 
47 B. Hurrell, "A 'Great Place' for Nuclear Waste." The Advertiser, Wednesday 2 December 1998 p3.
48 "Australian Senate." Federal Parliamentary Debates, Thursday 10 December 1998 pt 645. 
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Government, failed to provide any definitive reasons for not allowing the amendment 
except to repeatedly say that it was not necessary.49 This enabled S:nator Margetts 
and others to argue that the Government wanted to keep the door open for the 
importation of nuclear waste.50
Australia exports uranium but is not a nuclear state because it has no energy 
producing nuclear reactors. It does however produce small quantities of low-level 
and long-lived intennediate level radioactive waste, from the use of radioisotopes for 
medical and industrial research at Lucas Heights. 51 Australia sends its spent-fuel rods 
to COGEMA52 in France for reprocessing, and under the contract the ILW will be 
returned. This is the type of waste classified as HLW in the main nuclear states, 
where it is strongly advocated that it must be disposed of in geologic repositories to 
ensure safety over the long term. 53 Yet it can not be justified on economic grounds to 
construct a deep underground repository in Australia to se.cure such a small but 
dangerous quantity of long-lived radioactive waste. One of the arguments advanced 
by PRA was that a shared facility would minimise expense and benefit the smaller 
nuclear states in particular.54 Yet the direct cost reduction benefits to Australia from 
hosting a multinational repository to offset the costs of a national repository was not 
given much attention throughout the public debate. 
If the shared facility argument has economic merit, then surely it must follow that 
any costs associated with potential hazards well into the future must also be shared 
by the nation states responsible for producing the waste and utilising the 
multinational repository. This was a considerable flaw in the economic argument 
advanced by PRA, because there were no arrangements in the proposal to safeguard 
liability provisions over the long-tenn. All responsibility would  rest with the 
49 The Opposition argued that it was not contrary to any of their amendments and would not prevent a
domestic intermediate or low-level repository going ahead but would ensure against the construction 
of any larger facility, such as the one proposed by Pangea. See Ibid pl646. 
so R. Rose, "N-Waste Ban Fails in Senate." The West Australia,,,, Friday 11 December 1998 p32. 
51 A. Hoy, "Quake in Fright." The Bulletin, 10 August !999, pp36�38.
52 Compagnie Generale des Matieres Nucleaires (COGEMA) was founded in 1976 and is responsible
for some mining operations, uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing. 
53 M. Lowenthal, Radioactive Waste Classification in the United States: History and Current
Predicaments. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Report. University of California, Berkeley: 
California. 1997. 
54 Supra n 36 McCombie, et al., 1999 pl. 
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Australian Government following the closure of the facility after an operating period 
of 40 years. Moreover, the Access Economics Report suggested that part of PRA's 
$90 billion royalty payments to Federal and state governments could go towards the 
"long term care fund" of the repository, which would be controlled by the Australian 
Government. 55 Considering that the waste remains radioactive for tens of thousands 
of years, it is debatable whether such a funding arrangement would be adequate over 
the long-term. Therefore it is possible that any short or medium term economic gains 
for Australia could be offset by remediation costs associated with potential leakage 
and contamination of the biosphere long after repository closure. 
Another economic consideration is the potential loss in tourism from the negative 
connotations associated with a nuclear waste 'dump'. Political leaders take tile risk of 
a possible downturn in tourism seriously. In the US, the State of Nevada regularly 
uses the effects on tourism as a main argument against the Yucca Mountain 
repository.56 The State maintains that thousands might stay away if Nevada is seen as 
unsafe because of the dangers of storing the 'harmful' waste. During the PRA debate 
the Tourism Council of Australia issued warnings about the impact of a nuclear 
waste 'dump'. The Western Australian branch president, Laurie 01Meara, said the 
tourist industry was based on Western Australia being "clean" and "green11 and the 
waste site would damage that image in the "eyes of tourists11 •57 During the debate and 
since, two Premiers of opposing political persuasions advanced similar arguments 
about Western Australia's clean green image. When opposing the PRA project, 
Premier Richard Court emphasised both the importance of maintaining the State's 
good image for clean primary produce and totitism/8 and stated that his government 
would not risk damaging either. S!1 His successor, Premier Geoff Gallop, has 
repeatedly used Western Australia's 'clean green image' in his arguments for 
opposing both the PRA repository project and Australia's national low-level 
55 Supra n 37 Access Economics 1998 p8. 
56 D. Berns, "Las Vegas Operators Fight Nuclear Waste Dump Plan." Hotel and Motel Management
217 (2002) p41. 
s7 L. Tickner, "Tourism Warning on N-Dump." The West Australian, Thursday 22 July 1999, p6. 
ss "Legislative Assembly." Western Australian Parliamentary Debates, Tuesday 7 September 1999 
r,648. 
9 A. Burns, "State Bwies N-Dump Plans." The West Australian, Wednesday 8 September 1999 p4.
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radioactive waste repository. Thus, an economic argument th<1t rests on the negative 
image ofHLW is used to counter the PRA economic case. 
Environmental Benefits of Geological Repositories 
The main environmental and safety benefits of geological repositories were not 
particularly well explained to the Australian community. The advantages of securing 
HLW in deep geological repositories are twofold. The primary objective is to 
physically isolate the waste from the human and biological environment in order to 
protect humans from ionising radiation. The second (and perhaps now even more 
important objective) is to put the waste beyond the reach of terrorists and subversive 
groups from rogue states. Deep disposal ofHLW places it beyond the reach of both 
biological and human contact. 60 The repository is selected and designed in such a 
way as to prevent the migration of radioactive material from the repository back to 
the biosphere. 
The choice of wording is important in explaining the benefits of the repository 
concept. Phrases such as "the site will have high isolation characteristics"61 may be 
appropriate for infonnation sharing between experts but greater clarity is required 
when attempting to inform the public of the rationale behind the repository concept. 
In 1991 the collective opinion of the Radioactive Waste Management Committee 
explained the geological disposal concept in the following terms: 
Radioactive waste disposal systems are designed to isolate the waste from humans and 
the environment for the necessary times to ensure that no potential future releases of 
radioactive substances to the environment would cons titute an unacceptable risk.62 
Clearly the challenge remains to achieve the correct balance between articulating the 
safety features and environmental benefits without further increasing public anxiety 
about some of the complex aspects of nuclear activities. 
60 N. Chapman & I. McKinley, The Geological Disposal of Nuclear Waste. New York: John Wiley &
Sons, 1987 p43. [hereinafter, Chapman & McKinley, 1987]. 
61 Supra n 36 Mccombie, et al., 1999 pl. 
62 Nuclear Energy Agency: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. "Disposal of 
Radioactive Waste: Can Long-Tenn Safety Be Evaluated? A Collective Opinion," Paris, 1991 p6. 
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One possible way to achieve this is to remind the public of the necessary and 
successful measures taken on a daily basis to protect the workers from radiation at 
nuclear power plants.63 Obviously humans need to avoid exposing themselves to 
radiation at any time during the nuclear fuel cycle. This is achieved by shielding 
humans from the radioactive material at all stages throughout the nuclear process.64
Operators regularly use remote controlled handling equipment from behind protected 
thick walls to carry out their activities. Their vision is obtained either with the use of 
cameras and television screens or through specially designed insulated windows, 
depending on the particular task being perfonned. 65 Despite extremely high levels of 
radioactivity, the spent-fuel assemblies placed in ponds, filled with water enable the 
spent-fuel rods to be cooled and then if chosen, dismantled during the first step in the 
reprocessing process. At depths of 10 to 15 metres the water provides a natural 
radiation shield that safeguards the technicians working on the rods from elevated 
platfonns.66 It is necessary to use an appropriate language to not only better explain 
these complex issues, but to distinguish between the more imminent dangers 
associated with nuclear reactors compared to radioactive waste. 
The repository concept is also complex, difficult to explain and can talce time for 
community members to gain a comprehensive understanding of its inherent features. 
The public appears to envisage different connotations from the phrase "isolate and 
contain1167 compared to the scientists and related experts, who regularly use that term 
to describe the design features of geological repositories. It is not uncommon for 
images of a highly radioac1ive, easily flowing liquid substance, to be evoked in the 
public mind upon hearing such an explanation. The HL W ready for disposal is in a 
solid form. The radiation shielding qualities of a deep repository needs to be 
constantly reiterated. It may well be much better to explain the environmental 
benefits of the repository concept in two separate stages. The primary emphasis 
could focus on clearly outlining the substantial rarliation shielding qualities of 
63 No specific attempt was made to do this during the PRA debate. 
64 J, Thompson, "Legends, Myths, and Heroes: Decontaminating the Rocky Flats Advanced Size 
Reduction Facility." Radwaste Solutions 10 (2003) p42. 
65 N. Willes, "Winding up to Winding Down." Professional Engineering 15 (2002) p28.66 L. Carter & T. Pigford, "The World's Growing Inventory of Civil Spent FuP!." Anns Control Today
29 (1999) pt t. [hereinafter, Carter & Pigford, 1999]. 
67 Supra n 36 Mccombie, et al., 1999. 
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underground repositories. The proponents may well need to regularly illustrate the 
desirable aspects of placing the HL W deep underground in robust surroundings that 
provides the public with "more th.:m adequate shielding from the radiation emitted by 
the waste". 68 The second environmental and safety feature of geological repositories 
is its anti-migration benefits. That aspect was less convincing to the Australian public 
because of the belief that the radioactive material would leak into the ground water 
systems sometime in the future. 
Initially, design features of geological repositories relied solely on the natural 
geology to prevent migration of the radioactive material, but with increasing 
demands for maximum safety, engineered barriers are now widely accepted in many 
nuclear states.69 Specifically designed multi-barrier systems can be used to avoid 
rejecting geologically marginal sites, and can also provide an additional safety 
feature for even the most suitable geological formations. Engineered barriers fall into 
three categories: the waste form itself, the container it is housed in, and the backfill 
and particular sealing arrangements used. 70 The HL W intended for disposal is not in 
a liquid form, since the highly active liquor (HAL) resulting from reprocessing has 
been solidified prior to disposal. The preferred method in the UK is to convert the 
HAL into a glass matrix corrosion resistant substance, a process known as 
vitrification.71 The solidified waste is then encapsulated in specifically designer. 
containers, which form the next stage of the barrier system. There are differences in 
container design, with most nuclear states intending to use steel canisters. It is 
difficult to predict corrosion rates for the time-scale involved, but a conservative 
estimate for steel guarantees retention of the radionuclides for at least a thousand 
years. Finland and Sweden have opted for the more expensive long-lived copper 
canisters, predicting that they will preserve their integrity for tens of thousands of 
68 Supra n 60 Chapman & McKin1ey 1987 p43. 
69 See Nuclear Energy Agency : Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. Safety of 
Disposal of Spent Fuel, HLW and Long-lived /LWin Switzerland: An International Peer Review of the 
Post-Closure Radiological Safety Assessment for Disposal in the Opa/inus Clay of the ZiJrcher 
Weinland, OECD Publications, Paris. 2004. 
70 Pangea Resources. "Pangea's Fresh Look at the Challenge." Pangea Booklet, High Isolation Sites 
for Radioactive Waste Disposal (1998) pp7 & 8, [hereinafter, Pangea Resources BookJet, 1998]. 
71 N. Wilks, "Vit for the Duration." Professional Engineering (13 February 2002) p47.
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years. 72 The sealing of shafts and tUIU1els with concrete combined with backfilling 
provides the final technical barrier.73 This sealing arrangement minimises ground­
water movement and can also retard radionuclide migration. The technical barriers 
provide an assurance of safety that should help instil community confidence in the 
repository concept but the host rock and the natural geology are the only effective 
means of providing absolute safety for the long duration required. 
There are diverging expert opinions on the most suitable geological formations for 
storing and ultimately containing the HL W over the long-tenn. Among the main 
choices are salt, clay and granite. Some prefer salt formations because of the �bsence 
of water, since dryness limits radionuclide migration and because · of the 
encapsulation qualities of salt. Over a relatively short period of time, the salt creeps 
down and completely surrounds the waste, which further inhibits migration. 
However. retrieving the waste is more difficult in salt formations, it is likely to be 
costly and it may even be impracticable over the longer tenn. The WIPP repository 
in Carlsbad, New Mexico, where transuranic waste is sent, is now a working 
example of underground nuclear waste disposal in salt formations. Although WIPP 
has not been functioning for long, having commenced receiving waste in 1999, it is 
operating better that expected. 74
PRA selected Australia for its geological stability and low seismic activity in the 
region under study. To highlight the stability argument the proponents maintained 
that the area under consideration, in central Australia, has been undisturbed since the 
break up of the 'Pangea' supercontinent over 200 million years ago.75 The two
geological stability arguments were disputed, however, which contributed to the 
public skepticism of the technological safety features of the repository concept. PRA 
claimed that Australia had the desired stable geology with low rock penneabitity, 
72 Nuclear Energy Agency, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, in Cooperation 
with the European Commission. "Engineered Barrier Systems and the Safety of Deep Geological 
Repositories: State of the Art Report." 1-70. Paris: OECD Publications, 2003 p54. 
73 Sealing the repository can be postponed for an extended period to allow for regular monitoring of 
the technical features and corrosion rates of the chosen canisters. 
74 L. Smith, "The Role oft'1e Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in the Cleanup of the US Nuclear Weapons
Complex." Paper presented at the 9th International Conference on Environmental Re mediation and 
Radioactive Waste Management, Oxford, 21-25 September 2003 pl. 
7
' Supra n 70 Pangea Resources Booklet, 1998 p6.
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whfoh would ensure little water movement. This claim was contested by Professor of 
Geology, Dr Robert Pidgeon, who said that "sedimentary basins generally have 
porous rocks that contain groundwater aquifers and unless some very special 
situation is envisaged, such rocks are exactly the type of site that should be avoided 
in the disposal of HL W". 76 He went on to argue that if the locations suggested in the 
print media were correct, then the 11company strategy is flawed in its understanding 
of the geological principles ifl.volved". 77 These claims corresponded with the earlier 
assertions made by fonner �eologist and State Labor MP, Mark Nevill, who said that 
"the rock in the area is protozoic and sedimentary and more penneable than 
granite". 78 This publicised expert disagreement demonstrates the complexity of the 
technical issues, which fed into the public perception that greater risk was involved 
than was being claimed by the proponents. 
Earthquake activity occurs mainly along the boundaries of the Earth's tectonic 
plates.79 One of the objects of the Stage I study was to identify and clearly avoid the 
major tectonicaUy active regions. The Pangea Technical Report 01-01 (PTRl) cites 
the Global Seismic Hazard Map to illustrate the most tectonically risky areas 
throughout the world. 80 Because Australia is centrally located in the middle of one of 
the largest tectonic plates on Earth, it is a low risk area. Australia became the 
preferred choice, and PRA focused on the extensive contiguous sedimentary basins 
extending from central Western Australia into northern South Australia for their 
feasibility study.81 The PTRl provides scant detail by way of explanation for the 
preferred locations but it does acknowledge that intra-plate seismic activity does 
occur and allows that designated areas would need to be evaluated on a region-by­
region basis. 82 This means that somewhere in the sixth stage of the evaluation 
process the candidate site would be subjected to a detailed geological investigation to 
76 R. Pidgeon, "Your Say.'' The Sunday Times, 9 May 1999, p15.
7
7 Ibid. 
78 M. Priest, "MP Dumps on N�Site." The Sunday Times, 28 March 1999 p22.
79 Earthquakes are caused by sudden fault movements, which occur when stress builds up sufficiently
to force one plate down below another. See Quakes, Queensland University Advanced Centre for 
Earthquake Studies, Department of Earth Sciences, The University of Queensland. Earthquake maps 
of Queensland and Australia. Available: http://quakes.earth.uq.au/seis_maps pi.
8 Supra n 33 PTR 2001 p39.
81 Supra n 27 Barnaby, 2000.
82 Supra n 32 PTR 2001 p37.
83 
fully assess the potential for seismic activity. This specific detail went largely 
unnoticed in the media, and the public were certainly not reassured when expert 
disagreement over the volcanic risk factor in the relevant parts of Australia appeared 
in the press. 
In responding to an article in the Australian Financial Review, 83 Professor John 
Veevers took exception to the views expressed by the Chairman of the SRG, Dr Peter 
Cook. The main areas of contention were disagreement over the global nature of the 
disposal problem, the suitability of Australia's geology and the extent of the risks 
involved.84 Professor Veevers, who became perhaps the most outspoken professional 
critic of the proposal, maintained that the waste should be taken care of where it is 
created. To support this, he highlighted the small quantity of radioactive waste 
Australia created; contrasting the 250,000 tonnes ofHLW produced in the Northern 
Hemisphere but destined for the multinational repository with the four tonnes of IL W 
produced at the Lucas Heights reactor in Sydney. In addition, he argued that 
Australia did in fact experience recent significant seismic activity, with earthquakes 
in the Great Victorian Desert reaching a magnitude of 5 to 6 on the Richter Scale in 
the past 100 years. 85 He also drew parallels with the three intra-plate earthquakes in 
the New Madrid area in Missouri, which reached a magnitude of 8 in 1811-12, to 
demonstrate the risk factor associated within intra plate zones. 86 Dr Cook felt 
compelled to clarify his position and reiterated his calls for further detailed research 
and full public consultation before any rational decision could be made. 87 The expert 
disagreement's fed negatively into an already sceptical public and the environmental 
arguments of the repository were diminished further as a result. 
Social Aspects 
The nuclear industry has stated on many occasions that, because of the dangers of 
ionising radiation, it is extremely important to safeguard humans and the 
83 P. Cook, "The Geology of Nuclear Waste." Australian Financial Review, Friday 17 December 1998
&17. [hereinafter, Cook, 1998].J. Veevers, "N-Waste Disposal Isn't Our Problem." The West Australian, Saturday 10 July 1999
016. 
as Ibid. 
86 J. Veevers, "Risking Nuclear Disaster." The Advertiser, Friday9 July 1999 pl9.
87 P. Cook, "Science ls Best Guidi; to N-Waste." The West Australian, Tuesday 27 July 1999 pt 6.
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, �nvironment for generations to come. 88 PRA relied heavily on the technical and 
safety aspects of the proposal to convince a sceptical public that their method of 
"isolation and containment11 would fulfil this long-term environmental objective. 89
While there is little doubt PRA engaged extensive technical expertise, from a 
strategic point of view one must question why more attention was not given to 
addressing the public's perception of risk associated with the relatively unknown 
repository concept. The problem was compounded by the need to provide detail 
without using incomprehensible or vague language. Indeed the accusation of 
speaking above the community in technical jargon has been levelled at the nuclear 
industry, in practically all the nuclear states trying to site a repository.90 PRA 
attempted to resolve this difficulty by establishing a website, organising conferences 
and providing infonnation to interested parties, but it failed to engage the public in a 
broader debate. 
The task was made more difficult because of the premature release of the proposal 
and the resulting antagonistic stance taken by political leaders. The major 
shareholder acknowledged this difficulty and admitted that the Australian anti­
nuclear movement was able to take control of the initial agenda, which put PRA on 
the defensive. BFNL maintained that during the initial media contact 
Pangea was forced to publicly defend itself against emotive and sometimes outrageous 
claims, This meant that it was difficult to conduct a free and open debate on the merits 
of the concept: including the technical and environmental soundness, the non­
proliferation aspects, and economic benefits for Australia.91 
In addition, because the project was primarily a two-year feasibility study, there are 
no official Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) to assess, as these would not have 
been required until much later in the developmental stage. PRA found it difficult to 
counter adverse environmental claims without the capacity to refer to EIS documents 
88 T. Flileler, "Options in Radioactive Waste Management Revisited: A Proposed Framework for
Robust Decision Making." Risk Analysis 21 (2001) p789. 89 Supra n 36 McCombie, et al., 1999.
90 S. Albrecht, "Nuclear Gridlock." Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy 14 (1999) p97.
91 Personal correspondence, Written Response by BNFL to questions by Vincent Cusack, 30 May 
2002. 
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and because of the technicalities involved in explaining the repository design. 92 
Austn1.lians rely heavily on the media for political and current affairs infonnation, 
most of which is obtained from television reports,93 and this does not a11ow for 
detailed in-depth analysis of technical proposals. PRA did make additional 
infonnation available on request, but this effectively meant that the finer details of 
the repository concept were confined to particular groups or individuals with a 
specific interest in the project. 
Another significant problem was that the project did not rea!::h the stage of 
facilitating an independent peer review to objectively access the research undertaken 
by PRA, the SRG or Access Economics. A similar criticism was directed at the DOE 
for their research into the Yucca Mountain repository study,94 and it is somewhat 
surprising that PRA was not better prepared as a result of this experience. 
Consequently, the Australian public was expected to fonn an opinion based on two 
conflicting versions, one of which was highly technical and the other heavily 
influenced by the environmental lobby groups. Moreover, the most detailed 
technical report finalised by PRA was not reviewed by the SRG until late 2000 and 
was not approved for publication until May 2001. This was well after the public had 
made up its mind and after legislation outlawing the repository had been introduced 
into the Western Australian Parliament. 
In addition to the technical arguments, PRA selected Australia for its advanced stable 
democratic system of government, compared to some of the other nations with 
similar geology. A report prepared for PRA, by Dupont and Associates highlighted 
the political stability argument. It stated that Australia 
92 Ibid. 
is almost alone in the world in having the optimal mix of geography, political stability, 
technological sophistication, low population density, climatic conditions and geological 
structure for a waste repository.95 
93 I. Ward, Politics of the Media. Melbourne: Macmillan, 1995 p16.
94 L. Carter, "A Sweeter Deal at Yucca Mountain." Issues in Science and Technology 18 (2002) p46.
95 Supra I' 39 Dupont, 1999p37.
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The chairman of the SRG, Dr Peter Cook, also advanced the political stability 
argument against selecting some of the nations identified in the Pangea world study 
for their geological suitability.96 Surprisingly, in selecting Australia for inter alia its 
political stability, PRA failed to articulate detailed philosophical arguments to assist 
with its desire to achieve public acceptance for the project. During the entire study it 
failed to provide a single report outlining the social benefits for Australia. The 
Advancing Australia's Security lnterests91 report did discuss broad social aspects but 
these were global in nature, somewhat idealistic and far removed from the concerns 
of the Australian general public. The report focused on Australia's global and 
regio!1a! 1security1 interests and put forward arguments such as assisting to reduce the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; strengthening the alliance with the US; 
containing terrorism; supporting the United Nations; and protecting the global 
environment.98 These issues are without doubt important but mostly relate to foreign 
policy and were a difficult "sell" to convince the Australian public to accept an 
international repository. That may have changed somewhat since the events of 11 
September 200 I. 
The main contention after the economic and safety arguments was an appeal for 
Australia to consider the proposal in the interests of 'good global citizenship'. This 
appeal came from such prominent people as former US Administration official, 
Robert Gallucci,99 who stated that 
Australia was in a 'unique' position to help solve one of the world's biggest problems: 
safe storage of nuclear waste and plutonium from bombs dismantled at the end of the 
Cold War. If Australia could appreciate the concept and decide it was in the national 
interest, there would be enormous benefits for the world. 100 
Yet with the proposed repository set to receive only 20 per cent of the world1s HLW, 
the security arguments did not resonate with the Australian public. The 'good global 
citizenship' argument appealed to altruism of the highest order. When combined with 
'16Supran87Cook, 1998pl7. 
�
7 Supra n 39 Dupont, 1999. 
98 Ibid. 
w Gallucci was President Clinton's Special Envoy on Weapons ofMass Destruction, and was 
�assionate about multilateral efforts to find a secure home for nuclear waste.00 R. McGregor, "Clinton Adviser N-Dumps on Us." The Australian, Wednesday 12 August 1998 pl.
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the unproven teclmology, and the reliance on economic assumptions, it was 
extremely difficult for PRA to convince the public that any benefits outweighed the 
perceived risks. The repository concept was a significant undertaking by a private 
company, which attempted to persuade the Australian community of both private 
benefits and the public good security benefit without detailed philosophical 
arguments, and without govenunental backing. 
Without the backing of national or international governments it was perhaps not 
surprising that some of PRA's supporters reverted to the moral 1cradle to grave'
argument. Dr Nahan contended that 11Australia which has an estimated one third of 
the world's uranium reserves, should take some responsibility for the by-products of 
the uranium it exported". 101 The most outspoken Federal politician in favour of the 
proposal, Senator Ross Lightfoot, stated that 11we can't expect to benefit from 
exporting uranium if we are not prepared to deal with the waste created from its 
use11• 102 The cradle to grave argument was repeatedly rejected by the Federal 
Government, who asserted that its "involvement in the uranium mining industry in 
no way obligates Australia to accept wastes resulting from the nuc'Jear power 
industry11• 103 This also equated with the accepted international position that nations 
who benefit from nuclear power are responsible for its generated wastes. Most 
community members also rejected the cradle to grave argument and took the view 
that it was just another means of imposing an international repository on Australia 
complete with unwanted and unnecessary risks. 
Political Response to the Public Opposition in Australia 
Australian community sentiment has ranged from healthy scepticism to outright 
mistrust of institutions and specific professions. Recent studies have shown a low 
standing of politicians among the wider public, with perceptions of their honesty and 
trust consistently rated low.104 It was therefore not surprising that resistance quickly 
emerged in Australia to the plans for a multinational repository, due partly to the 
101 N. Miller, "N-Waste 'as Good as Gold'." The West Australian, Wednesday 9 December 1998 p7. 
102 R. Rose & J, Grove, "Senator Backs N-Waste Plan." The West Australian, Friday 26 March 1999 
r,13, 
03 Commonwealth of Australia. "National Radioactive Waste Repository Site Selection Study, Phase 
3: A Report on Public Comment." Canberra, 1999 pl I. [hereinafter, Phase 3 June 1999]. 
104 M. Goot, "In Politicians We Trust?" Australian Quarterly(1999) p20.
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premature release of the Pangea concept, and partly to the notion of 'clandestine' 
governmental discussions. 105 The controversy was fuelled by the revelation of 
discussions between PRA and senior members of government and by at least the 
initial mixed messages coming from some Liberal Party parliamentarians. People 
from Pangea met with the Deputy Premier of Western Australia (WA), Hendy 
Cowan, on 14 November 1997 in his ministerial office but information of the 
meeting was not disclosed to the public until after the news of PRA's plans broke. 106 
To add to the heightened scepticism, in February 1999 the Western Australian 
Premier's office became embwiled in the controversy, when it was revealed that 
Premier Richard Court's fom1er Chief of Staff, Ian Fletcher, was also present at the 
meeting with PRA in November 1997. 1G, The furore increased when it was
discovered not long after Fletcher's resignation from the Premier's office that PRA 
had approached Fletcher to act as its media adviser. 108 Premier Court later admitted 
that his office received regular updates from PRA following the 1997 meeting, but 
stated that he was never informed of the details. Opposition groups found this 
difficult to believe and claimed that PRA had being developing a relationship with 
key people over a long period of time. Consequently, the proponents of the concept 
were confronted with an aggressive media, eager to expose any meetings between 
PRA and senior members of governmerit. 109 In essence the controversy enabled 
opponents to advance the 'secret agenda' argument, which reduced the capacity for 
any meaningful debate. It also forced many politicians into taking a particular stance 
against the repository project at an early stage. 
The minor parties led by the Greens maintained the pressure in the State and Federal 
Parliaments, with questions relating to the Pangea concept and any other 'secret 
meetings' with politicians. Public pressure increased when the controversy extended 
into the Federal sphere in March 1999, when it was revealed that a Federal Minister 
ios Despite the rejection of the project by almost all politicians.
106 R. Rose, "WA Had N�Dump Talks." The West Australian, Thursday 3 December 1998, p24;
"Legislative Council." Western Australian Parliamentary Debates Wednesday 21 April 1999 p7456.
107 D. Black & H. Phillips, "Issues of the Western Australian Political Chronicles." Australian Journal
o{s Politics and History 45 (1999) p582.1 8 M. Priest, "Court Adviser Linked to Nuke Dump." The Sunday Times, 4 April 1999 ppl & 4.toll Editorial. "N-Waste Debate Is Here to Stay." The West Australian, Monday 30 August 1999 p14.
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had met with PRA. From the outset in rejecting the project, Senator Minchin had 
assured the Federal Parliament that there had been no ministerial level discussions 
with PRA.110 However, Federal Conservation Minister, Wilson Tuckey, caused his
government some embarrassment when he finally admitted that he had met with 
PRA executive Jim Voss in Perth on 5 November 1998.111 The admission came well 
after Resources Minister Minchin had inadvertently misled Parliament by clearly 
stating that no Minister had ever met with PRA. Subsequently, both Ministers were 
forced to apologise to Parliament, but only after Minchin's office had rung all 30 
Ministers to ensure there were no more meetings to report.112 While the incident 
caused the Federal Government some embarrassment, it was arguably far more 
damaging to PRA and the proponents of the repository. Moreover, the credibility of 
PRA was also questioned when it was revealed that Voss himself had previously 
stated that he had not spoken about the project to any government ministers.113 The 
reporting of another 'secret• ministerial meeting with PRA merely increased the 
perception of mistrust and reinforced the public fears of an extensive plan to 
construct a multinational repository in the Australia outback. 
The initial lack of transparency was used by the anti-nuclear lobby to fuel the 
perception that 'secret plans' were in place to use Australia for the world's first HL W 
1dump• .114 Working in conjunction with the Greens, they maintained a protracted 
grassroots campaign across Australia during the Pangea concept debate, to sustain 
pressure and influence public perceptions of risk. In Western Australia, where the 
controversy began, a number of environmental groups joined forces to streamline 
activities and maximise their impact. The groups came under the banner of the Anti 
Nuclear Alliance of Western Australia (ANAWA) and were coordinated by Robin 
Chapple, who at the time was research officer for the Greens Western Australia 
member of State Parliament, Giz Watson MLC.115 ANA WA and associated groups 
110 "Australian Senate." Federal Parliamentary Debates, Tuesday I December 1998 p952. 
111 R. Rose, "Tuckey in Gaffe on Nuclear Dump." The West Australian, Thursday 25 March 1999 p8.
112 Ibid. The apology was for misleading Parliament, albeit inadvertently. 
m "We lied, says nuclear waste firm". The Advertiser, Wednesday 31 March 1999 p5.IH Again this was the term widely used throughout the debate by both the anti-nuclear lobby and the
media. 
m Watson and Chapple played a major role in exposing Pangea's actividcs. Chapple has since become 
an MLC for the large Mining and Pastoral Region in Western Australiafollowing the 10 February 2001 
State Election, See http://www.mp.wa.gov.au/rchapple/ 
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provided a website and disseminated information, organised seminars, compiled 
newsletters and videos, and held rallies and local meetings in both urban and rural 
areas to canvass opposition to the repository. ANA WA was rewarded for its 
extensive public and media campaign when it achieved around 50,000 public 
signatures to a petition opposing the Pangea project. 116 In addition, the broader 
public also voiced their opposition to the concept through talk back radio, editorial 
letters and correspondence to their parliamentarians by way of various other 
petitions.117 This was one of largest public responses to a single issue in WA, which 
highlighted the level of concern with the long-term risks associated with geological 
repositories. 
The public pressure was something the politicians could not ignore and was 
transferred directly into a political outcome. Initially, the Court Coalition 
Government appeared reluctant to introduce legislation prohibiting a radioactive 
waste repository in Western Australia, but following the protracted public debate it 
did have a motion opposing the project passed in Parliament on 7 September 1999. 
The motion as moved in the Legislative Assembly by the Minister for the 
Environment, Cheryl Edwardes, stated: 
That this House notes -
(i) the Premier's statement that foreign nuclear waste should not be stored in Western
Australia; 
(ii) that the Premier's stand reflects the broader public opposition throughout Westem
Australia to any such proposal; 
(iii) the comments by the Director and Operations Manager of Pangea Resources
Australia Pty Ltd, Mr Marcis Kurzeme, in The West Australian newspaper of24 August 
1999, to the effect that Pangea will abandon its idea to locate an international nuclear 
waste repository in Western Australia if the proposal meets with continued public 
opposition; and 
(iv) expresses its total opposition to any proposal from any person or company to situate
an international nuclear waste repository in Western Australia on the grounds that such 
u6 The signatures were presented in the Legislative Council of the Western Australian Parliament by
Giz Watson MLC, see the ANW A web-site http://www.anawa.org.au/action/petition.html 
117 This was reflected directly by the Government and Opposition members who also presented around 
1100 public signatures to parliament opposing the Pangea repository. 
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a repository poses a significant threat to Western Australia's environment and public 
safety. 118 
While the motion was welcomed as a progressive step, it was still viewed as 
�nadequate, and the public demand for legislative backing remained. To alleviate the 
mounting pressure the Government finally agreed to support the opposition's 
prohibitive legislation, which had been introduced into Parliament on Wednesday 11 
August 1999.119 Indeed before the legislation passed through Parliament the
Government strengthened the Bill through a series of amendments, the most notable 
being that any change to the Act would require the approval of both Houses of 
Parliarnent. 120
Nuclear Waste Storage (Prohibition) Act 1999 
The purpose of the Nuclear Waste Storage (Prohibition) Act 19fQ121 (NWSA) was to 
send the strongest possible message to PRA by enshrining the widespread 
community resistance to the multinational repository in state law. In the second 
reading speech, the Opposition leader Dr. Geoff Gallop stated: 
The Bill is intended to prohibit the construction and operation of a Pangea·style nuclear 
waste storage facility in West em Australia. The objective of the legislation is to protect 
the health, welfare and safety of Western Australians and the environment in which we 
live by prohibiting a waste facility for any radioa ctive material derived from the 
operations of a nuclear reactor, nuclear weapons facility, nuclear reprocessing plant or 
isotope enrichment plant. It implicitly recognises that any potential economic benefits 
must be balanced against the social and environmental implications. In so doing, it also 
recognises that there are more ways for Western Australia to progress and develop than 
as the world's nuclear waste dump. 122 
The bipartisan-supported NWSA 1999, which was assented to on 7 December 1999, 
prohibited the construction or operation of a nuclear waste storage facility for all 
llS "Legislative Assembly." Western Australian Parliamentary Debates, Tuesday 7 September 1999 
�644. 19 "Legislative Assembly." Western Australian Parliamentary Debates, Wednesday 11 August 1999 
r6s. 
20 "Legislative Assembly" Western Australian Parliamentary Debates, Wednesday 13 October 1999 01972. 
121 No 54, 1999. 
122 Supra n 8 "Legislative Assembly." Western Australia11 Parliamentary Debat�, Wednesday 8 September 1999 p887, 
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radioactive waste except for low-level waste generated in Australia. 123 The Act
provides a penalty of $500 000 124 to anyone, including directors of a corporation,125
for a violation of the law. The Act also prohibits any public money, including from 
any statutory authority, to be spent on any activity associated with the development, 
construction or operation of a nuclear waste storage facility in the State.126 The Act
sent the strongest possible message from the Government of Western Australia to 
PRA that its proposal was not acceptable. Yet while the legislation was viewed as a 
win for opponents of the Pangea concept, it was apparent to some at least that a 
future Federal Government could override the State Law. Moreover, the Greens 
Western Australia have since reintroduced the legislation in an effort to clarify the 
definition of nuclear waste. 127 The main point of contention is Section 3 (b ), which 
could be used by the Radiological Council, through the Federal Government, to 
argue that the plutonium in spent fuel has a future 'beneficial use'. 
The successful passage of the NWSA in the Western Australia Parliament presented 
more than a problem for PRA, and the debate subsequently shifted to South 
Australia, where however, public opposition was equally strong. Throughout 1999, 
various opinion polls indicated a finn resistance to nuclear waste repositories, 
starting with a Channel Seven survey in July, which showed that 93 per cent of South 
Australians were opposed to hosting a national radioactive waste repository in their 
State. In late September 1999, Greenpeace commissioned a poll that clearly showed 
broad public concern about the management of nuclear waste in Australia. The 
polling, undertaken by Insight Research Australia, involved telephone interviews 
with over 1000 people throughout the country. 128 In response, a massive 85 per cent 
indicated a strong desire for the Federal Government to enact legislation to ban the 
import of foreign wastes into Australia. 129 When questioned about disposing of
123 Supra 121 Section (7). 
124 Ibid. 
125 Section (8). 
126 Section (9). 
127 D. Clery, "Greens Still FearWestem Australia Waste Dump." The West Australian, Saturday 26 
January 2002 p51. 
128 R. Rose, "Poll Backs Nuclear Dwnp Ban." The West Australian, Wednesday 27 October 1999 pl2.
119See Green, (1999) Survey reveals strong anti-nuclear sentiment Available:
www.geocities.com.ljimgreen3/opposition.hbnl. Question one was: "Do you think the federal 
government should pass legislation to ban the import of foreign nuclear waste into Australia?" 
Yes:85%, No:9%, Other:9%. 
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Australia's domestic waste in South Australia, 55 per cent of the total number 
surveyed opposed the idea.130 Notably, 86 per cent of South Australians answered 
that question in the negative. The survey also revealed a preference for renewable 
energy131 and opposition to a new reactor at Lucas Heights in NSW. 132 Despite
including a prelude to question four, which critics could argue was somewhat 
leading, opposition to the Lucas Heights reactor was strong in all of the six states. 
The polling results show a consistent pattern of anxiety with all things nuclear and a 
strong opposition to radioactive waste repositories in Australia at that time. 
Social Amplification of Risk in Australia 
As the events unfolded in Australia1 it became apparent that the circumstances were 
conducive to the 'social amplification of risk', and thus unfavourable to PRA. This 
was largely due to the heightened community suspicion driven by the initial 
allegations of secrecy surrounding the concept, followed by the protracted media 
exposure. The public perception of risk was amplified further when the Pangea 
project was linked with Australia's national repository debate. 133 While perceptions
of secrecy and mistrust commenced in Western Australia, 'social amplification of 
risk' was more evident during the South Australian debate. The daily South Australia 
newspaper, The Advertiser, was perhaps the main amplification station, and was later 
joined in that role by Channel Seven television in Adelaide. Both adopted an 
aggressive anti-nuclear stance. The primacy of the nuclear waste issue was 
highlighted in November 1999, when The Advertiser for two consecutive days 
selected the nuclear-waste issue for its hard-hitting front-page headline. The most 
sensational front-page appeared on Friday 19 November, with a headline saying 
"COMING TO A DUMP NEAR YOU1•134 It was accompanied by a large illustration 
of a 'danger' radiation symbol, widely recognised throughout the world and 
130 Ibid Question two was: "Do you support the federal government's proposal to send all of
Australia's nuclear waste to South Australia for disposal?" Yes:23%, No:55%, Other:23%. 
131 Ibid Question three was: "Do you think the federal government should spend as much on 
alternative renewable technologies as it does on nuclear technology?" Yes:83%, No:8%, Other:9%. 
132 Ibid Question four was: "The government admits t here is no disposal method for higher level 
nuclear waste. Do you think Australia should build a new reactor which will produce more of this 
waste?" Yes:15%, No:75%, Other:10%. 
133 H. Manning, "Issues of the South Australian Political Chronicles." Australian Journal of Politics 
and History 41 (2001) p285. [hereinafter, Manning, 2001]. 
134 P. Coorey & B. Huppatz, "Coming to a Dump near You." The Advertiser, Friday 19 November 
1999 pl. 
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frequently used at anti-nuclear demonstrations. The main story was backed up with a 
full report on page four, complete with a provocative photograph of Australian rock 
singer and environmentalist, Peter Garrett. 135 
This type of imagery was designed to feed the perceptions of ac already susceptible 
public. The environmentalist movement had been alarnted for some time that South 
Australia would end up with all of the nation1s nuclear waste, following the decision 
in 1998 to locate the national low-level radioactive waste repository in the Billa 
Kalina region. 136 The region covers 67,000 square kilometres of northern South
Australia and includes the towns of Andamooka, Roxby Downs, and Woomera. The 
public anxiety in SA commenced in 1997, when the Commonwealth/State 
Consultative Committee (CSCC) advanced the co-location option for Australia's 
radioactive waste in a single site. The CSCC's main recommendation was included in 
the Phase Three Site Selection Study: 
The Commonwealth/State Consultative Committee on the Management of Radioactive 
Waste supports the need for a national store for long-lived intermediate level radioactive 
waste, and in 1997, endorsed consideration of co-locating such a facility with a national 
near-surface repository. 137 
The co-location option was included in numerous public documents and supported at 
various times by the relevant Commonwealth and State ministers. Notably: 
Commonwealth, States and Territories agree that the co-location of a repository and an 
above growid storage facility at a single national site would provide a comprehensive 
strategy for Australia's small inventory ofwaste. 138 
In November 1999 The Advertiser reported that South Australia would be the most 
likely "dumping ground" for Australia's medium to high-level radioactive waste, 
including the returned waste from the overseas processing of the Lucas Heights 
spent-fuel rods. 139 To support this assertion, the newspaper cited an ANSTO 
135 P. Coorey & J. Wakelin, "More Will Follow, Warns Garrett." The Advertiser, Friday 19 November
199 p4. 
136 W. Parer, "SA Region Selected for National Radioactive Waste Repository." Media Release DPIE
98/267P, 1998. Available http://www.industry.gov .au/media/parer/98 _276p.html 
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newsletter dated 4 March 1999, which revealed the expectation that the returned 
waste would be "accommodated alongside the national waste depository11 • 140 
Environmental groups also drew attention to the evidence provided by the Chief 
Executive of ANSTO, Professo r  Helen Garnett, at the Senate Joint Committee on 
Public Works in May 1999. 141 During an interrogation by Labor :MF and vice 
chairperson, Mrs Janice Crosio, Professor Garnett not only reinforced the preferred 
co-location option, 142 but also admitted that the reprocessed waste was indeed 
destined for South Australia. Speaking of the management of the reprocessed waste, 
the exchange went as follows: 
Prof, Garnett: It will come back in an appropriately qualified storage container, and all 
of that is included in the cost. They are qualified for 50 years. 
Mrs Crosio: I do not care about the cost now. Where are you going to store that for 50 
years? 
Prof. Garnett: That �<,cs 1,; the storage facility which we have talked about earlier to be 
co-located .... 
Mrs Croslo: In South Australia? So we classify that as low level intermediate waste? 
Prof. Garnett: No that is the repository. That is what goes in the ground. 
Mrs Crosio: So consent is also for fuel rods as well? 
Prof Garnett: No, it is not fuel rods. It is no different in composition to the hundreds 
and hundreds of cubic metres of long lived intennediate level waste that already exists 
in Australia from Defence activities and other activities. The clean up of the St Mary's 
site resulted in a very large volume of long lived intermediate level waste going to 
storage. 
Mrs Crosio: For the record, when our reprocessed fuel rods come back they will be
deposited eventually in South Australia? 
Prof, Garnett: Yes. 143 
In view of this evidence, The Advertiser on Friday 19 November 1999 gave Peter 
Garrett, President of the Australian Conservation Foundation, greater prominence. 144
140 Ibid. The newspaper also referred to a draft environmental impact assessment prepared by ANS TO 
which again verified the preference for co-location. 
141 Conunonwealth of AustraliP. .  Official Committee Hansard: Joint Committee on Public Works. 
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It published his calls for the Parliament to enact legislation to prevent South 
Australia from becoming an international radioactive waste 'dump'. Garrett cited the 
example ofPRA to warn of the dangers of accepting the medium-level waste, which 
he claimed, if allowed to happen would result in higher category level waste dumps 
for South Australia. 145 The problem, which the Federal Government found extremely 
difficult to overcome, was that the environmentalist groups were able to link the low­
level site in South Australia to the nation's intennediate-level waste, under the co­
location option. This in turn was transferred into claims that such a repository, once 
approved, could easily be upgraded to facilitate the importation of HLW and a 
connection was made directly to the PRA project. 146 Subsequently, South Australians 
were extremely concerned that their State would end up with the long-term burden 
and responsibility for low, intennediate and perhaps even high-level international 
radioactive waste. On Saturday 20 November 1999, The Advertiser again placed the 
nuclear waste issue on its front page, this time with a heading "NOT IN OUR 
BACKYARD". 147 
Responding to the mounting political pressure, Coalition Premier John Olsen flatly 
rejected any moves for a medium or high-level waste repository for SA and claimed 
no knowledge of the increased likelihood that South Australia was d«: .itined to host a 
repository for the returned ILW. He also wrote to the Fedeml Re·:ources Minister, 
Nick Minchin, demanding consultation on the issue. 148 Minchin had been heavily 
criticised by environmental NGO's and the media for failing to adequately consult 
the public during the low-level waste site selection process. In support of its main 
report, The Advertiser ran an editorial berating the Federal Minister for his lack of 
openness on the nuclear waste 'dump' issue. It stated: 
When will politicians in the nuclear waste case exemplified by Federal Resources 
Minister and SA Senator Nick Minchin realise that without putting all the known facts 
before the public they inevitably arouse resentment and opposition? i.9 
145 Ibid. 
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Minchin denied any failure to consult with the community and issued a press release 
highlighting the withdrawal of two potential sites from the low-level site selection 
list following community consultation. 150 However, his assertions that a selection 
process for the 'medium1 level repository had not yet commenced was tempered by 
his refusal to rule out co-location of a medium and low-level waste repository. 151
Hence anxiety among South Australians remained. 
Mistrust of politicians was maintained and reinforced by continued reports in The
Advertiser and backed up with regular strong editorials. Public scepticism of nuclear 
related issues was already high in South Australia, as a result of the British atomic 
testing at Maralinga between 1953 and 1963. 152 British efforts to clean up the 
Maralinga site were feeble, and all three attempts were unsuccessful. 153 The pollutant 
of concern was plutoniwn, mainly isotope 239. 154 In 1985, a Royal Commission in
Australia estimated the cost of cleaning up the Maralinga test site at around $600 
million. In 1991 Australia lodged a claim for Britain to share in the costs of 
rehabilitating the site. 155 The prolonged dispute over liability and associated costs 
kept the issue in the pul:.i • ..: domain and at the same time increased the public 
perception of risk with all nuclear activities, and particularly in South Australia. 
Criticism was also directed towards the Australian Federal Governn 1nt for not 
conducting a proper clea.11 up of th� affected areas at Maralinga. Moreover, 
opponents of the PRA project, including green groups, the State Labor Opposition, 
and the media, rerutarly reminded the public of Maralinga during the PRA 156 and 
national repository debates.157 Senator Minchin accused the opponents of 
150 N. Minchin, 1\vo Radioactive Repository Sites Withdrawn Following Community Consultation.
Media Release 99/379, 18 November, 1999. 151 N. Minchin, Discussion Paper Released on Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste Store. Media
Release 01/329, 16 July, 2001. 152 Much of the literature in Australia tends to give the impression that Australia w as pressurised into
allowing the atomic testing. This was not the case, as it appears that Australia was a willing 
participant and those tests were part of Australia's overall nuclear ambitions. See W. Reynolds, 
Australia's Bid for the Ato111ic Bomb. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2000.
153 MART AC. Rehabilitation of Former Nuclear Test Sites at Emu and Marali11ga (Australia): Report 
bv the Maralinga Rehabilitation Technical Advisory Committee. 2002 pxli.
1�4 Ibid. 
155 I. Anderson, "Britain's Dirty Deeds at Maralinga." New Scientist 138 (1993) p12.
156 M. Hogarth. "Nuclear Powerhouse." Sydney Morning Hearald, 16 March 1999.U? T. Plane, "Maralinga Doubts help Premier Jay N-Dump to Waste." The Australian, 17 March 2003.
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exaggerating the prob[ems at Maralinga to generate more fear over the proposed 
national repository. 
The other issue which compounded the problem for the national repository selection 
process, and for PRA, is that the Federal Government continues to label Australian 
waste arising from reprocessed spent-fuel rods as "intermediate level Category S". 158 
In so doing, Australia is among the few nations in the world that does not apply the 
widely adopted classification ofHLW to reprocessed nuclear waste. This disparity in 
nuclear waste cl�sification amplified the mistrust of Australian government agencies 
and lent credence to the anti-nuclear lobby's assertions that a national radioactive 
waste 'dump' in South Australia was merely a stepping-stone to the international 
repository for HLW. In defence of its classification system, the Australian Federal 
Government and its agencies have argued that they have used the modified 
international IAEA criteria published in the Safety Series No. 111-G-1.1 in 1994.159
ANSTO, for example, has argued on many occasions that the returned processed 
waste will be below the specified heat range of2kW/m3 for HLW contained in the 
1994 publication. The Safety Series does classify HLW as "thennal power above 
about 2kW/m3 and long lived radionuclide concentrations exceeding limitations for 
short lived waste," but the document it is only a guide, is not conclusive and it has 
not been widely endorsed. 
Moreover, it seems somewhat disingenuous for the Australian Federal Agencies to 
single out only the quantitative heat specifications to support their labelling of long­
lived intermediate level waste {LLIW). The IAEA guide also considers other 
parameters for distinguishing boundaries, "such as the type of radionuclide, the 
decay period and the conditioning techniques". 160 It also recommends geological 
158 The Australian classification of radioactive waste was developed by the National Health and 
Medical Research Council. Category S is defined as long-lived intermediate level waste and includes 
returned reprocessed spent fuel waste from overseas back to Australia. See 
www.dest.gov,au/radwaste/:australia/categories.htm 
159 IAEA. Safety Series: Classification of Radioactive Waste, a Safety Guide. Vienna: International 
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disposal for the "long lived radionuclide concentrations exceeding limitations for 
short lived wastes". It specifically states: 
The suggested boundary levels for high level waste need not be distinct because of the 
general consensus that a high degree of isolation is necessary for management of 
radioactive wastes having very high concentrations of short and long lived 
radionuclides. 161 
In other words, the IAEA's internationally preferred method for the long-term 
management of both LLIW and HLW is to s<;cure the waste in a deep geological 
repository. During the Senate Committee inquiry into a new reactor at Lucas 
Heights, a number of NGO's and the Sutherland Shire Council accused the Federal 
Government of manipulating the classification categories to avoid using the more 
contentious HL W label. Whatever the reason, instead of alleviating anxiety, the 
dis crepancy surrounding the waste categories has served to increase the public 
perception of mistrust in the management of radioactive waste. Furthermore, it raises 
the pertinent question as to why the responsible Australian agencies do not adopt the 
entire IAEA safety guide and include a geological repository for its LLIW which it 
terms Category S. 
Critics also raised the possibility that Aus tralia might be tempted to seriously 
consider the Pangea project in order to minimise the economic costs associated with 
a fature repository for the higher category level waste. Environmentalists pointed to 
the earlier released Phase Two, Site Selection Study, which made specific reference 
to long-lived intermediate level radioactive waste Category S, to highlight their 
concerns. 162 The report stated: 
As mentioned in the project study group's Report on Public Comment Phase 1, the small 
quantity of Category S waste in existence does not justify the construction of a deep 
disposal facility at present. Deep underground co-disposal of radioactive waste of low 
radiotoxicity and Category S radioactive waste would be expensive unless an existing 
facility and infrastructure, such as an abandoned mine site, could be used. 163 
161 Jbidp17. 
162 Commonwealth of Australia. National Radioactive Waste Repository Si'te Selection Study Phase 2: 
A Report on Public Comment. 1995.
163 Jbidp13. 
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The situation was made more difficult for the Federal Minister, at a significant time 
in the debate, by the direct involvement of the television media during July and 
August 2000. The Adelaide branch of Channel Seven also acted as a major 
amplification station for risk and fear of nuclear waste, when it organised funded and 
drove the entire I'm with Ivy campaign. 164 The television network approached an 80-
year old pensioner, Ivy Skowronski, who had earlier gained public notoriety for her 
efforts in seeking tougher laws for home invasion crimes.165 Commencing in July, 
momentum was maintained over a four-week period by the regular appearance of 
high profile celebrities on the Today Tonight166 progranune, all of whom supported 
the populist Ivy crusade. The campaign culminated with a public rally organised by 
Channel Seven, which attracted around 1500 vot'al protesters. 167 At the rally Ms 
Skowronski claimed that 125,000 people had signed the petition opposing a 
radioactive waste 'dump' in South Australia. On the steps of Parliament House and 
struggling to be heard above the noise, Senator Minchin criticised the media for 
generating unnecessary public fear and repeated his calls for a national storage 
facility for low- level waste. Channel Seven also came under criticism by the ABC's 
Media Watch for 11running a scare campaign" and for its lack of objectivity in not 
reporting all the facts. 168 
While the I'm with Ivy campaign was primarily directed at the national low-level 
waste repository, the television network allowed the public to make the connection 
that a national repository was merely a stepping-stone for PRA. This power of the 
media to influence the repository debate was highlighted when Minchin was forced 
to issue yet another media release to clarify government policy. He repeated the 
Australian Government's position of rejecting nuclear waste from other nations and 
164 P. Barry, Media Watch: ABC Television 11 September, 2000. Transcript Available:
www ,abc.net.au/mediawatch/transcripts/s 1 75489 .htm [hereinafter, Barry 2000]. 
165 H. Morgan. "Police Step in at Noisy Rally by 1500 Opposed to Nuclear Waste Dump: Protesters
Try to Attack Minchin." The Advertiser, 17 August 2000 pl 1. 
166 At! age groups were covered, with the rock band "Killing Heidi" catering for the youth, "We're 
Killing Heidi and we're with Ivy" Today Tonight, (Channel Seven: Adelaide, 15 August 2000). The 
folk singer, John Williamson, Ibid(14 July 2000). Joy and Slim Dusty, Country Music; Radio 
Presenter and Newspaper Columnist Phillip Adams; as well as rock singer and environmentalist Peter 
Garrett were all "with Ivy" (3 July 2000) Ibid. 
167 Supra n 165 Morgan, 2000 pl 1. 
168 Supra n 164 Barry, 2000. 
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went on to criticise the fear campaign. He said: 
I have serious concerns that the I'm with fry campaign has led people to believe that it 
could be possible that international high level waste would somehow be acceptable in 
Australia, despite the I•ederal Gm·:imment's repeated public and private rejection of any 
proposal to accept international waste. Such a campaign is deliberately designed to 
promote fear and confusion about radioactive waste in the wider community. 169 
Arguably, the media in this instance intensified the public perception of risk and 
played a direct role in generating mistrust of the responsible agencies for managing 
radioactive waste in Australia. 
Senator Minchin's attempts to regain credibility by shifting the blame to the media 
suffered a significant blow at the end of 2000. 170 On 26 December 2000, The
Advertiser informed the public that the previous Commonwealth Labor Government, 
led by Paul Keating, had secretly moved 130 barrels of low to intennediate level 
waste to Woomera, in South Australia, for storage in 1994. 171 At the same time, the
public also learned that the Commonwealth Government would grant licences to both 
the Defence Department and CSIRO for the continual storage of the low and 
intennediate level waste 11t Woomera. To add to the public mistrust surrounding the 
secrecy, half of the waste was found to be of a higher category than originally 
thought and was subsequently reclassified as intennediate level. 1 n The Advertiser
maintained its fervour with a forceful editorial, which condemned both Labor and 
Liberal governments for their "dissimulating" behaviour on the issue of radioactive 
waste. 173 In trying to make the point that the "little known presence of intennediate 
level waste" had not harmed the state's image, Minchin heightened mistrust that a 
precedent could now be set for the acceptance of the higher level waste arising from 
spent fuel rods. 174 Whatever the reasons for their actions, the credibility of 
governments and their agencies were significantly eroded by acts of secrecy and or 
169 Minchin, N. "No Weakening of Government's Stand Against Accepting Other Countries 
Radioactive Waste." Media Release 00/352, 1999. 
170 See Supra n 133 Manning, 2001 p285. 171 Coorey, P. "Radioactive Waste to Stay at Woomera." The Advertiser, Tuesday 26 December 2002
p9. 172 lbidp9. 
173 Editorial. "Dismay Leads to Nuclear Dump Distrust." The Advertiser, Tuesday 26 December 2000 
pl6. 
174 /bidp16. 
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by the upward reclassification of radioactive waste. Consequently, the increased 
anxiety and mistrust of authority made it virtually impossible for progress to be made 
in any site selection process for radioactive waste in Australia. 
The Nuclear Waste Storage Facility (Prohibition) Act 2000 
The debate in South Australia, while sharing some similarities with that in Western 
Australia, was much more intense, and at times degenerated into heated exchanges 
between State and Federal government ministers. Initially the Olsen Coalition 
Government was reluctant to enact prohibitive waste legislation and rhose not to 
support either of the nuclear waste bills introduced by the Democrats 175 or the 
ALP 176 opposition. Olsen claimed that there were deficiencies in both bills, but did 
not initiate amendments to strengthen the proposed legislation. When it finally 
responded to the unrelenting public pressure by introducing its Nuclear Waste 
Prohibition Bill, the Olsen Government placed itself in direct opposition to their 
Federal Coalition colleagues, and particularly to fellow South Australian, Senator 
Nick Minchin. 177 Undeterred by public sentiment, Minchin accused Oi.3en of being 
misguided by responding to the anti-nuclear scaremongering, and he went on to say 
that he could override state laws. In reply, Olsen stated his preparedness to mount a 
High Court challenge to test the capacity of the Federal government to override the 
state legislation. m In reality such a constitutional challenge would have little chance 
of success, because under section 109 of the Federal Constitution when there is an 
inconsistency between State and Federal law the latter prevails. 
Notwithstanding the robust legal position, to achieve public approval and thus 
political consensus for a radioactive waste site in South Australia remains difficult. 
The Labor Opposition and the minor parties insisted on the inclusion of a referendum 
provision in the South Australian legislation. The amendment was designed to trigger 
a referendum if the Commonwealth moved to override the State law to establish a 
mediwn or high level nuclear dump in South Australia. It was described as the 
175 Introduced by Sandra Kanck on the 17 November 1999. 
176 Introduced by the Labor opposition on 13 April 2000, 
177 p. Coorey, "Minchin Again Tells South Australia It Cannot Override Canberra: We will put the
Nuclear Dump where we like." The Advertiser, 7 June 2000. 
in V. Marshall, "Issues of the South Australian Political Chronicles." Australian Journal of Politics
and History 46 (2001) p590. 
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ultimate nuclear deterrent and would have obvious political ramifications for any 
Federal govenunent prepared to select South Australia for the national repository. 
Not surprisingly the Olsen Government's opposition to the referendum provision was 
described as weak, and opponents made claims that he was acting more to protect his 
Federal colleagues than in the best interests of South Australia. The rest of the Bill, 
however, did enjoy bipartisan support. Following the passing of the Bill in the 
Legislative Assembly, the Olsen Government came under intense criticism for 
postponing the debate on its own legislation, because it did not have the numbers to 
defeat the referendum trigger amendment in the Legislative Council. 179 The mix up 
over pairs at the end of the parliamentary session was a major embarrassment for 
Olsen, and meant that debate on the legislation was postponed until the resumption 
of Parliament in October 2000. 
When the Bill finally passed through Parliament it did not include any mechanism 
for a referendum. The South Australian legislation was very similar to the Western 
Australian Nuclear Waste Storage (Prohibitition) Act 1999. 180 It included the
$500,000 fine for a breach, but it also contained a $500m penalty for a corporate 
breach. The Nuclear Waste Storage Facility (Prohibition) Act 2000 181 only permits 
low-level waste to be stored in South Australia. It prohibits the importation or 
transportation of all other nuclear waste into the State, as well as regulating against 
the construction or operation of a nuclear waste storage facility. It prohibits public 
money being spent on encouraging medium or HLW waste storage facilities, which 
effectively prevents any government agency from even conducting feasibility 
studies. 182 The intent of the legislation was not only to send a strong message to 
PRA that it was not welcome, but also to signal to the Federal Government that any 
radioactive waste other than low-level would have to be stored elsewhere in 
Australia. 
179 G. Kelton, "Dump Decision on Hold Missing MP's Mean Legislation Is Put Back." The Advertiser,
15 July 2000 p12. The newspaper reported that two government MLC's had been issued pairs for other 
votes and had left the building. 
180 Supra 121. 
181 No 68, 2000. 
IS2 Supra n 142 Holland, 2002 p287. 
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When the Rann Labor Government was elected in South Australia, in March 2002, it 
did not have the numbers in the Legislative Council to get its referendum trigger 
legislation passed and had to abandon its plans. Adopting a different approach, the 
State Government prepared legislation to declare the area around the Woomera site a 
public park, in a bid to block the Federal plan for the national LL W repository.183
The Federal Government responded by moving to acquire the land by using the 
'urgency' provisions of the Lands Acquisition Act 1989. The Federal Government 
claimed it was acting in the national interest by compulsorily acquiring site 40a to 
locate the LL W reponitory. The State of SA instituted legal proceedings under the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977, and argued that the 
compulsory acquisition of the land was unlawful. In the State of South Australia v 
Honourable Peter Slipper MP, the full bench of the Federal Court upheld the appeal 
that the Federal Government had misused its powers by acquiring the site to prevent 
the State Government declaring it a public park.184 It ruled that the Federal 
Government did not satisfy the 'urgent necessity' provisions of the Lands Acquisition 
Act to acquire the land and the acquisition was therefore invalid. Subsequently, the 
Federal Government abandoned its efforts to locate a LLW repository in SA, and has 
since left the responsibility for LLW to each of the individual states. 185
Conclusion 
The Pangea multinational repository project was somewhat ambitiou::; and premature, 
in the sense that no other country has yet achieved an operating HLW repository. 
Despite the economic benefits, the Australian public was not ready to accept the 
unproven technology or the associated risks for such a long time into the future. PRA 
failed to gain control of the debate following the initial controversy surrounding the 
'secret agenda' allegations. PRA must also take responsibility for failing to provide 
detailed convincing philosophical or social arguments to counter the f)Ublic's 
perception of risk. The presence of PRA in Australia significantly intensified anxiety 
among environmental NGO's and the broader community, which directly 
complicated the national search for a low and intennediate-level waste repository 
183 R. Di Girolamo, "Parkland Ploy for Dump Site." The Australian, Tuesday 3 June 2003 p7,
184 State of South Australia v Honourable Peter Slipper MP, FCAFC [2004], 164.
18
5 D. Shanahan & R. Di Girolamo, "PM Caves in over N-Dump: Political Backlash Kills National
Waste Site in South Australia." The Australian, Wednesday 14 July 2004. 
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site. In tum the additional scrutiny and controversy surrounding the national site 
selection process, combined with the contention over the classification of wastes in 
Australia, fed back negatively into PRA's attempts to secure a multinational 
repository in Australia. 
The Australian media played an important role in alerting the public to the issues, but 
on occasions also acted as an amplification station to intensify the public perception 
of risks pertaining to nuclear waste. Its readiness to expose the 'secret plan' to import 
'foreign' HLW commenced in Western Australia, but was surpassed by what can only 
be described as a media frenzy in South Australia. The daily newspaper in South 
Australia, The Advertiser, was an active participant and at times adopted an 
aggressive stance. It was Channel Seven television in Adelaide, however, that 
overstepped its role for direct commercial gain. In organising, funding and then 
fuelling tht:: I'm with Ivy campaign, it lost all objectivity, when moving from 
reporting and infonning the public to actively inciting oppositiot1 to repository sites. 
In effect the media's active involvement, particularly in South Australia <luring the 
'twin repository debates,' frustrated both PRA attempts to secure a multinational 
HLW repository and the Australian Government's efforts to locate a national LLW 
site. 
In addition, the heightened perception of risk was exacerbated by a mistrust of 
authority, which stemmed directly from the dissimulative actions of various 
governments and associated agencies involved in radioactive waste management in 
Australia. Arguably, the main challenge facing ,my future attempts to secure a 
national, multinational or regional repository will be the necessity to achieve public 
confidence in the geological contairunent concept to offset the public perception of 
risk associated with all things nuclear. The next chapter explores the repository 
concept through the lens of global public goods theory, with an emphasis on the issue 
of risk perception. It seeks to broaden the security arguments for geological 
repositories and explores the set of circumstances most likely to engender 
governmental support. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
MUL TINA TI ON AL REPOSITORIES: AN ACIDEV ABLE 
PUBLIC GOOD OR A RISKY PROPOSITION? 
The long-term management of HL W and its associated risks present a significant 
policy challenge for nation states to resolve. There are essentially two policy options. 
The first is that each nation state is responsible for the management of all radioactive 
waste wi,\in its territorial borders. 1 The second is a multinational solution involving 
interstate relations on either a regional or a broader international level. 2 The second 
option, most suited to the smaller nuclear states, would involve tbree3 or more 
nations using a shared repository for HL W in a voluntary host state. 4 The 
collaborative option is similar to Pangea Resources Australia's (PRA) 'voluntary host 
concept', in that a multinational repository requires a voluntary host state. The PRA 
project raised many political, legal and moral questions in Australia. It was from the 
outset a com ercial venture, with the primary aim of securing a profit, while 
providing a 'desirable service•,5 but it failed on a number of fronts to achieve public 
acceptance. 
In terms of providing a global public good there were two main failings with the 
PRA proposal. Firstly, it was destined to receive only 20 per cent of the world's 
HLW, which is too small a percentage to enhance overall global security. Secondly, 
all responsibility for the repository would have reverted to Australia following 
closure after forty years.6 Thus it was hardly surprising that the arguments for a 
single multinational repository, as a means of improving global security, did little to 
I This was th..: pr1:;i.tic,n taken by the Australian Government in its response to the Pangea Project. See
N. Minchin, "Questions without Notice: Nuclear Waste Storage." Australian Parliamentary Debates,
Senate, 18 October 1999, p9813.
2 M. EIBaradei, "Towards a Safer World." The Economist (US) (2003) p48.
3 A third possibility could result in two countries collaborating under a bilateral arrangement but that
would provide only direct benefits for the two involved and it is not discussed here. 
4 C. McCombie & N. Chapman, "SAPIERR Proposal for a Pilot Study on European Regional
Repositories." AR/US Newsletter 4 (May 2003) p2. 
� Access Economics. "The Economic Impact of the Nuclear Waste Repository Project." Canberra: 
Draft Report, prepared for Pangea Resources by Access Economics, 1998. 
6 lbidpp1�2 & 8. 
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convince the Australian public or its political leaders of the merits of such an 
ambitious proposal. In particular, the appeal for Australia to become a 'good global 
citizen' by accepting other countries' HL W failed to resonate with the community.7
As a result of the recent heightened danger of global terrorism, there is now greater 
public awareness of the potential for catastrophic radioactive fallout from a strike 
involving nuclear materials. 8 Nuclear experts and state leaders acknowledge the risk 
associated with surface storage of HL W in numerous locations around the world. 
Thus there is an opportunity to engage the global community in a rational debate 
about safeguarding each nation's HL W in order to enhance global security and 
increase environmental protection. 
The previous chapter detailed some of the reasons why the Pangea multinational 
repository project failed in Australia. This chapter applies public goods theory to the 
multinational repository concept to evaluate its strengths and to identify the likely set 
of circumstances required to bring such a proposal to fruition. There are two separate 
scenarios in which a multinational repository would provide a public good. In the 
first, a group of states agree to collaborate to construct and operate a single 
repository. Under that arrangement the states involved would originate from the 
same geographical area, and would pool resources to maximise the benefits. Suitable 
geology to safely isolate the waste,9 and economies of scale to reduce costs, appear 
to be the biggest incentives for regional collaboration and are likely to be most 
beneficial to the smaller nuclear states. There would also be regional security 
benefits obtained from safeguarding each country's HL W in a single repository 
within the region. This would therefore count as a 'regional public good1. 
The second scenario involves a more comprehensive solution for safeguarding the 
totality of the world's HLW. If the global security benefits are added to the 
7 R. McGregor, "Dumper Sells What No One's Buying." The Australian, 12 December 1998, plO.
8 The Future Foundation. "Public Attitudes to the Future Management of Radioactive Waste in the
UK." Report for United Kingdom Nirex Limited, February 2002 plO. [hereinafter, The Future 
Foundation, 2002}. 
9 I. Miller, J. Black, C. McCombie, D. Pentz & P. Zuidema, "High-Isolation Sites for Radioactive
Waste Disposal: A Fresh Look at the Challenge of Locating Safe Sites for Radioactive Repositories." 
Paper presented at the Waste Management '99 Conference, Tucson, 3 March 1999 p2. 
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geological and economies of scale arguments, then it follows that ideally the entire 
global inventory of HL W should be safeguarded from theft or diversion and from 
terrorist attacks. A single HLW repository with limited capacity (such as in the first 
scenario) would only marginally reduce the potential for global surface terrorist 
strikes. It would not greatly restrict the likelihood of rogue states obtaining and 
utilising weapons grade materia1 10 from spent fuel to manufacture atomic weapons. If 
the second more comprehensive scenario were to be pursued, the best option for 
reducing risks and enhancing world safety and security is to move the HLW to a 
limited number of strategic locations. 11 This truly global solution, while more 
difficult to achieve, would maximise the security benefits for a larger number of 
nation states. It would involve the construction of at least three, possibly four, 
regional repositories, which could form a 'global network of multinational 
repositories'. 
Although desirable in terms of security, aiming for the more comprehensive solution 
first may be counter productive. The involvement of a larger number of states makes 
consensus more difficult to achieve. State leaders in Europe could quickly 
complement existing efforts by the Association for Regional and International 
Underground Storage (ARIUS)12 and Support Action for a Pilot Initiative for 
European Regional Repositories (SAPIERR). 13 These two organisations have pooled 
resources to undertake a feasibility study for a multinational repository in Europe. 14 
State support would provide a stimulus to the ongoing research, and direct state 
involvement would likely accelerate the process and maximise the chance of success. 
An operating regional repository, providing environmental, economic, and safety and 
security benefits, would serve as an example, and could form the model for regional 
repositories in other parts of the world. 
In addition to seeking to uncover incentives for states to cooperate, this chapter 
argues the case for monitored retrievable underground repositories (MRUR) as a 
10 P. Webster, "Minatom: Thr Grab for Trash." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 58 (2002) pp37 & 66.
niereinafter, Webster, 2002]. 
I Ibid. 
12 See http://www.arius.world.org 
13 See http://www.sapierr.net 
14 The organisations are discussed in more detail below. 
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means of reducing public perceptions of risk. The reason for recommending 
underground repositories is to remove the potential for an aircraft attack, while a 
comprehensive ongoing monitoring system would assist in gaining the necessary 
public confidence in the safety features of geological repositories, and leave open the 
option for future technological advancement. The MRUR is a variation of Kristin 
Shrader-Frechette's recom.-nendation for monitored retrievable surface storage, 15
which was advanced well before the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The 
retrievable option should alleviate anxiety with the out-of-sight out-of-mind closed 
repository approach, and should also increase the likelihood of achieving overall 
public acceptance. The MRUR concept would apply to either the regional repository 
or to  the more 'inclusive network' of global repositories. 
Global Public Goods 
The concept of public goods is not new, having gained recognition in the 181h century 
by Adam Smith. In his treatise The Wealth of Nations, Smith, while maintaining the 
desire for minimal govenunent intervention in the market, advanced the importance 
of good roads, canals and navigable rivers to facilitate economic growth. 16 He and 
other social theorists acknowledged the concept of the government collecting taxes in 
exchange for the provision of protection or defence. A secure environment enabled 
traders, merchants, labourers and consumers to effectively conduct business in an 
orderly, peaceful fashion. 17 Smith made a clear distinction between private goods 
more efficiently provided by the market, and certain goods best left to the provision 
of government for the benefit of all. 
In 1954, Paul Samuelson's rather technical article 'The Pure Theory of Public 
Expenditure' advanced the debate on public goods. Samuelson, although not using 
the specific tenns, introduced 'non-excludability' and 'non-rivalry' as the central 
characteristics that distinguish a private good from a pure public good. He defined 
public goods as: 
15 K. Shrader-Frechette, Burying Uncertainty: Risk and the Case against Geological Disposal of
Nuclear Waste. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993 p213. [hereinafter, Shrader­
Frechette, 1993].16 A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations. Hannondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1982 p251. First published
in 1776. 
17 Jbidp497. 
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Collective consumption goods which all enjoy in common in the sense that each 
individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other 
individual's consumption of that good.18 
This non-rivalry component implies that any one person's consumption of the public 
good has no effect on the amount of it available for others. A traffic control light is a 
prime example: a pedestrian crossing a street with the assistance of a traffic signal in 
no way inhibits another pedestrian from also using it. 19 Samuelson contrasted the 
optimal competitive market pricing arrangements for private goods with the sub­
optimal arrangements available for the cost of providing collective consumption 
goods. 20 In other words, once a public good is produced and paid for, it is non­
excludable, which means that it is either impossible or extremely costly to exclude 
those who do not pay for the good from using it. Again, the traffic control signal is 
non-excludable because once it is produced and properly installed its benefits accrue 
to all.21 It would be completely impractical to attempt to prevent people who did not 
pay for it from using it. 
Two issues linked to the theory of public goods that need to be managed effectively 
are free riding and externalities. Free riding is directly associated with the non­
excludable characteristic of public goods and refers to a lack of incentive for 
consumers to meet the cost of supplying the good.22 If a public good is to be funded 
by taxation, there is the obvious tendency for individuals either to vote for tax 
reductions or to attempt to pay less tax, without limiting their expectation to benefit 
from the collective good. Thus a free rider problem unresolved usually results in the 
under-provision of the public good. "Externalities arise when an individual or a finn 
takes an action but does not bear all the costs (negative externality) or all the benefits 
18 P. Samuelson, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure." The Review of Economics and Statistics
36 (1954) p387. [hereinafter, Samuelson, 1954}. 
19 S. Lydenberg, "Trost Building and Trust Busting: Corporations, Government and Responsibilities."
Journal of Corporate Citizenship 11 (2003) p25. [hereinafter, Lydenberg, 2003}. 
10 Supra n 18 Samuelson, 1954 p388. 
11 Supra n 19 Lydenberg, 2003 p25. 
21 F. Sagasti & K. Bezanson, "Financing and Providing Global Public Goods: Expectations and
Prospects." Prepared for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden: Institute of Development Studies 
Sussex, 2001 plS. [hereinafter, Sagasti & Bezanson, 2001}. 
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(positive externality) of the action".23 Positive externalities and free riding are 
essentially the same, since the benefits accrue to persons who did not contribute to 
the costs. Negative externalities are such things as air, water, and noise pollution, the 
unwanted by-products of particular industrial or conununity activities. In the nuclear 
energy industry goverrunent and management have gone to great lengths to minimise 
negative externalities. Nuclear accidents such as the Windscale fire in the UK in 
1957, the meltdown of the Three Mile Island reactor in the US in 1979, and the 
Chernobyl disaster in the Ukraine in 1986, are examples of undesirable by-products 
of the nuclear industry. 
Few goods are purely public or purely private. Most goods involve a mix of public 
and private benefits and costs, requiring perhaps some fonn of combined funding 
arrangements to produce the good or to remedy negative externalities.24 Pure public 
goods are rare; examples include clean air, unpolluted waters, public sanitation, 
financial stability, and public peace and security. Some goods that the market is 
unable to provide include various kinds of infrastructure, health services, and disease 
prevention control, and (something which the market itself depends on) law and 
order. 
While Samuelson's article (the main argument of which was in algebra), failed to 
resonate within government or throughout the wider community, only a few years 
later John Kenneth Galbraith's The Affluent Society did.25 Galbraith cautioned against 
over-reliance on the free market, which could have the detrimental effect of 
producing 'private wealth amidst public squalor'. He was in effect warning against 
the dangers of under-supplying public goods. His famous example of the 
undesirability of driving expensive cars down badly paved, uncleaned, unpoliced 
public streets struck a chord, and demonstrated the need for more collective funding 
for roads and the provision of other public goods.26
23 I. Kaul, I. Grunberg & M Stem. "Defining Global Public Goods," in Global Public Goods: 
International Cooperation in the 2lst Century, edited by I. Kaul. I. Grunberg & M. Stern. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999 p5. {hereinafter, Kaul, Grunberg & Stern, 1999]. 
2.4 H. Stretton & L. Orchard, Public Goods, Public Enterprise, Public Choice: Theoretical 
Foundations of the Contemporary Attack on Government. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994 p72. 
25 J. Galbraith, The Affluent Society, Fourth ed. London: Andre Deutsch, 1985. First published in
1958. 
26 lbidpl92. 
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Despite the terminology, it would be incorrect to assume th ... t the provision and 
funding of public goods is solely the responsibility of government. The goods are 
deemed 'public' because of the nature of the benefits and/or costs, not because of who 
produced or funded them.27 The magnitude and complexity of some public goods 
makes it impossible to rely exclusively on government funding for their provision. 
There has therefore sometimes been a reliance on financial contributions from 
private sources, including profit and non-profit organisations and individuals.28 
Assistance or direct provision of public goods by non-profit organisations is not new. 
Various individual and community groups have actively participated in that regard, 
with volunteer fire fighting being a well-known example. For certain public goods, 
costs are borne directly by the users or beneficiaries, a method Ferroni refers to as 
11internalising externalities". 29 That method of funding goods or services is similar to 
the user pays system, but in the case of a public good the benefits usually extend 
beyond those that paid to provide it. Recently the private sector has become more 
involved in the provision of public goods, usually by way of combined funding 
arrangements. Public-private partnerships are now commonplace around the world 
in providing public goods such as energy, water, health and education. 30
Modernity and globalisation have produced many benefits around the world but have 
simultaneously brought about substantial risks that can only be resolved through 
collective global action.3 1 The use of nuclear fission for generating electricity has 
benefited many people by powering industry, helping to create more jobs, 
contributing to economic growth and providing modem domestic comforts. But the 
risk of radioactive dispersal from reactors and nuclear waste is a by-products of the 
technology that has to be carefully managed. Ulrich Beck defines this phenomenon 
of risk as a "systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and 
27 M. Carbone, "Global Public Goods: A New Frontier in Development Policy?" The Courier ACP­
EU (March-April 2002) p38. 
28 Supra n 22 Sagasti & Bezanson, 2001 p13. 
29 M. Ferroni, "Regional Public Goods: The Comparative Edge ofRegional Development Banks."
Paper presented at the Financing for Development: Regional Challenges and the Key Role of Regional 
Development Banks, Washington, 19 February 2002 p13. [hereinafter, Ferroni 2002]. 
30 D. Rondinelli, "Partnering for Development: Government-Private Sector Cooperation in Service
Provision." Paper presented at the Fourth Global Forum on Reinventing Government- Citizens, 
Businesses, and Governments: Partnerships for Development and Democracy, Marrakech, Morocco, 
11-13 December 2002.
31 U. Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage Publications, 1992 p21.
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introduced by modernisation itself'.32 Many public goods can be obtained by
removing uncertainty and eliminating or reducing risks that are harmful to society at 
large. It follows that an elimination or reduction of certain risks such as radioactive 
fallout is a public good. If the benefits were available beyond national borders it 
would be considered a regional or global public good only.33 
The concept of public goods has only recently been applied to the global arena, in 
response to rising policy challenges stemming from globalisation. In 1986 
Kindleberger34 made an early contribution to the debate, and a decade later Sandler35
also observed that there was an undersupply of public goods at the international 
level. Some of the issues Sandler highlighted as requiring collective global responses 
are global warming, ozone depletion and nuclear waste containment.36 Sandler has
since written extensively on the issue of global and regional public goods and has 
recently added transnational terrorism to the list requiring collective action. 37 The 
debate on the need for collective action to resolve transnational issues was advanced 
with the publication of Global Public Goods in 1999, which p rovided policy analysts 
with a new tool to confront the shortcomings of globalisation. 38 The editors, Kaul,
Grunberg and Stem, with the backing of the United Nations Development 
Programme, advocated a broad conceptual framework of examining global policy 
challenges through the lens of a global public good. The authors maintained the 
existing non-rivalry and non-exclusionary definition of public goods, and provided 
an analysis of the externality and free rider problems.39 Global public goods arise
when the benefits, or costs in the case of a public bad, spill across national borders 
and can be captured or resolved only by the collective action of states. 
31 lhid. 
33 O. Morrissey, D. teVelde & A. Hewitt, "Defining International Public Goods: Conceptual Issues."
In lntemattonal Public Goods: Incentives Measurement and Financing, edited by A. Mody, & M. 
Ferroni. Boston: Kluwer Academic, in Conjunction with the World BanJc, 2002 p40. [hereinafter, 
Morrissey et al., 2002]. 
34 C. Kindleberger, "International Public Goods without !ntemational Government." The American
Economic Review 16 (1986) p2. 
35 T. Sandler, Global Challenges: An Approach to Environmental, Political, and Economic Problems.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
36 lhidp2l. 
37 T. Sandler, "Collective Action and Transnational Terrorism" The World Economy 26 (2003): 779-
802. 
38 Supra n 23 Kaul, Grunberg & Stem, 1999. 
39 lbidp3. 
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In their introductory chapter, Kaul, Grunberg and Stem defined global public goods 
as: 
Outcomes (or intermediate products) that tend towards universality in the sense that 
they benefit all countries, population groups and generations. At a minimum, a global 
public good would meet the following criteria: its benefits extend to more than one 
group of coW1tries and do not discriminate against any population group or any set of 
generations, present or future.40 
Applying the above definition of global public goods to multinational HL W 
repositories shows that the "benefits must extend to mxe than one group of countries 
and must not discriminate against any population group or any set of generations, 
present or future11•41 
Regional Public Goods 
International public goods fall into two categories, global or regional, the latter being 
defined by a more limited geographical reach of the benefits supplied. The benefits 
of pure regional public goods are 'non-excludable' (no country in the region can be 
excluded from benefiting) and 'non-rival' ( one country's consumption does not 
subtract from the amount available to other countries in the region).42 In reality, very 
few regional public goods are strictly confined to a specific geographical region; 
most are mixed, providing a combination of national and transnational benefits. 
Similarly, regional public bads such as pollution extend across national borders, to 
impact on neighbouring or adjacent nation-states. The extent of the spillover benefits 
or harms determines whether the public good is deemed regional or global. An 
industrial accident dispersing pollutants across a number of national borders in a 
specific geographical area would be a regional public bad. A coordinated regional 
health programme to contain or eradicate contagious disease provides a regional 
public good. 43 The benefits from disease prevention in a region will have some 
degree of spillover effects in the global sphere by protecting the broader human 
population as well as avoiding potentially costly remedies. 
40 Ibidp16. 
41 Supra n 23 Kaul, Grunberg & Stem, 1999 pl6. 
42 Supra n 29 Ferroni 2002 p3. 
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Identifying the factors likely to promote collective action to provide regional or 
global public goods can be problematic. Sandler illustrates some factors that promote 
collective action at the transnational level. These include: 
the removal of wicertainty, a high share of nation-specific benefits, a limited number of 
essential participants and the presence of an influential leader state.44 
The rationale for regional or global public goods is that collectively the benefits to 
participating states are greater than they would be if the states acted alone. States 
were compelled into collective action to reduce ozone-depleting substances under the 
1987 Montreal Protocol.45 The same level of commitment or cooperation is yet to be 
achieved to mitigate global warming under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol.46 Some of the 
large industrial states, such as the US, argue that the cost of reducing greenhouse 
gases is much higher to them than the benefits from doing so. That position may 
change sometime in the future, but essentially the benefits of putting measures in 
place to reduce greenhouse gases must be seen by each state to outweigh the 
associated costs. 
Similarly, the problem for proponents of multinational repositories is that the costs 
may be perceived to be much greater than the benefits. The costs are not necessarily 
financial, and in many instances there are direct monetary advantages to be gained 
from utilising a shared repository. Support for the multinational repository has been 
slow, with some reluctance to even discuss the option among many states struggling 
to implement national repositories. The main concern, most evident at the European 
Nuclear Society's 1999 Topseal conference,47 was that any dialogue regarding taking 
someone else's HL W could run the risk of undennining the step by step, transparent, 
'bottom up' approach necessary for public confidence building at the national level.48 
Sweden, Finland and France are opposed to the 1shared1 concept and have enacted
43 Supra n 33 Morrissey et al., 2002 p36. 
44 T. Sandler, "Global and Regional Public Goods: A Prognosis for Collective Action. 11 Fiscal Studies
19 (1998) p221. 
4s Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol) 1987, 26 ILM 154. 
46 Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto Protocol) 1997, 
37 ILM22.47 This was an International Topical Meeting on Radioactive Waste Management held in Antwerp, 
Belgium between 10-14 October 1999. 
45 S. Rippon, "Don't Even Talk About Multilateral Approaches." Nuclear News 42 (1999) p35.
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specific legislation prohibiting the import of nuclear waste.49 The UK, Gennany, 
Australia and Argentina are also opposed to the concept, while the US, Japan, Spain, 
Canada and South Africa remain neutral on the i ssue, and appear to be keeping the 
option open,50 Indeed proponents of the multinational repository are keen to 
emphasise what they call a 'dual track' approach. They highlight the fact that research 
into the shared option does not impact on or inhibit a national solution and they argue 
the benefits of keeping both options open. 
The public and many leaders still perceive the greatest costs to be the risks from the 
relatively poorly understood and as yet empirically unverifiable features of 
geological repositories. 51 An examination of the literatwe also reveals a large
confidence gap between the nuclear experts and the public, on the environmental and 
safety benefits of geological repositor ies. 52 Each nuclear state has experienced 
varying degrees of community opposition to repository siting. The likelihood of 
implementing HLW repositories largely depends on achieving greater public trust, 
understanding and support.53 The necessary public confidence will be achieved only 
if the environmental, safety and security benefits are clearly articulated, and if such 
logical arguments can overcome the initial and in many cases prolonged scepticism. 
It is evident that the proponents of the HLW repository concept have failed, thus far, 
to convince the public that the benefits of geological disposal are greater and more 
desirable than the risks of surface storage. One reason is that much of the debate 
occurs only between technical experts at conferences and through academic journals. 
Even when the environmental safety benefits are highlighted in a public forum,54 the 
popular press often neglects to adequately report them. Instead, as demonstrated in 
4 9  W. Dietze, "Overview on Legal Issues Involved in  the Internationa l Disposal of High-Level
Radioactive Waste- With Special Consideration to the Regional Disposal in the European Union." 
Paper presented at the SAPIERR Working Group Meeting, Piestany, Slovak, 19-20 February 2004 p3. 
so C. McCombie, "Overview ClfDevelopment of Regional/Multinational Concepts." Paper presented at
the SAPIERR Working Group Meeting, Piestany, Slovakia, 19-20 February 2004. 
si Supra n IS Shrader-Frechette, 1993.
sz See R. Dunlap, M. Kraft & E. Rosa, Public Reactions to Nuclear Waste: Citizens Views of
Repository Siling. Durham: Duke University Press, 1993. 
SJ S. Bjurstrom, "Nuclear Waste Can Be Managed: An Informed Public Is the Best Partner." Industry
Week245 (1996) pl7. 
s.4 C. McCombie, D. Pentz, M. Kurzeme & I. Miller, "Deep Geological Repositories: A Safe and
Secure Solution to Disposal of Nuclear Wastes." Paper presented at the GeoEng 2000- International 
Geotechnical Engineering Conference, Melbourne, November 2000 p2. 
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the Pangea case, the media often pick up on key phrases or uses emotive words like 
nuclear waste 'dump' that significantly help shape public perception of risks.55 
Yet leaving the HL W at interim surface storage facilities in numerous locations 
around the globe poses a security risk. There are widely differing views on what is 
meant by human security, ranging from aspirations for the elimination of poverty to 
substantial improvements in human rights, to the prevention of ecological disasters 
and transboundary pollution. 56 Here we are concerned only with the need to 
safeguard the world's HL W in order to protect humans from any environmental 
impacts, from the threat of weapons proliferation, or from what may be the more 
immediate threat of terrorism. Under certain circumstances multinational repositories 
have the potential to provide environmental, economic and security benefits at a 
regional or global level. The elimination or reduction of risks associated with the 
existing and widespread surface storage of HL W would enhance the global public 
good of human security. Reducing the number of global surface sites, and shifting 
the waste to centralised facilities would diminish the risk of theft or diversion of 
weapons useable material,57 while isolating the HL W in underground repositories 
would provide enhanced security from more specific risks such as terrorist attacks. 
Terrorism and the Nuclear Security Threat 
As stated already, peace and security are pure public goods, and once achieved 
within a region, all people living there freely enjoy its benefits. Historically, nationM 
states have often actively cooperated on a range of security issues in order to achieve 
and maintain peace and stability for all. Because of proliferation concerns, 
international efforts to ensure the peaceful use of atomic energy have remained a 
high priority in international relations since the commencement of the atomic age. 
After World War Two, attempts were made to regulate against nuclear weapons 
5s R. McGregor, "Black Stump Nuke Dump." The Australian, Wednesday 2 December 1998 p5; B. 
Hurrell, "A 'Great Place' for Nuclear Waste: State Promoted as Dump Site." The Advertiser, 
Wednesday 2 December 1998 p3; M. Priest, "Court Adviser Linked to Nuke Dump." The Sunday 
Times, 4 April 1999, pl & 4; P. Coorey & B. Huppatz, "Coming to a Dump Near You." The 
Advertiser, Friday 19 November 1999 ppl & 4. 
s6 G. King & C. Murray, "Rethinking Human Security." Political Science Quarterly 116 (2001/02) 
r,ss. 
7 L. Carter & T. Pigford, "Confronting the Paradox in Plutonium Policies." Issues in Science a11d
Technology 16 {1999) p32. 
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proliferation, while at the same time, nuclear technology for the peaceful production 
of civil energy creation was pennitted.58 In 1968, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT)59 was signed, and although not perfect it was a bargain between the 
nuclear weapons and non-weapons states. The non-weapons states agreed not to 
pursue a weapons programme in exchange for nuclear materials and technology for 
energy creation. Around 187 nation-states have signed the NPT, and while it has 
been largely successful in containing the spread of nuclear weapons, it is now 
evident that much more needs to be done to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and 
to safeguard weapons grade material in an ever-changing world. 
The attacks of 11 September 2001 on New York and Washington sent shock waves 
across America and other western nation states. 60 Those terrorist strikes evaporated 
the West's sense of security based on its economic stability and military power.61 The 
main threats against states and world security in contemporary times are organised 
crime networks, nationalist and religious extremisms, and global terrorism. 62 The 
latter appears to present the greatest challenge, and it thrives amidst ,:ollapsed or 
failed states and political and economic malaise. hnmediately after the attacks of 
September 2001, the US responded with a promise to track down the perpetrators, 
and they embarked on a concerted effort against global terrorism. The chief suspects 
were Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda network, and the US commenced bombing 
Afghanistan on 7 October 2001, in an effort to capture bin Laden and destroy his 
strongholds. Despite executing a swift war, the US was unable to seize bin Laden, or 
to demonstrate the effectiveness of the war on terror. A subsequent bombing in Bali, 
on 12 October 2002, killed 202 people and illustrated the ongoing danger from acts 
of terror in many parts of the world. 
58 J, Chace, "After Hiroshima: Sharing the Atom Bomb." Foreign Affairs 75 (1996) pl30.
59 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1 July 1968, in force 5 March 1970, 729 
UNTS 161. 
60 J, Camilleri, "Globalization of Insecurity: The Democrative Imperative." International Journal on
World Peace 18 (2001) p4. 
61 C. Newland, "Fanatical Terrorism Versus Disciplines of Constitutional Democracy." Public
Administration Review 61 (2001) p643. 
62 M. Kaldor, "Perspectives on Global Governance: Why the Security Framework Matters." Paris:
United Kingdom, London School of Economics, 2003 p3. 
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Far from eliminating global terrorism, since the 'war on terror' began there has been a 
suicide bombing on a hotel near Mombasa in November 2002, triple bombings in 
Riyadh in May 2003,63 and car bombings at the Marriott Hotel Jakarta on 5 August 
2003, and in Istanbul on 15 November 2003. There has also been the notorious train 
bombing in Madrid on 11 March 2004 that killed 191 people, and another car 
bombing outside the Australian embassy in Jakarta on 9 September 2004.64 All of 
these resulted in the tragic loss of life, and the attacks were claimed by terrorists with 
links to al Qaeda. The reason for mentioning these horrific acts here is to illustrate 
the complexity of the problem and to demonstrate the new level of terror threat. 
There are diverging views on how best to contain terrorism, with some advancing the 
argument that significant gains have been made65 while others argue that the war on 
terror may have inadvertently increased the further risk of terrorism. 66 There can 
however be no doubt of the continuous risk and the need for all nuclear states to 
update their nuclear policies from those designed during the Cold War to what is 
required to meet the new level of security threat. 
In 2001, the British Security Services listed the main terrorist threats in the UK as a 
possible nuclear attack and a biological or chemical attack on the London 
Underground. In response to the new level of threat in the US, Congress allocated a 
record sum of $1.5 billion in the budget of 2002 to be spent on terrorism related 
research.67 Following a full reassessment of a range of goverrunent, public, and 
industrial practices, leaders in many states became acutely aware of the need to better 
safeguard existing nuclear materials. In October 200 I at a European meeting of 
MEP's in Strasbourg, time was set aside to debate safety at nuclear sites. In 
November 2001, the head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei has said that: 
The ruthlessness of the September 11 attacks bas alerted the world to the potential of 
nuclear terrorism making it far more likely that terrorists could target nuclear facilities, 
nuclear material and radioactive sources worldwide. The willingness of terrorists to 
63 F. Gardner, "Is US Winning Its War on Terror." BBC /Jews 9 September 2002.
64 S. Powell & P. Walters, "Terror at Our Door: 11 Indonesians Die in Embassy Attack." The
Australian, 10 September 2004 pl. 
6s M. Adams, "More Wins Than Losses: War on Terror." Time 159 (2002) p26.
66 S. Makinda, "Global Governance and Terrorism." Global Change, Peace and Security 15 (2003)
p44. 
61 D. Malakoff, "Spending Triples on Terrorism R & D." Science 295 (11 January 2002) p254,
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sacrifice their lives to achieve their e vil aims creates a new dimension in the fight 
against terrorism. We are not just dealing with the possibility of governme n ts diverting 
nu clear materials into clandestine weapons programs. Now we have been alerted to the 
potential of terrorists targeting nuclear facilities o r  using radioactive sources to incite 
panic, contaminate property, and even cause injury or death among civilian
populations. 68 
There is now a renewed focus on the risk of nuclear terrorism among some leaders 
and within academia and various organisations. Charles Ferguson and William Potter 
of the Centre for Nonproliferation Studies, in Monterey, illustrate four main threats 
from nuclear terrorism. These are: 
1. The theft and denotation of an in tact nuclear weapon
2. The theft or purchase of fissile material leading to the fabrication and detonation of
a crude nuclear weapon- an improvised nuclear device (IND)
3. Attacks against and sabotage of nuclear faciliti es, in particular nuclear power
plants, causing the release oflarge amounts of radioactivity
4. The unauthorized acquisition of radioactive materials contributing to the fabrication
and deto nation of a radiological dispersion device (RDD) - a "dirty bomb" or -
radiation emission device (RED).69 
The first two involve nuclear explosions that would cause great panic and could 
potentially result in many fatalities. The first two therefore present the greatest 
anxiety to those responsible for maintaiP.ing security. Ferguson and Potter maintain 
that the US and other nuclear states "must work immediately to remove the 
probability of nuclear terror acts with the highest consequences and mitigate the 
consequences of the nuclear terror acts that are the most probable".70 The authors
argue the case for securing, consolidating and eventually eliminating all the world's 
highly enriched uranium, as well as the need to maximise security around all global 
plutonium stocks. Their solution is ambitious and challenging and would most 
certainly require the active involvement of the leading nuclear states. 
68 IAEA. "Calculating the New Global Nuclea r Terrorism Threat." International Atomic Energency 
Agency Press Release, 1 November 2001. 
69 C. Ferguson & W. Potter, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism. Monterey, California: Monterey
Institute oflntemationa l Studies, 2004 p3. 
70 Ibid p325. 
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Graham Allison, from the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at 
Harvard University, is highly critical of current nuclear policy and the inadequate 
response by government to the heightened level ofthreat.71 He asserts that a nuclear 
terrorist attack is inevitable if the US and the other states maintain their current 
course. He further argues, however, that such an ultimate catastrophe is preventable. 
His solution requires all nuclear weapons and the materials that they can be made 
from to be secured to a new 11gold standard".72 This would need to be backed up by a 
global clean-out of all fissile material that cannot be 'locked down' to the 'gold 
standard'. The global endeavour of locking down all fissile material would require a 
strong commitment and drive from the most influential nuclear states to achieve that 
particular global public good. Allison acknowledges the risks from attacks on nuclear 
facilities and on what he describes as the 1softer target' of spent fuel ponds.73 A 
concentrated effort to safeguard all nuclear materials, including spent fuel and HL W, 
is also required to enhance global and regional security. Multinational repositories 
may well become part of the overall policies required to maximise public security. 
Post September 11, all nuclear states undertook a major revaluation of security for a 
range of nuclear installations. Evidence from the US illustrates the existing 
precarious situation and the fact that much needs to be done to improve nuclear 
security. Only hours after the attacks, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) quickly moved to reassure officials and the public that the containment 
structures of nuclear reactors were designed to withstand the impact of a fully loaded 
jumbo jet. Just over a week later, the agency had to retract its earlier overly 
optimistic statement, and admit that the structures were only designed to withstand 
the force from much smaller aircraft.74 A large aircraft attack that penetrated the 
walled structures of a reactor could cause the core to go critical, similar to what 
occurred following the Chernobyl accident in 1986. A reactor could also be attacked 
by an act of sabotage involving conventional explosives, but this would most likely 
require insider assistance. A damaging attack on the cooling system, resulting in a 
71 G. Allison, Nuclear Te"orism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe. New York: Henry Holt,
2004. 
72 Ibidpl43. 
73 lbidp55. 
74 D. Hirsch, "The NRC: What Me Worry?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists January/February (2002)
p39. [hereinafter, Hirsch, 2002]. 
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loss of water, could cause the core to overheat and possibly result in meltdown, 
releasing large quantities of radioactive material into the atmosphere. 75
Following the heightened level of terror threat, the NRC did call for a review of 
security measures at nuclear facilities. Although the details are considered sensitive, 
it is believed that the main areas l!nder review concern the most highly radioactive 
material and includes nuclear reactor sites. 76 The owners and operators of the nuclear
power plants and the Nuclear Energy Institute, the industry's primary trade 
association, argue that the reactors are the most secure commercial facilities in the 
US. Yet critics, such as Paul Leventhal of the Nuclear Control Institute, reject such 
optimistic assertions and refers to a "culture of denial 11 that has penneated the nuclear 
industry for many. decades.77 Others have expressed alarm at the apparent 
unwillingness of the NRC to upgrade its 25 year old "design basis threat11 to match 
the terrorist threat to nuclear installations. A regular critic of US homeland security, 
Democrat Congressman Edward Markey, released a report in March 2002 outlining a 
number of security gaps at nuclear reactor sites.78 The report analysed around 100
pages of NRC correspondence, in response to several letters of inquiry by Markey. 
Among the main areas of criticism are that the NRC does not know how many 
foreign nationals are employed at nuclear reactors, and that it does not require 
adequate background checks that would detennine past terrorist links.79 Of the 21 
nuclear reactors located within five miles of an airport in the US, only four per cent 
of them were designed with some regard for light aircraft impact. Despite these 
obvious weaknesses, the NRC has rejected the need to install anti-aircraft capabilities 
at reactor sites. so
7s F. Barnaby, "Nuclear Terrorism: The Risks and Realities in Britain." Oxford: Oxford Research 
Group, February 2003 p3. [hereinafter, Barnaby, 2003]. 
76 C. Ferguson & I. Lubenau, "Securing US Radioactive Sources." Issues in Science and Technology
20 (2003) p68. 
77 L. Haase, "Securing US Nuclear Power Plants and Radioactive Materials against Terrorism." The 
Century Foundation Homeland Security Project: Issue in Brie/(2002) p4. 
78 E. Markey, "Security Gap: A Hard Look at the Soft Spots in Our Civilian Nuclear Reactor
Security." 1-13. Massachusetts: Staff Summary of Responses by the Nuclear Regulatory Conunission 
to Correspondence from Rep. Edward Markey, 2002. 
79 lbidp4. 
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In a critical report in 2003 the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI) described the Bush 
Administration's efforts on homeland security as swprisingly lax and inadequate.81 
By using a letter grading system with the highest score A equal to four points, the US 
Administration only received an overall average of D for a host of potentially 
vulnerable security related areas. Yet, significantly, the nuclear industry and 
particularly the NRC attained the highest grade A for the security of nuclear power 
plants.82 While commendable for providing some additional on-site security, the 
NRC places a heavy reliance on probability statistics, and is not required to conduct 
aircraft impact evaluations prior to licensing nuclear reactors. Thus although a heavy 
aircraft attack on a nuclear reactor may be classified in statistical terms as a low 
probability risk, the consequences from such an incident occurring could be 
devastating and should no longer be dismissed as purely theoretical or improbable. 
The security of other nuclear materials did not rate as high, with the PPI advocating 
the need for far greater attention to secure the large number of licensed sources of 
radioactive materials in the US. This concern stems from the over 250 reports of lost 
or stolen nuclear materials in the US each year, although the majority of these 
materials are recovered. 83
While much of the initial focus in the aftennath of 11 September 2001 surrounded 
the security of nuclear reactors, the vulnerability of spent fuel in cooling ponds may 
well be a much greater concern. 84 When the majority of today's reactors were 
designed and built in the 1960s and early 1970s, it was envisaged that the spent fuel 
would be reprocessed and the uranium and plutonium extracted and recycled. The 
spent fuel ponds were designed to hold only around 200 tons of fuel for a 1,000-
megawatt reactor, which would require 20 to 27 tons being removed from the core 
each year and placed in the cooling ponds. 85 The ponds were never expected to reach 
81 Progressive Policy Institute. "America at Risk: A Homeland Security Report Card." Washington: 
Progressive Foundation, 2003 pS. 
82 /bidplS. 
83 United States General Accounting Office. "Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. and International 
Assistance Efforts to Control Sealed Radioactive Sourc·�s Need Strengthening." 1-104, Washington: 
Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget, and 
International Security, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, 2003 p3. 
84 M. Wald, "Officials Fear Reactors Are Vulnerable to Attacks by Terrorists." The New York Times, 4
November 2001, p8. ss L. Carter, & T. Pigford, "The World's Growing inventory of Civil Spent Fuel." Arms Control Today
29 (1999) p9. 
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anywhere near capacity because the cooled fuel rods were intended to be sent for 
reprocessing. The option of recycling spent fuel rods is limited because reprocessing 
occurs mainly in the UK, France and the Soviet Union, with the US and others opting 
for direct disposal after a period of storage. And because of delays in implementing 
pennanent storage or geological disposal sites, the nuclear industry has been forced 
into higher-density spent fuel storage, in ponds designed to hold much less. 
The main danger to highly stacked ponds would be posed by a loss of water, which 
could occur following a terrorist attack or a less sophisticated act of sabotage on the 
cooling system.86 If this were to occur, convective air-cooling would not be sufficient 
to prevent a rise in temperature in densely packed ponds. Recently discharged spent 
fuel can heat up rapidly and to the point where the zircaloy fuel cladding catches fire, 
releasing the volatile fuel's fission products. 87 It is easier to maintain lower density 
ponds, even though an act of aggression could still occur during the required cooling 
stage of fifty years or more. If a direct hit occurred during that time, the lower 
number of fuel rods would result in much less radioactivity being emitted into the 
airstream. To overcome the curient overcrowding problem, nuclear states should 
move quickly to secure more pennanent facilities to safeguard their spent fuel over 
many generations. The nuclear industry's preferred option of underground geological 
repositories has the clear advantage over surface storage in virtually eliminating the 
potential for surface air strikes. 
The nuclear states engaged in reprocessing spent fuel rods are France, the UK and 
Russia, who all have the additional security concern of safeguarding the highly active 
liquid waste (HAL}88 extract from the reprocessing process. The waste is a 
concentrated solution of fission products in nitric acid and includes caesium-137. It is 
classified as HL W and has to be constantly cooled to prevent boiling. In the UK the 
liquid waste is stored in above-ground storage tanks at Sellafield, in a complex 
known as 8215. There are twenty-one tanks, seven of which are kept empty to 
86 R. Alvarez, "What About the Spent Fuel?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists SB (2002) p46.
87 R. Alvarez, J. Beyea, K. Janberg, J. Kang, E. Lyman, A. Macfarlane, G. Thompson & F. von
Hippel, "Reducing the Hazards from Stored Spent Power-Reactor Fuel in the United States." Science 
and Global Security 11 (2003) pl. 
88 Known as highly active liquor (HAL). 
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enable the speedy transfer of liquid in the event of an emergency. 89 The method and 
quantity of HAL stored at Sellafield is a high order safety and security consideration. 
The issue has received more public attention since the heightened terror threat at the 
end of 2001. Yet the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) has been concerned 
with the build up of HAL for some time and in 1995 published a report dealing with 
the issues. The NII stated in the report that a commercial aircraft could breach the 
concrete structure of the 8215 facility and penetrate one of the tanks, resulting in a 
release of high-level waste to the environment. Gordon Thompson the executive 
director of the Institute for Resource and Security Studies in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, has been a consistent critic of the HAL storage facilities at Sellafield. 
Thompson maintains that the NII did not consider the effects of the fuel air explosion 
that would accompany a direct hit from a commercial aircraft. 90 He further contends 
that the NII did not consider the implications of such an attack on the cooling or 
containment of the HAL in the surrounding tanks.91 Thompson provides the 
following alarming scenario: 
The initial breaching of one or more liquid HLW tanks, and the accompanying fuel-air 
explosion and fire, would create severe radioactive contamination of the Sellafield site. 
The resulting radiation fields could preclude actions needed to provide cooling and 
containment of liquid HLW in other tanks in the 8215 facility. Then, over a period of 
days, these tanks would boil dry, after which the solid residue in the tanks would heat 
up and release volatile radioisotopes including caesium-137 to the atmosphere. The 
eventual release of caesium-137 to the atmosphere might exceed 50 per cent of the 
inventory in the tanks, The present inventory is about 8 million TBq (2,400 kilograms). 
Thus the release of caesium-137 to the atmosphere might exceed 4 million TBq (1,200 
kilograll15).92 
The situation is particularly disconcerting because of the high concentration of 
nuclear materials at Sellafield and because of the condensed geographical nature of 
89 Supra n 75 Barnaby, 2003 p4.
90 G. Thompson, Civilian Nuclear Facilities as Weapons for an Enemy: A Submission to the House of
Commons Defence Committee. Institute For Resource and Security Studies. 3 January, 2002. 
I?ereinafter, Thompson, 2002].I See also R. Edwards, "The Nightmare Scenario: What Would Happen If a Passenger Jet Ploughed 
into a Nuclear Plant?" New Scientist 172 (2001) pi 1. [hereinafter, Edwards 2001]. 
92 Supra n 90 Thompson, 2002 p3. 
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surrounding counties and nation-states.93 To compound the problem, BNFL has 
encountered availability shortfalls with its two-vitrification lines, having only 
achieved an average 34 per cent production capacity from 1991 until 2001. In 1999, 
the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) was extremely critical of BNFL for the 
ongoing delays in solidifying the HAL.94 Delays in the vitrification process were 
attributed to blocked pipes, faulty equipment and other technical difficulties. The NII
has directed BNFL to reduce the build up of the liquid waste to a buffer stock by 
2015, but as of February 2000 it was yet to be convinced that the target would be 
met.95 
In an effort to rectify the problem, BNFL commissioned a third vitrification line, 
specifically designed to overcome the problems associated with lines one and two. 
Yet the construction, testing and operational phase of the third line is well behind 
schedule, and as of June 2C04 is still not in the planned production phase. Ironically, 
in its 2003 Annual Review, BNFL claimed that it was "overcoming the throughput 
challenges experienced on the old vitrification lines".96 That was a record year, with 
the target of 250 containers to store exceeded by 83, one above the previous record. 
Despite highlighting the 'record', the review makes no mention of the third 
vitrification line. There is little information available on the company's website 
regarding the third line. The waste management conference held in Oxford, during 
September 2003, was noticeable for the absence of presentations or infonnation 
regarding the vitrification plant. A paper presented at the Oxford conference did 
reveal, however, that there was still 1500m3 of concentrated HAL in the 21 tanks.97 
That quantity is virtually the same as it was in 1999, which shows that little progress 
has been made. BNFL claims to be focused on resolving the problem but even if it 
meets its target by 2015, and reduces the HAL to the required buffer stock of200m3, 
93 The Sellafield plant is only 80 kilometres from the Scottish border and around 200 kilometres from 
Ireland. 
94 R Edwards, "End of the Line? Liquid Waste Could Finally Kill Off Britain's Ageing Nuclear
Plants." New Scientist 164 (4 December 1999) p5. 
95 Nuclear Installations Inspectorate. "The Storage of Liquid High Level Waste at BNFL, Sellafield: 
An Updated Review of Safety." 1-90. Bootle: Health and Safety Executive (HSE), 2000 p47. 
96 BNFL. Annual Review: Reaching New Horizons. 2003 p13. 
91 N. Baldwin, "Remediating Sellafield: A New Focus for the Site." Paper presented at The 9th
International Conference on Environmental Remediation and Radioactive Waste Management, 
Oxford, 21-25 September 2003 p3. 
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the vitrified waste will remain in above ground storage for the foreseeable future. 
While much safer than the existing large quantities of HAL, surface storage is only 
an interim solution and is far from ideal in tenns of reducing the risks from terrorism. 
Another security concern is the risk of terrorists using a dirty bomb. The so-called 
'dirty bomb' is a crude device that consists of conventional explosives such as 
dynamite, or semtex, and some radioactive material.98 It is not in the strictest sense a 
nuclear weapon but the intent of its potential explosion is to disperse the radioactive 
material into the atmosphere.99 The dose of radiation exposure would depend on the 
quantity of radioactive material used and the location and size of the bomb. The 
impact on humans would be greater in densely populated areas. Frank Barnaby, a 
nuclear physicist, maintains that if a 'dirty bomb' were to explode the exposure dose 
levels would be relatively smalt. 100 He acknowledges however that its main impact 
would be psychological. An explosion involving even a small quantity of radioactive 
material would create nfear, panic, and social disruption, exactly the effects terrorists 
wish to achieve". ]OJ A 'dirty bomb' is remarkably easy to construct, once the 
materials are obtained, which is a major cause of anxiety among those charged with 
the responsibility for maintaining security. The relative easy construction highlights 
the need to compile an accurate inventory and then safeguard all high-risk 
radioactive material. 
There is now a growing appreciation of the urgent need to transfer HL W to 
geological repositories. As Lord Oxburgh and his fellow House of Lords Select 
Committee members succinctly stated: 
The terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC of 11 September 2001 not only 
override any remaining arguments for long-tenn storage of nuclear waste at or near 
ground level but also reinforce the recommendations in our 1999 Report for early and 
98 IAEA. "How Real?" Newsbriefs (2002) p3. 
99 C. Kucia, "Conference Pledges to Curb Dirty Bomb Danger." Arms Control Today 33 (2003) p33.
100 F. Barnaby, How to Build a Nuclear Bomb and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction. New York:
Nation Books, 2004 p38. 
101 Ibid. 
128 
deliberate progress on the one remaining realistic option of deep geological storage. 102 
He went further in a 2002 Geoscientist article when he stated: 
Afl:er September 11, even those who would previously have been content (for whatever 
reason) to see wastes retained at surface indefinitely, now have to think again. Scenarios 
for an aerial attack on Sellafield have been modelled, and they are not attractive. 103 
The absence of a long-tenn policy for effectively safeguarding HLW in the UK is 
disturbing to some, and not only illustrates the lack of commitment from consecutive 
British govenunents, but is indicative o f  the challenge ahead to safeguard the global 
inventory of HLW. Waiting for 'ideal sites' may no longer be an option, and the UK 
and all nuclear states may wish to heed the advice of Lord Oxburgh and move with 
deliberate speed to secure the waste in interim repositories. 104 
One country often cited for its innovation and vision concerning nuclear technology 
is Sweden. In the early 1980s, Sweden demonstrated great foresight when designing 
its Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Fuel (CLAB) 105 by planning for almost 
every possible scenario. Acknowledging the unpopularity of 'pennanent repositories' 
in all nuclear states, Sweden came up with an innovative concept that was well ahead 
of its time. CLAB was constructed 30 metres underground and as such is far more 
secure than any similar surface facility located anywhere in the world. It became 
operational in 1985. Recently, Brita Freudenthal of SKB remarked that 
when we built this plant, we thought about human intrusion, terrorism even war. People 
in the nuclear industry laughed; they thought, 'typical Swedes'. They arer.'t laughing any 
more. 106 
Freudenthal was speaking post September 11 2001 with the new realisation that 
nuclear facilities may be particularly vulnerable to terrorism or acts of sabotage. 
Many of the nuclear states are now somewhat envious that they are not as advanced 
102 R. Oxburgh, (Chair). "Managing Radioactive Waste: The Government's Consultation." London:
House of Lords Select Committee on Science and Technology, 23 November 2001. 
101 R. Oxburgh, "Making a Meal of Our Nuclear Waste." Geoscientist 12 (2002) p12.
104 Ibid.
105 Centrala Lagret for Anvant Kll.mbransle 
106 R. Stone, "Deep Repositories: Out of Sight, Out of Terrorists' Reach." Science 303 (2004)pl63.
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as Sweden in terms of the security of their spent fuel. The CLAB facility, which has 
been operating without incident for almost two decades, is also indicative of how 
technology could be used to provide interim storage underground for HL W . 107 Since 
1985, the underground spent-fuel pond has been regularly monitored, maintained, 
and when required, more fuel rods have been added to it. CLAB, therefore, is an 
existing example whereby an underground facility does not have to be 'out-of-sight 
out-of-mind'. Sweden is also well advanced with its plans for a permanent deep 
HLW repository. Site investigations for a deep repository are continuing in 
Osthammar and Oskarshamm. Both sites have local community support, and a final 
decision on the preferred site is expected in 2008. ios
While the US, the UK and Sweden are all established nuclear states with well 
developed technologies, only the latter has existing ,.mderground facilities to 
safeguard their spent fuel rods. Much can be learned from the Swedish experience 
and it may well be advantageous for all nuclear states to combine knowledge and 
resources, to find the optimal safe solution to enhance the public good of human 
security. 
Risk Perception and Public Trust 
The main obstacle to date in implementing the nuclear industry's preferred option of 
geologically repositories has been public opposition, largely driven by the perception 
of risks associated with the extremely long timeframes involved for the radioactive 
material to decay to accepted safe levels. 109 Public anxiety about geological disposal
is focused on the potential for leakage into the ground water systems much earlier 
and at higher levels of radioactivity than experts predict. It is extremely difficult to 
resolve issues of risk, as comparing particular risks in society involves great 
uncertainty. Analysts either have to rely on probability statistics or undertake 
sampling surveys to gauge the public perceptions of risk.110 Since each method has
its limitations and both essentially rely on subjective assessment, decisions on global 
107 Ibid. ios SKB. "Research Well Advanced As Decision Phase Approaches." SKB Press Release, 30
September 2004, 
109 D. North, "A Perspective on Nuclear v;i.!:te." Risk Analysis 19 (1999) p752.
110 p. Slovic, "Going Beyond the Red Book: The Sociopolitics of Risk." Human and Ecological Risk
Assessment9 (2003) pl 183. 
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HLW security are in the end political. In tenns of safeguarding HLW in geological 
repositories, the fundamental issues for the nuclear states to resolve are: What level 
of risk is socially acceptable? And what measures can be put in place to effectively 
manage that risk? 
As the House of Lords Select Committee report revealed, there are really only two 
policy options for HLW, long-tenn surface storage or underground geological 
disposal. 111 Until recently it has been difficult for decision-makers to move away 
from long-term surface storage of HLW to geological disposal because the public 
perceived the repository option as being risky and irreversible. Yet there are 
measures that can be put in place to minimise the risks associated with geological 
repositories. The 1999 House of Lords Select Committee Report advocated phased 
disposal underground, as a practical means of securing the waste, while leaving open 
options for further technological advancement. In the phased disposal concept, the 
site chosen would ultimately be backfilled and sealed.112 Consequently, the public 
perceives little difference between proposals for deep geological repositories and the 
phased disposal concept. It is however possible to apply the monitored retrievable 
storage concept to the underground environment by using a variation of CLAB. A 
monitored retrievable underground repository (MRUR), without specific time 
constraints for closure, would remove the 'finality' aspect and perhaps even shift the 
public debate away from issues of hydrology and leakage of radioactivity to safety 
and security of the HLW.113 It would provide for the capacity to monitor the
interaction between the waste canisters and the geological environment at regular 
inteivals over a prolonged timeframe. 
The necessity of gaining and maintaining public trust as a means of alleviating 
perceptions of risk is widely recognised. A range of factors including leadership, risk 
communication and public access to infonnation can influence l evels of trust. An 
effective public participation process, complete with a willingness to respond to 
community concerns, is also necessary for building public trust. When consulted the 
111 L. Tombs, (Chair). "Management of Nuclear Waste." London: House of Lords Select Committee
on Science and Technology: Third Report, 10 March 1999. [hereinafter, Tombs 1999]. 
112 B. Nuttall, "Nuclear Waste Management." Science and Public Affairs (2003) pl8.
113 /bidp18. 
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public has shown a clear preference for monitored retrievable HL W storage facilities. 
This is based on a desire to 'wait-and-see' if new technology or an alternative to 
geological repositories emerge. Until recently the preference for retrievable storage 
facilities was to construct them on the surface but that appears to be changing. One 
of the main conclusions from a 1999 Consensus Conference114 in the UK states that 
"radioactive waste must be removed from the surface and stored underground, but 
must be monitorable and retrievable" .115 The imperative of gaining public trust was 
also prominent at that conference. An appreciation of the capacity for a MRUR to 
help build public trust will likely grow as the debate unfolds. A concerted effort will, 
however, have to be undertaken to broaden the debate to involve as many 
stakeholders as possible. The issue most likely to create such an incentive for 
widespread engagement in the HL W repository debate is regional and global 
security. 
Since the heightened level of terror threat, security of all nuclear materials has 
attained a much higher priority amongst political leaders, but the extent of public 
awareness of the link between security and geological repositories remains unclear. 
In 2001, a follow-up study conducted by the Future Foundation sought to measure 
public awareness and attitudes towards radioactive waste management in the UK.116
It revealed that awareness levels remained low, but when prompted the public 
recognised the importance of finding solutions and rated the issue highly. 
Interestingly, at the end of the interview when asked "had they any other concerns?" 
seven per cent volunteered terrorism and security without any prompting. 117 That 
was a reasonably high response, as the authors illustrated the difficulty people find in 
providing responses to 'on the spot' questions (79 per cent did not raise any additional 
concerns). It is likely that prompted questions on security would have resulted in 
higher resp·onse levels.118 The desire for higher levels of infonnation and public
1
14 A Consensus Conference is a form of public participation, pioneered in Denmark, which aims to 
influence the policy making process by opening up a dialogue between the public, experts and 
roliticians. is The UK Centre for the Environment and Economic Development. "Final Report." Compiled from
the UK National Consensus Conference on Radioactive Waste Management, Westminster Central 
Hall, London, 21-24 May 1999. Online version. 
116 Supra n 8 The Future Foundation, 2002. 
117 Jbidp9. 
m lbidplO. 
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participation was high, with around two-thirds stating their preference for additional 
infonnation. This suggests the UK public is willing to engage in the debate, but 
much needs to be done to ensure the public receives adequate information to increase 
the existing levels of awareness. It is likely that the findings from the UK study 
would transfer to other nation states. 
Public acceptance of geological repositories will likely grow as the debate unfolds. It 
wilt gain momentum after a period of demonstrable safe operation. The WIPP 
repository has already achieved technical success, but will require a much longer 
operating timeframe before its safety features can be confidently confinned.119 The
first operating HLW repository in the world, likely to be Yucca Mountain in Nevada, 
or perhaps Sweden, will also boost public confidence and will when operational 
eliminate the argument that no nuclear state has implemented a repository for HLW 
because 'it is perceived as being so dangerous'. The opening of the first national 
HL W repository will be an important psychological step, but it will do little to 
provide the public good of enhanced regional or global security by reducing the risks 
from terrorists or rogue states. 
Enhancing Internadonal Nuclear Security as a Public Good 
In the current climate of terrorism the arguments for safeguarding HLW and spent­
fuel rods in underground repositories appear much stronger than ever before. The 
attempt by Pangea to locate a multinational repository in Australia helped to raise 
international awareness of the HL W disposal problem, and provided a practical 
working experience for key people now involved with the ARIUS. Following the 
fonnation of ARIUS in February 2"02,120 the shift in focus on radioactive waste 
solutions for smaller users has achieved broader support for the shared repository 
concept, at least at the regional level. There appears to be a greater appreciation of 
the security benefits of underground repositories than was present during the Pang ea 
debate. Safeguarding the entire global inventory of spent fuel and HL W in geological 
repositories, although desirable ar.d feasible, is a significant challenge. A more 
achievable option might be to aim for a regional multinational repository rather than 
119 The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant near Carlsbad received its first waste shipment on 26 March 1999. 
120 ARIUS. "Arius Newsletter." May 2002, pl. 
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seeking a 'complete' global solution from the outset. The political realities are such 
that Europe has the largest concentration of nuclear reactors, and ARIUS has already 
gained support for the multinational repository concept among some of the smaller 
nuclear states. 
ARIUS was formed by electric utilities and waste agencies from Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Switzerland, Hungary and Japan,121 and has since been joined by associates from 
Italy, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Latvia. 122 ARIUS has worked closely with 
Decom Slovakia. In 2003, ARIUS and Decom Slovakia were jointly responsible for 
initiating and funding the Support Action for a Pilot Initiative for European Regional 
Repositories (SAPIERR). The two organisations submitted a research proposal 
within the European Commission's (EC) 61h Framework Programme (FP6), in May 
2003.123 The FP6 is the European Community Framework Programme for Research, 
Technological Development and Demonstration. One of the criteria for eligibility is 
that all proposals seeking assistance from the FP6 must have transnational 
characteristics. The SAPIERR project is a pilot study into the feasibility of a 
multinational repository for Europe. There are 21 organisations from 14 states 
participating in the SAPIERR working group. 124 The pilot study is mainly funded by 
the project coordinator, Decom Slovakia, which receives its funding from the EC in 
Brussels, and ARIUS, which is funded directly by the Swiss Government 
Department of Education and Science. Although only in the initial stages, SAPIERR 
is considered an important development for the multinational repository concept and 
the study could benefit from the application of public goods theory. 
For a multinational repository to meet the criterion of a public good, the benefits 
must extend to both nuclear and non-nuclear states. Those without nuclear waste are 
not required to participate, and therefore obviously cannot benefit from the 
economies of scale criteria. The most apparent benefit to non-nuclear states from a 
multinational repository is the enhanced security provided by removing the HL W 
121 Ibid.
122 ARIUS. "Arius Newsletter." May 2004, pl.
123 V. Stefula & C. McCombie, "Sapierr Paves the Way Towards European Regional Repository."
Paper presented at the 5th International Conference on Nuclear Option in Countries with Small and 
Medium Electricity Grids, Dubrovnik, Croatia May 2004. 
124 
Ibid. 
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from the surface to the less vulnerable underground environment. The elimination of 
the potential for a terrorist strike or an act of sabotage on a HLW facility is most 
advantageous to all states in the region. Hence, under a security appraisal, the 
benefits of a regional multinational repository are non-excludable because the 
safeguards and security benefits it provides, accrue to both the participating nuclear 
states and to the non-nuclear states. There may also be environmental spillover 
benefits for some states in close proximity to one or more of the participating nuclear 
states. 
The other main criterion of a public good is the non-rivalry component, which means 
that the benefits are available to all consuming the good. In tenns of a multinational 
repository, the efficiency, security, and environmental benefits to one country do not 
subtract in any way from the benefits available to the other countries using the 
repository. Thus a multinational repository meets the non-rival requirement, with the 
only qualification being the question of space limits. Those responsible for designing 
the repository would need to calculate the total amount of existing and predicted 
HLW, from both participating 125 and potential non-participating126 nuclear states. 
The repository should then be designed and constructed with ample capacity for 
storing the total inventory of existing and predicted under-secured HL W in the 
region. There will inevitably be reluctance or opposition by some states to a 
multinational repository, as there is with most issues requiring collective action. This 
is not necessarily a problem, as some of those states are well advanced with a 
national solution. Others are not, however, and may decide to join at a later stage, or 
indeed one of the states with a planned national repository could become the 
voluntary host state under the right set of circumstances. It is therefore important to 
create the incentive& and the opportunity for reluctant states to join at a later stage 
should they choose to do so. 
Economies of Scale aod the Benefits of Collaboration 
Until recently the primary incentive for many of the smaller nuclear states to 
collaborate to construct a multinational repository was the economic benefit of doing 
m The countries that agree to join in the multinational repository from the outset. 
126 Countries with the potential to join at a later stage.
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so. In 1994 the Nuclear Energy Agency examined costs associated with the nuclear 
fuel cycle and highlighted varying institutional and other factors associated with 
repository implementation from country to country. 127 Those factors can differ 
dramatically across cultures, making it difficult to provide even an estimated average 
dollar cost for a single geological repository. As a guide, in the US the Department of 
Energy had to revise their estimate for the total cost of completing the Yucca 
Mountain repository upwards to $US 49.3 billion from fiscal year 2001. 128 Critics of 
the project maintain that that is a consetvative estimate, and argue that it is much 
more likely to be $US 60 billion or higher. Whatever the true cost, a single 
geological repository will amount to billions of US dollars, and that level of required 
funding would be beyond the means of many of the smaller nuclear states acting 
alone. That assertion has been widely documented and utilised as a main argument 
for a shared repository by proponents in states such as Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Switzerland, Taiwan and the Ukraine. 129 
The most recent IAEA study examining the multinational repository issue, reports 
the economic benefits in the following way. 
Thus, a large capacity, multinational repository could offer an economic advantage in 
that the host and partners could achieve substantial economies of scale by pooling 
resources and sharing the fixed capital costs and also the operating costs, as well as the 
associated financial risks. Doing this could allow the host and partner countries to 
achieve a lower unit cost than would otherwise be the case for a national progranune 
undertaken by either the host or partner countries acting alone, 130 
The IAEA report designates the economics of disposal systems as an area requiring 
further study. It is envisioned that the more immediate costs of constructing the 
repository, and providing the day to day operations, would be funded separately from 
127 Nuclear Energy Agency: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. The 
Economics of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle. 1994. 
128 L. Barrett, (Acting Director). Analysis of the Total System Life Cycle Cost of the Civilian
Radioactive Waste Management Program. 2001. 
129 p. Witherspoom, "Introduction to Second World Wide Review of Geological Problems in 
Radioactive Waste Isolation." In Geological Problems in Radioactive Waste Isolation: Second 
Worldwide Review, edited by P. Witherspoon. Berkeley, California: Lawrence Berkley National 
Laboratory, 1996 p3. 
130 IAEA. Developing Multinational Radioactive Waste Repositories: Infrastuctural Framework and 
Scenarios of Cooperation. IAEA-TECDOC-1413. October, 2004 p23. [hereinafter, IAEA-TECDOC-
1413, 2004). 
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the potential long-tenn responsibility or liability costs. It is likely that the states 
would only perfonn a coordinating role in the fonner, but would be expected to 
underwrite any associated costs arising from the latter. The joint issues of 
responsibility and liability are discussed in the next chapter. The precise funding 
arrangements required to secure a multinational repository would need to be 
detennined during the negotiation phase by the participating states. 
Such negotiations could benefit from an understanding of public goods theory, and 
specifically from some of the literature on financing public goods. Ferroni illustrates 
four methods of financing regional or global public goods, which are through public 
sources, private sources, payments by users and beneficiaries, and partnerships. 131 
The method chosen will largely depend on the nature of the public good provided. As 
Sandler has shown, different global public goods pose different financial 
challenges.132 It is expected that once political commitment is achieved, funding for 
the construction and operation of the shared facility would be attainable. Regional 
public goods can be broken down into three important subclasses, which are club 
goods, common pool resources, and joint products. Of those three, club goods are 
most relevant to the regional multinational repository concept. Club goods are public 
goods with non-rivalry consumption, but are restricted to members by way of an 
institutional arrangement. 133 Club goods are closely related to a user pays system, 
which has a number of advantages. It enables consumers to determine how much 
value they place on the good and then a charge can be set accordingly. 
A shared method of funding could be applied based on a set charge directly linked to 
the percentage of the waste going into the repository. To simplify with a hypothetical 
example, suppose six states including the host state, Eurovania, 134 have agreed to 
share in a regional multinational repository, which is designed to take 2,000 tonnes 
of HLW each year for 40 years. The six states include the host state Eurovania, 
131 Supra n 29 Ferroni, 2002 pl3. 
132 T. Sandler, On Financing Global and International Public Goods, School oflntemational
Relations, University of Southern California, July 2001. 
133 P. Stalgren, Regional Public Goods and the Future of International Development Co-operation.
Expert Group on Development Issues, Swedt:n. 2000 pt 0. 
134 I specifically chose a 'non-existent' country as the host state in order to avoid any suggestion of bias 
or preference. 
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which is the largest nuclear state, with 800 tmmes deposited in the repository each 
year. This is followed by Switzerland on 400 tonnes, with Bulgaria, Belgium, 
Hungary and ltaly 135 contributing 200 tonnes each year for the 40 years. A 
percentage breakdown reveals that Eurovania will contribute 40 per cent, 
Switzerland 20 per cent and the remaining four states contributing 10 per cent each 
of the total 800,000 tonnes of HLW, over the lifetime of the repository. The 
breakdown in construction and operational costs would be also a 40, 20, I 0, 10, I 0, 
10 split, with the host state Eurovania gaining the additional benefits of increased 
GDP rates and higher employment from repository construction and export 
revenues, 136 as an incentive for accepting the repository. 137 
The hypothetical example used here is similar to the add-on scenario listed as one of 
the options in the IAEA-TECDOC-1413 study. 138 It is based on the premise that the
voluntary host state has a relatively large quantity of HL W requiring long-term 
storage. And the host state either decides to complement an existing operating 
repository or it decides to participate in the cooperative solution from the outset. 
Many factors, including economies of scale, environmental considerations and or 
regional or global security benefits, could motivate the host state in offering the 
services of a carefully designed and managed repository. 139 There are many scenarios
and motivating factors for potential host states to come forward but it is not intended 
to provide an in depth analysis of them here. The process of identifying the likely 
incentives, the most suitable option, and the specific 'service charge' is best left to the 
individual states to determine. One considerable disincentive, however, is the 
unresolved issue of who should assume ownership and responsibility for the HLW 
over the many decades required for the waste to decay to safe accepted levels. The 
issue of long-term responsibility and potential liability or remediation costs is such a 
contentious issue that the next chapter is devoted to discussing the options. 
135 For the sake of convenience I have utilised some of the members of ARIUS for my hypothetical 
example. It is important however to clearly state that the choice of these countries in no way suggests 
that they will participate in a shared repository. 
m For providing the service to the participating states. 137 See Access Economics. "The Economic Impact of the Nuclear Waste Repository Project." 
Canberra: Draft Report, prepared for Pangea Resources by Access Economics, 1998. 138 Supra n 130 IAEA-TECDOC-1413, 2004 pl6. 
139 Ibid.
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Conclusion 
The implementation of national geological repositories for HLW has been 
problematic for all nuclear states and an operational facility is yet to be achieved. 
The public perception of the risks and the public's reluctance to accept the technical 
safety features have been the main impediments to HLW repository site selection. 140 
Yet the perception of risk is subjective and it can evolve with specific events. The 
terrorist attacks of recent years may have changed many people's perception of risk. 
The safeguarding of all surface nuclear facilities from air attacks and sabotage is now 
a high priority, and securing HLW underground in a number of global sites would 
effectively remove that threat. Geological repositories appear to be the best option 
for reducing the risks of terrorists targeting the ever-growing surface stockpiles of 
HLW. Undergro•_•nd storage provides additional safeguards against the theft of 
weapons-useable material from extracted spent-fuel rods. Geological repositories 
may also be the ultimate long-tenn solution for radionuclide containment. The 
benefits of isolating the HL W to protect the environment and enhance regional or 
global security may now outweigh the demonstrated anxiety with potential repository 
failure. 
Securing the entire global inventory of HL W would provide maximum-security 
benefits for all. Such a comprehensive task, however, would be difficult to achieve, 
and the more feasible option may be to advance the issue on a region by region basis. 
Research into the feasibility of a shared repository is already underway in Europe. 
The joint project conducted by ARIUS and SAPIERR seems a logical place to apply 
public goods theory to better refine the security arguments and to test a range of 
funding options. That research into a potential regional repository for Europe 
provides a good opportunity to contrast the public perception of risk with the 
geological repository against the risks from HL W surface storage. A single 
multinational repository shared by a select number of nuclear states provides 
additional regional security benefits, if it receives some HLW that would otherwise 
have remained on surface. This would most likely be waste arising from the smaller 
nuclear states, but some of the larger nuclear states may also be motivated to utilise a 
140 P. Slovic, M. Layman & J. Flynn. "Perceived Risk, Trust, and the Politics of Nuclear Waste."
Science 254 (1991) pt 604. 
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shared repository, with a renewed impetus of additional security that it would 
provide. 
The difficulties of implementing a global network of geological repositories to 
safeguard the world's spent-fuel and HLW are many. Such an undertaking, while 
ambitious, is achievable but it would require the strong commitment and drive from 
the world leaders in the most influential nuclear states. The issue with the potential to 
achieve that commitment is enhanced world security. National and international 
security requires a high degree of interstate cooperation to maintain and enhance 
overall world peace. To reduce or eliminate the risk or likely impacts from terrorism 
is a global public good, because the benefits of enhanced security extend across 
borders to all nations and their citizens. The principal argument for advocating a 
global network of multinational repositories is the clear risk reduction benefits from 
terrorist attacks on existing HLW surface storage facilities, or on spent-fuel 
stockpiles. Multinational repositories would also make a significant contribution in 
preventing the theft or diversion ofweapons-useable material 
140 
CHAPTER FIVE 
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR STATES FOR 
THE LONG-TERM MANAGEMENT OF HLW 
The 1939 Trail Smelter arbitral decision is often cited as authority to hold that every 
state should conduct its activities, in such a manner that does not cause serious harm 
in another state, or in areas beyond national jurisdiction. 1 The obligation on states to 
prevent transboundary environmental harm has since gained increased recognition 
and is now widely accepted as part of the general principles of international law. 
Responsibility for environmental hann can arise from either a breach of customary 
law or from a breach of treaty Jaw.2 In the field of nuclear law the civil liability 
regimes were designed with a focus on nuclear reactors, and they also contain 
notable limits in time for claims.3 Despite some improvement post Chernobyl, there 
are still gaps in those regimes, and because nuclear waste management was 
considered a national responsibility, the issue of long-tenn liability for HL W is as yet 
unregulated. Indeed the transfer of responsibility for the 'imported' high-level waste 
(HLW) to Australia, after a 40-year operating period, was a factor in increasing the 
public perceptions of risk with the Pangea repository project in Australia.4 This 
suggests the joint issues of long-tenn responsibility for the HLW, and liability for 
potential accidents or environmental harm from repository failure need to be 
resolved. 
The previous chapter demonstrated the public good benefits of regional and 
multinational repositories. This chapter seeks to address the 'shared' responsibility 
and liability issues raised by the multinational repository concept. The chapter 
examines the existing international nuclear liability regimes to detennine their 
1 "Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal Decision" [1939] Reprinted in, 33 American Journal of
International law 182. And subsequent decision in [1941] 35 AJIL 684. [hereinafler, Trail Smelter 
1'941] 35 AJ/l 684].P. Birnie, & A. Boyle. International law and the Environment. Second ed. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002 p181. [hereinafter, Birnie and Boyle, 2002]. 
3 The civil nuclear liabilities are discussed in more detail below. 
•I.Holland, "Waste Not Want Not? Australia and the Politics of High-Level Nuclear Waste."
Australian Journal of Political Science 37 (2002) p286. [hereinafter, Holland, 2000].
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suitability for dealing with the long-term management of HL W in a shared 
repository. The analysis reveals significant deficiencies in nuclear liability law, and 
highlights the need for a more robust international regime to moderate the risks 
associated with the long-term storage of the shared HLW in a multinational 
repository. Among the discovered weaknesses is reluctance on the part of the major 
nuclear states to sign up to the civil nuclear liability regimes.5 A lack of commitment 
from the major nuclear states does little to engender trust or encourage either the 
small nuclear or the non-nuclear states to sign up to the nuclear liability regimes. In 
addition, the civil nuclear liability regimes were never designed for and are 
particularly unsuitable for the time-span required for the HLW to decay to safe 
accepted levels in a geological repository. 
Under the existing nuclear liability regimes, there is a time limit placed on the period 
for potential claims to be lodged, and liability is channelled exclusively to the 
operator.6 While the time limit issue could perhaps be resolved by extending the 
duration of coverage,7 the issue of liability is much more problematic. Even if one 
assumes that a private operator would be prepared to commit to complete 
responsibility and liability for all aspects of the repository and for many years post 
closure, the company will not be trading over the required period of monitoring. This 
raises the question as to who can assume responsibility for the several thousand years 
necessary for the radioactive materials in the HLW to decay to safe accepted levels.8
The only feasible option is for the nation state to assume long-term responsibility for 
the management of HL W. The issue is more complicated under the shared repository 
arrangement. It would be most unlikely for a host state to come forward with the 
offer of a site if it is required to accept full responsibility for the HL W over the long­
term. It is therefore necessary to explore the option of collective nation-state 
5 N. Horbach, "1997 Nuclear Liability Treaties: Conformities and Deficiencies in Some EU Applicant
States." Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 18 (2000) p379. [hereinafter, Horbach, 2000].
6 N. Pelzer, "Focus on the Future ofNuclear Liability Law." Journal of Energy and Natural Resources
Law 17 ( 1999) p342. [hereinafter, Pelzer, 1999]. 
1 Supra n 5 Horbach, 2000 p383. 
8 There are different assertions made as to the time it takes for the HLW to reach the accepted safe 
levels, but even the proponents of the repository concede that the time period extends into the 
hundreds of thousands of years. See I. Miller, J. Black, C. McCombie, D. Pentz & P. Zuidema, "High­
Isolation Sites for Radioactive Waste Disposal: A Fresh Look at the Challenge of Locating Safe Sites 
for Radioactive Repositories." Paper presented at the Waste Management '99 Conference, Tucson. 3 
March 1999. 
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responsibility under international law to facilitate shared responsibility and liability 
arrangements and thus increase the likelihood of greater public acceptance for the 
multinational repository option. This chapter continues with an analysis of the 
international law of state responsibility, and concludes that it is the most appropriate 
legal mechanism for enshrining the collective responsibility of nation states in a 
multilateral treaty for the long-tenn management of HLW. Under the law of state 
responsibility. the state concerned must accept responsibility in the event of a breach 
of an internationally wrongful act. There must be a clear identifiable international 
ol:ligation for state responsibility to be invoked. That obligation would be difficult to 
establish under the existing international law framework. Hence, in order for 
collective nation state responsibility to be applicable to multinational repositories, a 
specifically designed multilateral treaty that covers all aspects of HL W storage over 
the long-tenn is required. 
An acceptance of collective nation state responsibility involves a shift away from or 
more precisely an extension of the traditional notion of state responsibility, which 
was essentially a bilateral matter between the responsible and the injured states.9 In 
recognising the limitations of 'State Responsibility', and in light of the proliferation 
of multilateral agreements, the International Law Commission (lLC} extended the 
concept to cover several states and the broader international community. To achieve 
this, the ILC drew upon the obligation erga omnes 10 concept, which has gained 
widespread recognition since the International Court of Justice (ICJ) dictum in the 
Barcelona Traction11 case. Obligations erga omnes are those owed to the 
international community as a whole. As identified in the dictum, the obligations 
relate to the protection of common interests and basic moral values, including 
outlawing acts of aggression, genocide and the protection of humans from slavery 
and racial discrimination. 12 The obligations erga omnes concept has since evolved to 
include self-detennination and environmental protection. 
9 D. Shelton, "Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility." The American
Journal of /11temational Law 96 (2002) p839. 
10 The Latin expression erga omnes means 'towards all'. And in this context, the tenn implies that a 
state has obligations to all other states, 
II Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited, Second Phase (1970) ICJ Reports 4. 
rziereinafler, Barcelona Traction (1970) ICJ Reports 4. 
2 Ibid para 34. 
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Following an analysis of the state responsibility concept, this chapter will argue for 
an innovative approach whereby the nuclear states utilising the repository would 
accept shared responsibility and liability for damages arising from an accident during 
the long-tenn storage ofHLW in the repository. This commitment would need to be 
formalised in a binding treaty, based on the latest and most relevant ILC Articles on 
state responsibility. 13 A comprehensive multilateral treaty, which includes liability 
provisions for damages, would ensure that adequate monitoring and compliance 
measures are in place for the long-tenn management of the shared repository. Such a 
treaty would provide an incentive for interstate cooperation in research and 
development and it would help to instil the necessary public confidence to achieve 
repository acceptance. The chapter will further demonstrate the benefit of all the 
states using the repository to sign and then ratify the Treaty in order to increase the 
chance of public acceptance. 
Internationalisation of Nuclear Risks 
Awareness of the potential impacts of transboundary environmental harm and the 
perception of risk from particular teclmologies have increased in recent decades. 
There are various reasons for this increased awareness, including greater access to 
information and communication. In contrast, prior to and during the early industrial 
age many of the hazards borne by society were deemed to be the result of external 
influences, and were often labelled 'acts of nature' or 'acts of God' by those with 
religious beliefs. 14 The rise of industrial capitalism has removed many of the earlier 
risks, and brought many benefits such as better knowledge and access to health, 
better shelter from the elements and many material and personal comforts. Such 
benefits have led to lower rates of infant mortality and increased longevity. There are 
also, however, new risks associated with technological advancement. These range 
from fast cars and aeroplanes to chemical, genetic and the various risks associated 
with nuclear power. Some of these risks are more acceptable to society because of 
the belief in personal control in the management of that risk, for instance, when 
13 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session. "Draft Articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts." UN GAOR, 56th Session, N56110,
2001. [hereinafter, ILC Draft Articles, 2001 ]. 
14 U. Beck, "From Industrial Society to the Risk Society: Questions ofSwvival, Social Structure and
Ecological Enlightenment." T//eory Culture and Society 9 {1992) p98. 
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driving a car. Alternatively, familiarity can reduce the perception of risk as happens, 
for example, with relatively frequent air travel. 15 Others such as nuclear power, 
unlike the earlier 'natural disasters 1 or the more acceptable risks, often become 
politically charged. The reason for this is that industrial risks, such as those 
associated with nuclear power involve choices and the ultimate decision brings with 
it the problem of social accountability and responsibility. When accidents occur in 
industrial risk areas, there is often a tendency to apportion blame towards the 
decision-making bodies. 
The feeling of a lack of control of a situation often raises anxiety and can heighten 
the public's perception of risk. As expected, the reporting of the accident at Three 
Mile Island in 1979 diminished confidence in the nuclear industry, but the 
repercussions following the accident at Chernobyl seven years later were most 
profound. The radioactive fallout from Chernobyl, on 26 April 1986, clearly 
demonstrated the internationalization of risks to many states, even to some that do 
not utilise nuclear technology as an energy source. 16 The immediate anxiety 
concerned the radioactive fallout, which impacted not only on the USSR but also on 
various states not in immediate proximity. This was a significant wake up for some 
non-nuclear states, which for the first time were confronted with the transboundary 
effects of a major radioactive accident. It clearly highlighted the inability of states to 
effectively manage some of the risks from a modem technological industrialised 
world and challenged traditional notions of state sovereignty based on autonomy 
within territorial borders. 17 Ironically, it was also modern technology that enabled 
the western world to penetrate the territorial sovereign borders of the USSR by 
satellite to identify the source of the accident. The failure of the USSR to inform the 
IAEA or its neighbouring states until 72 hours after the accident and until it was 
pressured into doing so raised particular concems. 18 The accident at Chernobyl also 
highlighted the inadequacies of nuclear law from both a national and an international 
15 R. Rohnnann & 0. Renn, "Risk Perception Research: An Introduction," in Cross-Cutural Risk 
Perception: A Survey of Empirical Studies, edited by 0. Renn & R. Rolumann. Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2000, p26. 16 Supra n 2 Birnie and Boyle, 2002 p452. 17 P. Sands, Cliernobyl: Law and Communication. Cambridge: Grotius Publications, 1988 pS.
lB Ibid pp3-5.
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perspective. It illustrated the limited powers of the IAEA and the lack of agreement 
on questions of liability or state responsibility. 19
Following the accident at Chernobyl, the USSR refused to accept any liability for 
damages incurred in other nation states. From an international legal perspective, the 
Soviets were not a party to either of the conventions on third party liability for 
nuclear damage and were thus not governed by any international regirnes.20 The 
question of state responsibility under customary international law did not arise 
because transboundary health threats, and thus issues of liability, were largely 
ignored by states prior to the Chernobyl accident.21 In any event, no affected nation 
state brought a claim against the USSR, at least in part because of a reluctance to 
create international nonns on transboundary liability for nuclear damage.22 However, 
the accident did result in increased attempts to improve international cooperation on 
nuclear activities. At a subsequent special review conference, IAEA member states 
reaffirmed their individual responsibility for nuclear safety, while recognising that 
the role of the IAEA is to encourage interstate cooperation on a range of nuclear 
issues.23 Soon after, international states adopted Conventions on Early Notification 
of a Nuclear Accident24 and on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident,25 but 
these were hastily prepared and they inadequately addressed issues of liability or the 
overall risks to all states from nuclear activities.26 At the same conference, the 
member states considered mandatory international minimum safety standards for 
nuclear reactors, but agreement on these could not be reached due to many factors. 
These included the practical problems of differing national standards and differing 
19 Supra n 2 Birnie and Boyle, 2002 p454. 
20 P. Reyners & E. Lellouche, "Regulation and Control by International Organisations in the Context
ofa Nuclear Accident: The International Atomic Energy Agency and the OECD Nuclear Energy 
Agency." In Nuclear Energy Law After Chernobyl, edited by P. Cameron, L. Hancher & W. Kuhn. 
London: Graham and Trotman, 1988 pl5. 
21 J, Barkenbus, "Nuclear Power Safety and the Role oflnternational Organization." International 
Organization 41 ( 1987) p476. 
22 M. Politi, "The Impact of the Chernobyl Accident on the States' Perception of International
Responsibility for Nuclear Damage." In lllternationaf Respom;ibility for Environmental Hann: 
International Environmental Law and Policy Series, edited by F. Francioni & T. Scovazzi. London: 
Graham& Trotman, 1991 p475. 
23 Supra n 2 Birnie & Boyle 2002 p459. 
24 Vienna Convention on Early Notification ofa Nuclear Accident, 1986, IAEA INFCIRC 335. 
25 Vienna Convention on Assistance in the Case ofa Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, 
1986, IAEA INFCIRC 336. 
16 A. Kiss & D. Shelton, International E11vironmental Law. New York: Transnational Publishers, 2000
p553. 
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types of nuclear installations, and the ongomg tensions between the benefits of 
international regulation and the perceived loss of sovereignty. 
Civil Nuclear Liability Regimes 
Some months after the accident at Chernobyl the USSR argued for a comprehensive 
international regime to cover the issue of compensation for nuclear damage. Its 
preferred approach was to establish a new convention on state liability under public 
international law.27 However, this was not agreed upon by the other nuclear states, 
due in part to a reluctance to create fresh international norms. Thus, for the entire 
range of nuclear activities, the existing civil liability conventions remain the only 
means of redress for accidents involving participating states. The 1960 Paris 
Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy28 and the 1963 
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage29 were drafted at a time 
when the nuclear industry was in its infancy. Both conventions were heavily skewed 
in favour of the operator, who "was pro tected from the full consequences of tortious 
claims, in order to encourage investment and development". 30 This was achieved by 
placing a cap on the total liability of the operator. The Paris Convention was adopted 
under the auspices of the OECD and covers nuclear accidents within Western 
European states. It has a limited geographical application, when compared to the 
IAEA-backed Vienna Convention which has the potential for universal membership. 
While both conventions seek to improve international nuclear safety with liability 
provisions against the operator, there are significant deficiencies in both liability 
regimes.31 Criticisms of the two conventions include a failure to provide in express 
terms for environmental damage and a totally inadequate low ceiling of financial 
27 N. Pelzer, "Concepts of Nuclear Liability Revisited: A Post Chernobyl Assessment of the Paris and
the Vienna Conventions." In Nuclear Energy Law after Chernabyl, edited by P. Cameron, L. Hancher, 
and W. Kuhn. London: Graham and Trotman. 1988 pl 14. 
28 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field ofNuclear Energy (Paris) 29 July 1960, in force 1 
April 1968, 956 UNTS 251 (as amended by 1964 protocol). 
29 Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (Vienna), 21 May 1963, in force 12 November 
1977, 1063 UNTS265. [hereinafter, The Vienna Convention]. 
30 M. Lee, "Civil Liability oftbe Nuclear Industry." Journal of Environmental Law 12 (2000) p317.
31 L. de La Fayette, "Towards a New Regime of State Responsibility for Nuclear Activities." Nuclear
law Bulletin 50 (1992) p!O. [hereinafter, de La Fayette, 1992]. 
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liability.32 The two conventions also provide for the jurisdiction to remain in the state 
where the accident occurs rather than where the damage falls. These shortcomings 
contributed to the low number of signatory states, which was significantly below the 
worldwide coverage expected in the early 1960's.33 The accident at Chernobyl did
result in an extensive review of the liability regimes, which lasted around ten years. 
The concerns were addressed to some extent in September 1997, when delegates 
from around 80 states adopted a Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention,34
coupled with a new Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear 
Damage. 35 The definition of environmental damage was broadened under the revised
VieIU1a Convention to include costs of preventive measures, a loss of income, and 
provisions to reinstate the envirorunent to its previous condition. The protocol raised 
the operator's minimum liability figure to 300 million Special Drawing Rights 
(SDR),36 which equates to around 400 million US dollars.37 In addition, under the 
Convention on Supplementary Compensation, the Installation State must provide a 
further 300 million SDR's,38 and the State Parties are to provide additional amounts
based on an agreed formula.39
These changes provided significant improvements to the existing civil liability 
regimes for nuclear activities. Yet there remains a number of deficiencies, one of 
which is the lack of global hannonisation for nuclear liability law. Firstly, there is 
32 P. Sands, "Observations on International Nuclear Law Ten Years after Chernobyl." Review of 
Europeati Community and International Environmental Law 5 (1996) p200. 
33 Supra n 31 de La Fayette, 1992 p 11.
34 Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage 1997, IAEA 
INFCIRC 566. This was adopted on 12 September 1997 but is not yet in force. Pursuant to Article 
21.1, the Protocol "shall enter into force three months after the date of deposit of the fifth instrument 
of ratification, acceptance or approval. As of 5 December 2001 there were four Contracting States, 
namely Argentina, Italy, Morocco and Romania. 35 Convention 011 Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage 1997, IAEA INFCIRC 567. This
was iidopted on 12 September 1997 but is not yet in force. The Convention, pursuant to Article XX.l,
"shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the date on which at least five States with a 
minimum of 400,000 units of installed capacity have deposited an instrument referred to in Article 
XXVII". As of 14 November 2000, there were three Contracting States, namely Argentina, Morocco 
and Romania. 
36 "Special Drawing Right" means the unit of account, valued on the basis ofa basket of key 
international currencies, as defined by the International Monetary Fund and used by it for its own 
or,rations and transactions.3 As valued in 1997. 
38 Ibid Article III l(a) 
39 Ibid Article IV l(a) 
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not a unifonn adherence by the contracting states to the 1988 Joint Protocoi,40 which 
links both liability conventions. Secondly, some of the larger nuclear states remain 
outside of both liability conventions, preferring to stick with national nuclear liability 
laws. These include the US, Canada, China, Pakistan, Ja pan, Korea and South 
Africa.41 While the majority of these nations have national legislation mostly in line 
with the conventions, the lack ofa formal link to one of the multilateral conventions 
can be problematic for enforcing responsibility, which can impact directly on victims 
in foreign states. It is also regrettable that a leading nuclear state, the US, does not 
lead by example and commit to one of the main liability conventions, which may 
encourage other reluctant nations to sign up.42 The US did break its stance on 
international nuclear liability regimes by signing up to the Convention on 
Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage on 29 September 1997. 43 Yet the 
Supplementary Convention is not yet in force and does not link the two main liability 
conventions, and a much greater commitment is needed from the US, and others, if 
the goal of global hannonisation of nuclear liability laws is to be achieved. 
Another problem associated with the nuclear liability regimes is the limitation of 
claims in time. This is a feature of many legal instruments, the rationale being that 
the opportunity for victims to lay claims should not be allowed to continue 
indefinitely.44 The Vienna and Paris Conventions include an extinction period often 
years, although national law, if applicable, may provide additional coverage. The ten­
year time period was agreed in an attempt to achieve an appropriate balance between 
compensation and industry protection. The short timeframe was severely criticised, 
especially since the effects of radiation exposure may not be discovered until long 
after the event. Hence the 1997 Protocol to the Vienna Convention extended the 
claim period to thirty years for personal injury but left in place the ten-year 
extinction for all other damages.45 This inconsistency raises questions in relation to 
reparation of the environment, which somewhat diminishes the broader definition of 
40 Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention, 
IAEA INFCIRC 402. Adopted on 21 September 1988 and entered into force on 27 April pursuant to 
Article VII which was three months later. 
�
1 Supra n 6 Pelzer, 1999 p342. 
�
2 Ibid 
43 Supra n 5 Harbach, 2000 p379. 
44 Supra n 6 Pelzer, 1999 p336. 
45 Article 8 Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention. 
149 
environmental damage agreed to in 1997. It is acknowledged that the longer the time 
span involved, the more difficult it is for claimants to prove causal links. However, 
the time limitation illustrates that the nuclear liability regimes were designed to cover 
the accidents arising from nuclear reactors or perhaps during the transboundary 
movement of nuclear waste. Neither convention provides the means to cover 
potential liability for the HL W over the long storage period required to safeguard the 
radioactive waste in geological repositories. 
Under the Vienna, Paris and Supplementary Compensation Conventions, liability is 
channelled exclusively to the operator and is absolute. This means that there is no 
requirement for victims to prove fault or negligence against the operator following an 
accident. While the conventions were designed specifically with nuclear reactors in 
mind, the Vienna Convention now includes the definition of a nuclear installation as 
"any facility where nuclear material is stored'1.46 It is most likely that this would 
apply to an underground repository, at least while the operator47 retains responsibility 
for the facility. The operator would need to satisfy the Installation State that it has the 
necessary insurance or other financial security to meet the compensatory 
requirements of the relevant liability regime. In the case of Australia, which has 
signed only the Supplementary Compensation Convention, it was envisaged during 
the PRA project debate that the operator would be required to set aside 300 million 
SDR's (worth about $US 400 million) in compensation funds.48 Yet the operating life 
of the repository was planned for forty years, after which it would be petmanently 
sealed. After forty years all responsibility and thus liability would transfer directly to 
the host-state. This demonstrates a fundamental weakness in the nuclear liability 
regimes when applied to the multinational repository concept. The daunting prospect 
of assuming total responsibility, after forty years, was among the main reasons why 
Australia rejected the PRA project49 and why two separate state governments passed 
almost identical legislation prohibiting the storage of HL W in their regions. 
46 Vienna Convention Article 1 J (3) 
47 Ibid Article I C "Operator", in relation to a nuclear installation, means the person designated or 
recognized by the Installation State as the operator of that installation. 
48 See Freehill Hollingdale and Page. "Briefing Paper - Application of Treaties to Importation of 
Nuclear Waste to Australia," Report prepared for Pangea Resources Australia Ply Ltd, 1998 p12. 
49 "Legislative Assembly." Western Australian Parliamentary Debates, Wednesday 8 September 1999 
p886. 
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The issue of liability thus highlights the problematic nature of placing the onus of 
responsibility solely on the host-state and raises questions of fairness and equity. It is 
unlikely that agreement for a multinational repository could be achieved by relying 
on the existing nuclear liability conventions. Under the current arrangements the 
burden of responsibility falls on the host-state to ensure that adequate safety and 
compliance measures are in place. The host-state would also be responsible for 
ensuring the operator has the necessary expertise and financial liability funds, 50 and
for approving and granting the operating licence.51 It follows that the state would try
to ensure that the operator meets its liability obligations over an agreed timeframe, as 
the onus would be on the state to pick up any compensatory shortfalls, should the 
operator liquidate. Yet to expect a single nation to assume total responsibility and 
associated liability for other nations' HLW for many decades is most ambitious, and 
unlikely to prove successful. Those shortcomings raise the obvious question as to 
why the nuclear states utilising the multinational repository should be exempted from 
assuming some responsibility and thus exempted from liability for the waste they 
have created. That question is especially pertinent when one considers that those 
nuclear states would have benefited from their use of nuclear generated power. It is 
widely accepted that energy production for domestic and industrial use contributes 
directly to economic growth and to overall improvement in the quality of life.52
Hence, for a multinational repository to gain acceptance there must also be an 
obligation on the states having enjoyed the benefits of nuclear energy to share in the 
potential risks involved in the long-tenn storage of the HLW. The absence of such an 
obligation was a clear failing in the PRA project for Australia, which was primarily a 
commercial venture, designed to make a profit. 53 Interestingly the operator and
associated companies would have profited during the forty-year operating life of the 
repository, but they planned to leave the potential long-tenn costs to Australia post 
so NEA Secretariat. "Problems Raised by the Applications of the Conventions on Nuclear Third Party
Liability to Radioactive Waste Repositories." Nuclear Law Bulletin 55 (1995) p20. [hereinafter, NEA 
Secretariat 1995]. si Supra n 31 de La Fayette, 1992 p22.
52 J, Lang-Lenton Leon, "Radioactive Waste Management and Sustainable Development." NEA News
19 (2001) pl8. 
SJ C. McCombie, G. Butler, M. Kurzeme, D. Pentz, J. Voss & P. Winter, "The Pangea International
Repository: A Technical Overview." Paper presented at the Waste Management '99 Conference, 
Tuscon 1999pl. 
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closure. It is acknowledged that the voluntary host-state was expected to benefit from 
increased employment opportunities, export revenues54 and royalties and taxes to the 
relevant governments. Yet, as the Access Economics Report conceded, part of the 
estimated $90 billion payments to the Australian goverrunents "might go to establish 
a long term fund for care of the facility post closure". 55 Considering that the multi­
barrier repository technology is unproven, it is simply impossible to predict how 
much would need to be set aside to cover future costs of potential accidents or 
leakage over the time frame involved in safeguarding the HLW. Hence, it is most 
unlikely that any host state would accept HL W from other nation states, if they also 
have to assume all responsibility and costs for potential accidents during the long­
term management of the facility. In the case of the PRA project, the Australian 
population through their governments completely r�jected the proposal because in 
their view the benefits did not outweigh the risks. 56
As argued in the previous chapter, a multinational HLW repository is an ambitious 
undertaking that requires a cooperative and collaborative solution by the nation states 
intending to utilise the shared facility. Coverage from the civil nuclear liability 
regimes during the transportation of HL W is somewhat ambiguous, and it is non­
existent for the long duration required for the radioactive isotopes to decay to safe 
accepted levels in a geological repository.57 In the interests of cooperation, fairness
and to address the public perception of risk, the onus of responsibility and liability 
caIU1ot rest solely with the host-state. To overcome this problem the nuclear states 
intending to utilise the repository would have to commit to some form of collective 
responsibility over an extended period of time. This can be achieved only by utilising 
the most relevant principle in international law, and by enshrining that principle in a 
binding multilateral treaty, with the full endorsement of the nuclear states using the 
shared repository. Such a principle must have the capacity and robustness to be 
applicable for the long duration involved for storing the HLW. The international law 
principle of state responsibility is one concept particularly suited to resolving 
s4 Although t!te intent was for Australia to import the HLW, the host state would in fact be exporting a service, and the revenue raised would be recorded on the export side of the ledger. 
55 Access Economics. "The Economic Impact of the Nuclear Waste Repository Project." Canberra: Draft Report, prepared for Pang ea Resources by Access Economics, 1998 pl. 
56 Supra n 4 Holland, 2002 p287.
57 NEA Secretariat 1995, p20. 
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conflicts across state borders, and it may well be the central concept to enshrine in a 
multilateral treaty for HL W. 
The International Law Concept of State Responsibility 
'State Responsibility' can be loosely described as being similar in operation to Tort 
Law as applied in the domestic sphere, 58 and is the principle whereby states can be 
held accountable in interstate claims for breaches of obligations under international 
1aw.59 In order for state responsibility to be invoked, there must be an identifiable 
international obligation, and then state responsibility assigns a duty on that state to 
make amends for breaching the international obligation. The breach of an 
international obligation can occur under treaty or customary international law. The 
state responsibility concept is not confined to affording reparation after the event, as 
is sometimes implied, but has wider applications, including an obligation not to 
cause P.nvironmental harm. Initially the principle was fairly limited in scope, as it 
only invoked state responsibility for injuries to aliens.60 Arguably the most cited 
instance of state responsibility involving environmental damage beyond the 
territorial borders of a state was the Trail Smelter arbitral decision.61 The case 
involved the transboundary movement of sulphur fumes from a lead and zinc ore 
smelter in Trail, British Columbia, across the border into the US, causing damage to 
crops, trees and lands. Following negotiation, the US and Canada agreed that the 
case should be referred to the International Joint Commission for determination. This 
was a body set up by the two states under the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. 62 The 
Commission assessed the damage in 1931 at $US 350,000, which Canada agreed to 
pay, as it had not disputed the issue of liability. 
ss F. Vicuna, "St.ate Responsibility, Liability and Remedial Measures ur1der International Law: New 
Criteria for Environmental Protection." In Environmental Change and International law: New 
Challenges and Dimensions, edited by E. Brown Weiss. Tokoyo: United Nations University, 1992 
r,t24.9 I. Brownlie, The Rule of law in Jntemational Affairs: lntemational law at the Fiftieth Anniversary
'tfthe United Nations, The Hague: KJttwer Law International, 1998 p79.D. Bodansky & J. Crook, "Symposium: The ILC'S State Responsibility Articles: Introduction and
Overview." The American Joun,al of International law 96 (2002) p776. [hereinafter, Bodansky & 
Crook, 2002]. The word alien means a foreign national, and in the context of state responsibility means the protection of foreign nationals and their property. 61 "Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal Decision." Reprinted in, American Journal of International Law 33 
{1939] 182. And 35 AJIL [1941] 684. [hereinafter, Trail Smelter 35 AJIL [1941] 684].1 D. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law. Fourth Edition, London: Sweet & Maxwell,
1991 p243. 
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However, since the smelter continued to operate, the United States sought the 
prevention of further sulphur fume emissions and claimed around $US 2 million 
compensation in damages. This time the matter was referred to arbitration, whereby 
the Tribunal resolved in 1938 to award $78,000 to the US for damages between 1931 
and 1937. The second question asked of the Tribunal was "whether the Trail Smelter 
should be required to refrain from causing damage in the State of Washington in the 
future and, if so, to what extent?"63 The Tribunal applied the domestic law of the 
United States and the general principles of international law to reach its conclusions. 
The final decision of the Tribunal, as issued in 1941, contained the following: 
Under the principles of international law, as well as the law of the United States, no 
state has the right to use or pennit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause 
injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the property or persons therein, when 
the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing 
evidence.64 
Hence Trail Smelter65 provided a landmark decision in international law prohibiting 
transboundary pollution beyond a state's borders. Yet, as Brownlie quite accurately 
contends, the decision made a "rather modest contribution to the jurisprudence",66 
because of its limited application. Among its limitations were a requirement of 
tangible injury that could be given a monetary figure; the incident had to be of 
"serious consequence"; and the injury had to be established by "clear and convincing 
evidence 11 •67 Moreover, the decision only dealt with damage to property and did not 
take into account the broader envirorunental considerations of damage to wildlife and 
ecosystems. Notwithstanding these limitations, Trail Sme/ter68 did provide an 
important precedent in international environmental law on transboundary pollution. 
The concept of state responsibility was strengthened by the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) in the Corfu Channef9 case, where each state was deemed to have an 
63 Ibid p244. 
64 Trail Smelter [1941) 35 AJJL, 716. 
6s Ibid.
66 I. Brownlie, "A Survey oflnternational Customary Rules of Environmental Protection." Natural
Resources Journal 13 (1973) p180. 
67 Trail Smelter [1941] 35 AJIL, 116. 
68 Ibid. 
69 The Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom V Albania) (1949) ICJ Reports 1. 
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obJigation "not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the 
rights of other states".70 In that case, the court held that Albania had a duty to warn 
British warships of the existence of mines in the Corfu Channel, which was part of 
Albanian waters. In the Lac Lanow:71 case, which involved a claim by Spain that 
France had violated a treaty by diverting a river in its · �rritory before it entered 
Spain, the Tribunal found no breach of treaty, but held that if France had polluted the 
waters, Spain would have had a valid claim. 72 Lac Lanoux also noted that states have 
a specific obligation to consult and negotiate with any state that may be affected by 
the proposed activity. Collectively, Trail Smelter, Corfu Channel and Lac Lanoux 
clearly established the existence of a rule of international law prohibiting 
transboundary harm, and paved the way for potential liability for a failure to , r· ,,
hannful activities against another nation state.73 These decisions in effect placeo ;..ii 
onus of responsibility to coincide with state sovereignty, if actiom. withili a state 
cause pollution to the environment of or impact adversely on peoples of ,:uother 
state. In the absence of specific treaty obligations, states can invoke the dispute 
resolution provisions available under public international law. The two or more states 
involved in the dispute would have to agree to the jurisdiction of the ICJ before it can 
preside over the contentious issue. 
The state responsibility concept received notable recognition during the 1972 United 
Nations (UN) Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm.74 This 
conference marked the beginning of concerted global consciousness about 
environmental issues and provided the catalyst for international cooperation to 
resolve a number of outstanding collective problems.75 The declaration passed in 
Stockholm contained seven proclamations and twenty-six principles. Principle 24 
70 Ibid p22. 
71 Lac lanoux Arbitration (France V Spain) (1957) 24 /LR 101. 
72 L. Jurgielewicz, Global Environmental Change and International Law. London: University Press of
America, 1996p54. 
73 R. Rayfuse, "International Environmental Law." In Public International Law: An Aul·tralian
Perspective, edited by S. Blay, R. Piotrowicz & B. Tsamenyi. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
1997 p357. 
14 United Nations. "United Nations Conference on the Human Environment." Stockholm, Sweden, 5-
16 June 1972. 
HP. Taylor, An Ecological Approach to International Law: Responding to Challenges of Climate 
Change. London: Routledge, 1998 p73. 
155 
sought to enhance nation state cooperation on environmental issues. It specifically 
stated that: 
International matters concerning tile protection and improvement of the environment 
should be handled in a cooperative spirit by all countries, big and small, on an equal 
footing.16 
In tenns of the state responsibility concept, Principle 21 of the Stockholm declaration 
provides the fundamental 'soft law' principle of international law concerning 
transboundary pollution. It states the ,;ommon conviction that: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of 
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their 
own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of 
areas beyond the limits ofnationaljurisdiction.71 
Principle 21 has been embodied in a number of conventions, including the 1982 
United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea,78 the 1985 Vienna Convention for 
the Protection of the Ozone Layer79 and the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate 
Change.80
At Rio de Janerio in 1992, the UN Conference on Environment and Development81 
reaffirmed and built upon the declarations passed twenty years earlier at Stockholm. 
The participating states at the Rio Conference adopted inter alia 27 guiding 
principles. Principle 2 reiterated the notion of state responsibility to prevent 
environmental harm with a reproduction of the entire wording contained in Principle 
21 of the Stockholm Conference. It extended the concept from specific 
'environmental policies' to include the important addition of 'developmenta l 
policies'.82 The inclusion of the phrase 'developmental' has been criticised by some 
76 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment 1972, 11 ILM 1416. 
77 Ibid.
78 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, 21 ILM 1261. 
79 Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 1985, (Vienna) 26 ILM 1529. 
ao Framework Convention on Climate Change 1992, 31 JLM 85 I. 
81 United Nations. "Report of the United Nations Conferenc.-: on Environment and Development." 
A/CONF.151126 (Vol. I) 3-14 June 1992. lhereinafter, UNCED 1992]. 
Rl Ibid Principle 2. 
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as weakening the emphasis on the need for environmental protection in favour of 
development interests. Others, however, view the inclusion in a mon:: positive 
manner, as an extension of the obligation to prevent environmental harm in a broader 
policy framework. Under the latter interpretation 11not only national environmental 
policies, but also national development policies are subject to the duty not to cause 
transboundary pollution. 1183 This acknowledgment of the need for �tates to balance 
resource development with their environmental obligations provides additional 
confirmation to the international law principle not to cause significant transboundary 
environmental damage. Although classified as non-binding soft-law, these 
declarations do help shape state practice and can evolve into customary law or be 
utilised in the hard Jaw Treaty format. 
State responsibility was enhanced further by the stronger commitment of nation 
states to develop international liability laws at the Rio Conference on Environment 
and Development in 1992. Again, Principle 13 built on the earlier Principle 2284 
wording in an effort to expedite international liability laws for environmental 
damage. Principle 13 reads: 
States shall develop national law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of 
pollution and other environmental damage. States shall also cooperate in an expeditious 
and more detennined manner to develop funher intemational law regarding liability and 
compensation for adverse effects of environmental damage caused hy activities within 
their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their jurisdiction. 85 
Those declarations increase the likelihood of invoking state responsibility under 
customary international Jaw. Yet despite the obvious widespread commitment to 
these general principles, there has been reluctance by some states to formalise 
liability commitments in binding treaty regimes. In the absence of such regimes the 
invocation of state responsibility is more difficult as states have to rely on Customary 
83 F. Perrez, "The Relationship between ''Permanent Sovereignty" and the Obligation Not to Cause
Transboundary Environmental Damage." Environmental law 26 (1996) pl203. 
H Supra n 76 11 /LM (1972) p1416. es Supra n 81 UNCED 1992 Principle 13.
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International Law, and the dispute settlement procedures available under general 
international law. 
As discussed earlier, there is a noticeable reluctance among the nuclear states to sign 
up to the civil nuclear liability regimes,86 not to mention accede to the substantial 
amendments required for those conventions to adequately provide liability 
arrangements to cover the potential risks associated with a multinational HL W 
repository. It would be more likely for a country to offer a site for a multinational 
repository if there were shared responsibility and liability arrangements in place and 
able to be invoked. That can be achieved only with such provisions enshrined in a 
binding Treaty. The state responsibility concept appears to be particularly suited for 
inclusion in the Treaty as it has the capacity to act both as a preventive and, with the 
liability obligations, a restorative mechanism in the event of an accident during the 
long-term storage of HL W. State responsibility, if deemed suitable, would need to be 
specifically enshrined in an agreed treaty designed to cover all aspects involved in 
the long-tenn storage of HLW. That treaty would provide a clearly identifiable 
international obligation on the nuclear states utilising the repository, but before 
discussing that it is necessary to examine the state responsibility concept in greater 
detail to determine its suitability for inclusion. 
ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
The International Law Commission (ILC) was established in 1947 with the main 
objective of codifying and enhancing the progressive development of international 
law. Among the many responsibilities assigned to the ILC in the initial years was the 
task of codifying the law of state responsibility, which it was invited to do in 1953 
and which it completed in 2001.87 The Commission has been criticised on various 
occasions, and somewhat paradoxically, for both its broad and narrow focus on the 
concept during the forty years it took to complete the draft articles on state 
responsibility. The long period taken by the lLC to codify the principles of state 
responsibility is due in part to the Commission's heavy workload and involvement in 
such an enonnous range of issues, combined with their part time role. However, it is 
86 Supra n 6 Pelzer, 1999 p342. 
81 Supra n 60 Bodansky & Crook, 2002 p777. 
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also indicative of the complex nature of state responsibility, and demonstrates to 
some extent the ILCs awareness of the historic reluctance of sovei:-eign states to 
commit to such a far-reaching principle, and the need for their completed work to 
gain acceptance from the community of nation states. 88 The ILC's detailed work in 
the area of codification is widely regarded as an authoritative statement of the 
existing law.89 It has attended to a vast range of topics and has contributed greatly to 
numerous conventions and treaties, including the law of the sea, state succession, 
international watercourses and diplomatic immunity.90 The ILC's draft convention on 
what was later to become the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is 
often cited as its most spectacular success.91
The ILC process of codifying state responsibility began with an extremely ambitious 
undertaking, when the first special rapporteur, F. V. Garcia-Amador of Cuba, 
reverted to the notion of state responsibility for injury to aliens. By concentrating his 
efforts on the primary rules of obligation, the task became so complex and 
contentious among nation states that little progress was made. The Commission was 
unable even to discuss his proposals in detail, and in 1961 it appointed a 
subcommittee under the chainnanship of Roberto Ago of Italy to provide a way 
forward. Subsequently, most of the earlier work by the Commission was abandoned, 
and instead Ago focused on the general 'secondary' rules of state responsibility, 
rather than particular primary rules of obligation. 92 In other words, the ILC ceased its 
attempt to codify the general substantive rules of state responsibility, and shifted its 
focus to a state's specific breach of obligation. As Ago stated: 
The Commission agreed oo the need to concentrate its study on the determination of the 
principles which govern the responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, 
maintaining a strict d istinction between this task and the task of defining the rules that 
place obligations on States, the violation of which may generate responsibility. 
Consideration of the various kinds of obligations placed on States in international law, 
ail R. Rosenstock, "The ILC and State Responsibility." The American Journal of International Law 96
(2002) p794. 
89 This should not however be confused with being a "source" of international law. Indeed the 
authority of the ILC has been likened to that of the writings of highly respected publicists. 
90 Supra n 2 Birnie and Boyle 2002, p21. 
91 I. Sinclair, The International law Commission. Cambridge: Grotius, 1987 p39.
n Ibid. 
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and in particular, a grading of such obligations 21ccording to their importance to the 
international community, may have to be treated as a necessary element in assessing the 
gravity of an internationally wrongful act and as a criterion for determining the 
consequences it should have. But this must not obscure the essential fact that it is one 
thing to define a rule and the content of the obligation it imposes [the primary rule), and 
another to determine whether that obligation has been violated and what should be the 
consequence of the violation [the secondary rule]. Only the second aspect oftbe matter 
comes within the sphere of responsibility proper; to encourage any confusion on this 
point would be to raise an obstacle which might once again frustrate the hope of a 
successful codification of the topic.9l 
The focus on secondary rules enabled the ILC to proceed, and that conceptual 
framework remained throughout the deliberations leading to the completion of the 
draft articles in 2001.94 In addition, Ago's approach gained wide acceptance by 
avoiding protracted disputes driven by national self-interest. In concentrating on the 
secondary rules, Ago in effect broadened the focus to cover the whole area of 
international law, but left the task of setting and adopting specific obligations, most 
likely by treaty, to the collective body of nation states. That deft shift allowed the 
ILC to focus instead on the consequences of a breach of such obligations. Moreover, 
it did not restrict the possibility that state responsibility can also be derived from 
either customary or general principles of international law. Any conflict, however, 
arising from the latter means of invocation can only be resolved under the existing 
dispute mechanisms of public international law. 
Treaty law can also be contentious and open to different interpretations but it has 
evolved into the most recognised and robust source of international law. Edith 
Brown-Weiss provides an assessment of the historical jurisprudential disagreements 
among states regarding the invocation of obligations in international agreements, 
which can be summarised in the following three questions. Do international 
agreements create only bilateral obligations between pairs of individual states? Do 
they also create an indivisible whole, so that the treaty obligations are to be 
93 JLC. Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2 (1970) p306. Wording in italics has been 
added for emphasis. 
� J. Crawford, "The ILC's Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: A 
Retrospect." The American Journal of International law 96 (2002) p877. [hereinafter, Crawford, 
2002]. 
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performed in relation to every other state party to the agreement? Or do international 
agreements, in some cases, reflect obligations of a state toward the international 
community as a whole.95 The first question is relatively straightfmward. Since the 
rights and obligations exist between indi':'idual states, the state holding the right can 
invoke state responsibility against the holder of the obligation. Brown-Weiss 
maintains that the second category "is more complicated, because it posits that some 
agreements create rights and obiigations that are indivisible for all states party to the 
treaty and that each state owes an obligation to every other state party to perform 
those treaty obligations".96 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties addressed 
this problem in article 60 by defining when a state party to a multilateral agreement 
may terminate or suspend the operation of a Treaty in response to a material breach 
by another contracting party. The third category raises the question of obligation 
erga omnes (towards all), which as stated previously gained greater acceptance 
following the Barcelona Traction case. 97 The ILC considered and accommodated all 
three categories in the draft articles on state responsibility and all three are discussed 
below. 
The completed draft articles on state responsibility were submitted to the United 
Nations General Assembly in 2001, with the simple recommendation that the 
Assembly take note of the articles. On 12 December 2001, the General Assembly 
formally adopted Resolution 56/83, which duly noted the articles and "commended98 
them to the attention of Governments without prejudice to the question of their future 
adoption or other appropriate action. 1199 To just 'note' the articles was somewhat
unusual, as in most instances the Assembly would pass a stronger resolution with a 
more fonnal authorisation of the articles that would usually provide the basis for a 
fully-fledged convention. Pierre Klein contends that merely taking note of the 2001 
articles left a number of questions unanswered. 100 These include whether the articles
95 E. Brown-Weiss, "Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century." The American
Journal of International Law 96 (2002) pBOl. [hereinafter, Brown Weiss, 2002]. 
96 Ibid 
91 Supra n t I Barcelona Traction (1970) ICJ Reports 4. 
98 The word commends is used in the present tense, in the text of the resolution. 
99 United Nations. "General Assembly Resolution 56/83." 2001, para 3. 
100 P. Klein, L. Bois son de Chazournes, X. Hanquin & D. Caron, "The State of State Responsibility."
American Society of International law. Procedings of the Annual Meeting (2002) p169. [hereinafter, 
Klein, et al., 2002]. 
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can be invoked in bilateral interstate relations without fonnal UN approval, and 
whether, in the absence of fonnal authorisation, the states and judges will be able to 
resolve the more controversial aspects of the text. mi James Crawford provides a 
more positive assessment and highlights the fact that governments were continually 
involved in providing input to the process through the United Nations General 
Assembly, Sixth Committee on Legal Affairs. He also suggests that the ILCs 
willingness to act on the Committee's suggestions was among the main reasons why 
the Assembly promptly passed Resolution 56/83 with practically no debate.102
Furthennore, the resolution allows ample time for further consideration by the nation 
states, and it avoided the possibility of a significantly weakened t ext, if the Assembly 
had attempted to fonnally sanction the articles. States can also draw on and fonnalise 
aspects of the state responsibility articles into specific treaties. 
The articles on state responsibility are organised into four parts, with the origins and 
elements of international responsibility contained in part one. Part two deals with the 
content of international responsibility, and part three with the implementation of the 
international responsibility of a state. Some general provisions are listed in the 
smallest section, part four. 103 It is not intended here to provide an in depth analysis of 
all the disputed provisions throughout the ILC deliberations, which lasted some four 
de:cades, or to indeed provide a detailed account of the 59 articles contained in the 
final text. 104 However, before focusing on the final text pertaining to the collective 
state obligation areas of interest most relevant to multilateral regimes, it is worth 
noting a related area of contention that held up the codification process for many 
years. 
Perhaps the most controversial issue during the entire deliberations was Article 19 of 
the 1996 drafts. The ILC initially attempted to translate the erga omnes concept into 
the draft articles by reference to the notion of 11intemational crimes" of states in 
Articles 19 and 40. Article 19 (2) read as follows: 
101 Ibid. Klein acknowledges that the resolution of those issues could be in either a political or a 
�udicial forum. 
02 Supra n 94 Crawford, 2002 p875. 
LoJ ILC Draft Articles, 2001, 
104 Such analyses are beyond the scope of this study. 
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An internationally wrongful act which results from the breach by a State of an 
international obligation so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the 
international community that breach is recognised as a crime by that conununity as a 
whole constitutes an international crime. 105 
Article 19 (3) provided some examples of international crimes based on the rules of 
international law already in force. James Crawford maintains that such attempts 
"plainly strayed over the line between primary and secondary rules". Article 19 in 
effect established a distinction between responsibility for international crimes and 
delicts. 106 The rationale behind that distinction was that certain wrongful acts were 
considered more serious, and thus thought to require separate rules of responsibility. 
Yet the distinction created much debate and confusion over what constitutes specific 
crimes, and what the consequences would be arising from those crimes, when 
defined. 107 The connotations surrounding the use of the word 'crimes' was also 
contentious. 
To alleviate the controversy, the ILC decided to remove all reference to 'crime' and 
the entire text of article 19. This was a compromise between those advocating a 
specific category for the more serious breaches, and those who argued that state 
responsibility should be contained in a single undifferentiated category of 
internationally wrongful acts. 108 Following the removal of article 19, the ILC 
introduced a new chapter dealing with serious breaches of obligations owed to the 
international community as a whole. Article 41 specifically stated: 
I. This Chapter applies to the international responsibility arising from an internationally
wrongful act that constitutes a serious breach by a State of an obligation owed to the
international community as a whole and essential for the protection of its fundamental
interests.
ios ILC. Report of the International law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eight Session. General
Assembly Official Records, Fifty-First Session Supplement No.to/NSt/10. 6 May-26 July, 1996 
r,131.06 J. Howard, "Invoking State Responsibility for Aiding Crimes - Australia, the United States and the
Question of East Timor." Melbourne Journal of International Law 2 (2001) p3. [hereinafter, Howard, 
2001]. 
107 See in particular the conunents from Japan to the ILC, "State Responsibility: Conunents and 
Observations Received from Governments." UN Doc AICN.41492, 1999, p9. 
108 Supra n 106 Howard, 2001 p9. 
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2. A breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure by
the responsible State to fulfil the obligation, risking substantial harm to the fundamental 
interests protected thereby.109 
Yet Article 41 also proved contentious, and a number of governments, including 
France, Japan, United Kingdom and the United States, objected to its contents, and 
sought the entire deletion of Chapter III. In arguing against the wording of Article 
41, one government representative wittily referred to the text as being "still haunted 
by the ghost ofintemational crimes 11. no There was however support for the retention
of Chapter III from nations such as Derunark, Austria, the Netherlands and Slovakia, 
though it was agreed that the wording needed improvement. The text was further 
reviewed and, in the final draft, Article 41 appears much less controversial, outlining 
in (1) that "states shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious 
breach within the meaning of article 40".111 Firstly the breach must concern an
obligation arising under a perempt.:,ry norm of general international law. Secondly 
the intensity of the breach must be considered serious. As the commentaries reveal: 
Article 40 serves to define the scope of the breaches covered by the Chapter. It 
establishes two criteria in order to distinguish "serious breaches of obligations under 
peremptory norms of general htemational law" from other types of breaches. The first 
relates to the character of the obligation breached, which must derive from a peremptory 
nonn of general international law. The second qualifies the intensity of the breach, 
which must have been serious in nature. Chapter III only applies to those violations of 
international law that fulfil both criteria. 112 
Thus, Articles 40 and 41 are designed to complement each other, with the former 
defining the scope of the breaches covered by Chapter III, and the latter setting out 
the particular consequences of the breaches. 
109 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-second session. "State 
Responsibility: Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting Committt:e on Second Reading." UN 
A/CN.4/L.600, 21 August 2000. [hereinafter, ILC Draft Articles, 2000]. 
11
0 J. Crawford, "Fourth Report on State Responsibility." International Law Commission, 53rd
Session, A/CN.4/517, 2001 pl7. 
111 ILC Draft Articles, 2001. 
111 J. Crawford, The International law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction
Text and Commentaries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002 p245. [hereinafter, Crawford, 
Conunentaries 2002]. 
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The collective dimension of state responsibility has been significantly enhanced by 
the work of the ILC and especially by the decision to retain Chapter III. The modem 
integrated world of multilateralism was accommodated for, with the shift from the 
traditional bilateral approach of state responsibility to an acceptance of obligations 
erga omnes. That shift is clearly stated in Article 33, which reads: 
The obligations of the responsible State set out in this part may be owed to another 
State, to several States, or to the international community as a whole, depending in 
particular on the character and content of the international obligation and on the 
circumstances of the breach. 113 
That clause is another recognition of the obligation on states to talce all necessary 
measures to prevent hann to other nation states and to the international community as 
a whole. The inclusion of the concept of erga omnes in the draft articles is an 
important development in the codification of international law, and when fonnally 
adopted will give far greater weight to the collective responsibility of states. It is also 
worth noting that, even without fonnal ratification, the ILC articles have the potential 
to be used by the ICJ, and other arbitral tribunals, to provide clarity and to assist in 
judicial decisions to resolve disputes. This has led to some commentators, such as 
David Caron, warning against the danger of giving too much credence to the ILC 
articles, which although written in treaty fonn, should not be viewed as a source of 
law without fonnal adoption.114 Caron is also critical of the ambiguity in much of the
text, and highlights the need to go beyond the 'plain meaning' rule, to consult the 
commentaries and ILC reports for greater clarification of intent. He does concede, 
however, that if applied correctly the state responsibility articles in conjunction with 
case law and customary international law can have a significant impact on the future 
development ofintemational law. 115
Despite these improvements, the beneficial aspects of the State Responsibility 
Articles to the proponents of a multinational HL W repository are unclear, even when 
formally adopted by the coHective body of nation states tlrrough the UN. The main 
113 /bidlLC2001. 114 See D. Caron, "The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: The Paradoxical Relationship between
Form and Authority." The American Journnl of International Law 96 (2002) p867. [hereinafter, 
Caron, 2002]. 
115 /bidp873. 
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reason for this is that there is as yet no international mechanism designed with 
responsibility and 1iability obligations for the nation states utilising multinational 
repositories. While formal adoption of the State Responsibility Articles would likely 
assist the ICJ in resolving potential disputes arising from an accident during 
transportation of the HLW,116 the articles would have little effect in the absence ofa
specific treaty for the shared repository. The reason for this is that in order to invoke 
state responsibility, there must be a clearly identifiable breach of a specific 
obligation. Thus it would be advantageous from the outset to ensluine the relevant 
sections of the draft articles on state responsibility in a specifically designed treaty 
for the eventual storage of HL W in the multinational repository. 
' 
So what sections of the draft articles are most suited to fit the shared responsibility 
requirements of the multinational repository concept? The relevant sections 
pertaining to the collective responsibility of nation states are contained in Articles 33, 
42, and 48, 117 with Article 54 providing a saving clause, which leaves open the 
option of countenneasures. Article 33 clarifies the scope and effect of international 
obligations. It is explicit in paragraph one that the obligation of the responsible state 
depends both on the primary rule which established the obligation that was breached 
and on the circumstances of the breach.118 The commentaries use the example of
ocean pollution, which has the potential to affect the international community as a 
whole or states ofa region or only a single neighbouring state. 119 The gravity of the 
breach may have a significant impact on ihe obligations to cease certain activities 
forthwith, and on the extent of reparation. The conunentaries further illustrates that 
11the reference to several states includes the case in which a breach affects all the 
other parties to a treaty or to a legal regime established under customary international 
law" .12° Since there is no specific legal regime for HL W disposal under customary 
international law, the above quote suggests it would be prudent for an easily 
116 The Court's jurisdiction and indeed all international judicial and arbitral tribunals require the 
consent of parties involved in the particular dispute. 
117 Supra n 100 Klein, et at., 2002 pt 72. 
118 ILC Draft Articles 2001. 
119 ILC. "Commentaries to the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Inten'tationally Wrongful 
Acts." UN Doc. A/56/10 2001 p233. [hereinafter, ILC Commentaries 2001], 
120 Ibid. 
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identifiable obligation to have in place a specific ratified treaty covering all aspects 
ofa HLW multinational repository. 
The signatories to a treaty for a multinational HL W repository would need to commit 
to the relevant sections in the draft articles dealing with the collective responsibility 
of nation states. Article 42 is one such article that introduces the invocation of 
responsibility by an h�ured state. The article provides that: 
A State is entitled as an injured State to invoke the responsibility of another State if the 
obligation breached is owed to: 
(a) That State individually; or
(b) A group of States including that State, or the international community as a whole,
and the breach of the obligation:
(i) Specially affects that State; or
(ii) Is of such a character as radically to change the position of all the other
States to which the obligation is owed with respect to the further performance of the
obligation. 121 
The conunentaries make clear that Article 42 provides that the implementation of 
state responsibility is in the first place an entitlem�nt of the 'injured' state. It defines 
the term in a relatively narrow way, drawing on the di�tinction between injury to an 
individual state or potentially a small number of states, and the legal interests of 
several or all states in certain obligations established in the collective interest. The 
specific obligations protecting the collective interest are dealt with in Article 48. The 
definition of an 'injured state' in Article 42 is closely modelled on Article 60 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, although the two provisions vary in 
scope and purpose. "Article 42 is concerned with any breach of an international 
obligation of whatever character, whereas article 60 is concerned with breach of 
treaties" . 122 In essence Article 60 is restricted to material breaches of treaties, 
whereas, in the context of state responsibility, Article 42 is concerned with any 
breach of an international obligation of whatever character. Another significant 
difference, with particular relevance to a potential treaty for a HL W waste repository, 
is _the intent of Article 42 (a) to provide an obligation under a multilateral treaty to 
121 ILC Draft Articles, 2001. 
122 
Supra n 119 ILC Commentaries, 2001 p295. 
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one particular state. 123 This would enable a number of states to commit responsibility 
to a single state, whereas Article 60 relied on the formal criterion of bilateral 
arrangements. As Brown-Weiss contends, Article 42 innovatively provides for the 
invocation of responsibility under the traditional bilateral approach, as well as 
providing obligations to a group of states under a multilateral treaty. 124 
Article 42 provides the best means for collective 'state responsibility' to include not 
only an outward responsibility from a single state to the international community as a 
whole, but also an inward responsibility from a group of states to a single state. 
Subject to agreement and formalisation in the Treaty, such a provision would 
accommodate shared responsibility for the HLW by the nation states utilising the 
repository. This would provide protection to the host state that has accepted the 
HL W from the other participating states. It would most likely increase the chance of 
gaining repository host acceptance, as well as provide incentives for the other states 
to ensure adequate monitoring procedures are in place to reduce the potential for 
incurred liability. 
The capacity for a atate other than the injured state to invoke responsibility of 
another state is accornodated for under Article 48, provided: 
(a) the obligation breached is owed to a group of States including that State, and is
established for the protection of a collective interest of the group; or
(b) the obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole.125 
This section is particularly relevant to states pru1:icipating in the collective interest 
although there has also been criticism of its extende..i scope and ambiguous text. Xue 
Hanquin expresses concern that Article 48 "leaves too much room for unilateral 
interpretation of what constitutes a collective interest and when an obligation erga
omnes has been breached." 126 His argument may haVe e.ome merit if the 'literal 
meaning' of the text is applied to the final draft articles. However, it was never the 
intent of the articles to give a free hand to any state to embark on a moral crusade 
123 /bidp298. 
114 Supra n 95 Brown-Weiss, 2002 pBOI. 
125 Article 48, ILC Draft Articles, 2001. 
125 Supra n 100 K1ein, et al., 2002 p174. 
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and initiate legal action in the 'general' collective interest. As Caron argues, it is 
always wise to consult the commentaries to ascertain the intent behind the wording 
of the text. 127 Thus paragraph 2 states: "Article 48 is based on the idea that in cases 
of breaches of specific128 obligations protecting the interests of a group of states 
which are not themselves injured in the sense of article 42." 129 The commentary 
further contends that the specific obligations have to be 1collective obligations' such 
as a regional security agreement, a regional nuclear free zone treaty, or specific 
arrangements for protecting the environment or human rights.130 Thus, it appears an 
endo.rsement of this article would strengthen the collective interests of the 
participating states in the shared multinational repository for HLW. 
Article 48 1 (b) is also innovative. It is likely to remain controversial in some 
quarters but may be particularly suited to cases concerning the transboundary 
movement of the HLW on the high seas. In this section, the ILC applied the famous 
dictum handed down by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Barcelona 
Traction 131 case, that there is a distinction between obligations owed to particular 
states and those "owed to the international community as a whole". The relevant 
paragraph of the case states: 
When a State admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign nationals, whether 
natural or juristic persons, it is bound to extend to them the protection of the law and 
assumes obligations com:eming the treatment to be afforded them. These obligations, 
however, are neither absolute nor unqualified. In particular, an essential distinction 
should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community 
as a whole, and those arising vis-a-vis another State in the field of diplomatic 
protection. By their very nature the fonner are the concern or all States. In view of the 
importance of the rights involved, all States can he held to have a legal interest in their 
protection; they are obligations ergo amnes. m 
Interestingly, the articles avoided the use of the tenn "obligations erga omnes" 
because in the Commission's view it conveyed less information than the ICJ's 
121 Supra n 114 Caron, 2002 p869. 
118 Emphasis added. 
119 Supra n 119 ILC Commentaries, 2001 para I p319. 
130 Ibid para 7 p320. 
Ill Suµra n 11 Barcelona Traction ( 1970) ICJ Reports 4.
132 /bidpara 33. 
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reference 133 to the 'international community as a whole', and has in some instances 
been confused with obligations owed to all parties to a treaty.134 Article 48 l (b) 
recognises that the international community as a whole has a legal interest in the 
performance of particular obligations that are considered to be of universal 
significance. In the Barcelona Traction135 case, the ICJ outlined some such 
obligations, including outlawing acts of aggression and genocide, and protection 
from slavery and racial discrimination. Additional obligatiom can emerge over time 
and, as the commentary revealed, the ICJ added the right of self-determination of 
peoples to the list during the East Timor136 case. The prohibition of all dumping of 
radioactive waste into the ocean has been widely accepted since the amendment to 
the London Dumping Convention in 1993. 137 Arguably, that obligation could be 
added to the list, and Article 48 would most likely cover an accident involving HLW 
on the high seas, once the articles are fonnally endorsed by the UN. Moreover, the 
international community as a whole has a legal interest in protecting humans·and the 
broader environment from a radioactive fallout arising from a HL W accident on sea 
or on land. 
The collective responsibility sections in the ILC draft articles are broadly accepted 
by the international community, as evidenced by the fundamental areas of interest 
detailed by the ICJ and with the reiteration of Principle 21 in a number of 
cooperative multilateral regimes in specific issue areas. Thus, the fonnalisation of the 
collective responsibility sections in the draft articles would make a significant 
contribution to the enhancement of the international law of state responsibility. Once 
the ILC collective principles are endorsed, state responsibility provides the most 
suitable international legal mechanism for ensuring adequate liability and restorative 
provisions for the multinational HLW repository over the long-tenn. To overcome 
ambiguity in the present international system, the most relevant sections, particularly 
the ILC collective responsibility sections, need to be endorsed in a binding 
multilateral treaty for a HLW repository. Such a commitment would likely meet 
Ill During the same case, see Ibid.
134 Supra n 119 ILC Commentaries, 2001 para 9 p321. 
m Supra n 11 Barcelona Traction ( 1970) ICJ Reports 4. 
136 East Timor (Portugal Y Australia.) {1995) ICJ Reports 90, para 29.
m Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 1972, 
1046 UNfS 120. 
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resistance from at least some of the nuclear states wishing to utilise the shared 
repository, because of the unknown potential liability costs. However, this being the 
case only highlights the unfairness in expecting the single host-state to accept all 
responsibility and thus liability for the long duration involved for HLW to decay to 
safe levels. 
While the potential for damage from a HL W repository accident may not be 
immediate or as profound as a critical reactor meltdown, there are a host of safety 
concerns that must be properly managed to address the public perception of risk. 138
In the absence of a demonstrable existing repository for HLW, and to forcefully 
support the technical safety arguments, the nuclear states must be willing to 
demonstrate their confidence in the repository concept. A commitment to collective 
responsibility and potential liability from the nuclear states utilising the repository 
would be the best means of demonstrating that commitment, as well as providing an 
avenue for alleviating the public perception of the risks associated with the 
multinational HLW repository. That commitment can only be secured in a specific 
binding regime, with the full endorsement of the state responsibility principle, 
complete with the latest and most relevant ILC recommendations. In signing up to a 
binding treaty which accepts shared responsibility for the repository, the collective 
states would ensure that proper regular monitoring measures are in place, to avoid 
associated costs with an accident or repository failure. JJ9 Another additional
incentive is the desire to maintain public confidence, which if not achieved could 
significantly impede acceptance of a multinational repository. 
Conclusion 
The obligation on states to prevent transboundary pollution is now widely accepted 
among international states. This commitment is most strongly expressed in the 'soft 
law1 general principles of international law. Despite its tenn, soft law should not be 
underestimated, as it can have a significant impact on the practice of states, and can 
eventually lead to customary international law. The obligation on states to prevent 
LJa P. Slovic, M. Layman & J. Flynn. "Perceived Risk. Trust, and the Politics of Nuclear Waste." 
Science 254 (1991) pl603. 
139 Supra n 31 de La Fayette, 1992 p23.
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environmental hann to other states and people received notable recognition with the 
international law principle of state responsibility. This concept was established with 
the Trail Smelter arbitration decision in 1941. It has gained stature over the years 
with additional case law and has been the subject of extensive scrutiny by the ILC in 
recent times. That process led to the completed draft articles on state responsibility in 
200 I which the UN, as requested, duly noted. This allows time for further refinement 
and also gives states the opportunity to adopt the relevant articles in ,!'.pecific treaties, 
should they choose to do so. 
The ILC deliberations and completed draft Articles have significantly advanced the 
development of state responsibility in international law. The specific section on the 
collective responsibility of states is most innovative and particularly relevant to a 
host of issues in the modem globally integrated world. In terms of the transboundary 
nature of a multilateral HLW repository, state responsibility is the most suitable 
international legal principle to mitigate the hazardous risks associated with long term 
radioactive waste. To avoid uncertainty, however, the nuclear states cannot leave the 
application of the concept to the resolution of the international courts. It would be 
better for them to seize the opportunity, examine the ILC draft articles and enshrine 
state responsibility in a specific HL W multilateral regime. The detailed elements of 
that treaty would be decided by the participating states, but would require an 
expansion of the state responsibility concept to the col_lective responsibility of states. 
In so doing, the treo.ty would need to include the collective responsibility sections of 
the ILC draft articles, or similar wording. A comprehensive HLW multilateral treaty, 
complete with detailed collective liability mechanisms, would most likely alleviate 
the public perception of associated radioactive risks. The additional advantage of 
such a detailed regulatory regime, especially if it contained a shared commitment for 
potential liability costs, would be the increased likelihood of gaining repository host 
acceptance. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
A SPECIFIC INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME FOR 
MULTINATIONAL REPOSITORIES 
The number of fonnal and in many cases binding mu1tilateral agreements in trade, 
security, human rights and the envirorunent has increased greatly since the Second 
World War. 1 The primary reason for this is that nation states have been compelled to
seek solutions to a range of issues at either a regional or a global level. 2 A number of
steps need to occur, however, before such agreements become fonnalised. Firstly, the 
problem to be resolved must be identified and researched. Secondly, the problem 
area must have the elements of interdependence requiring interstate cooperation. 
Thirdly, deliberations can occur over many years before the necessary commitment 
and collaboration among states is obtained. 3 The degree and depth of nation state
commitment is fundamental to the process, design and eventual structure of the 
international agreement. An agreement that is weak from the outset can reflect a lack 
of commitment among the state parties on how to resolve the issue in question. It can 
also allow states to ignore the guiding principles of an agreement, claiming that there 
are no binding strictures on their internal governing machinery. Some treaties for 
example, only contain statements of intent, or what are known as guiding principles. 
While such 'soft law' treaties amount to no more than declarations between states, the 
principles have the potential to gain broad acceptance and be later included in 
binding agreements. 
The previous chapter argued the case for shared responsibility and long-tenn liability 
provisions to be included in a binding treaty in order to manage HL W in a 
multinational repository. It highlighted the fact that the civil nuclear liability 
conventions are unsuitable for the necessary amendments required to cover the long-
I B. Simmons, "Compliance with International Agreements." Annual Review of Political Science
(1998) p75 [hereinafter, Simmons, 1998]; S. Barrett, Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of 
Environmental Statecraft. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003 p135. 
2 N. Lavranos, "Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Who Makes the Binding Decisions?"
European Environmental law Review (2002) p44. 
3 0. Young, Creating Regimes: Arctic Accords and International Governance. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1998 p4. [hereinafter, Young, 1998]. 
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tenn responsibility for the multinational repository, because of the large number of 
participating states with varying interests. The 1997 Joint Convention on the Safety 
of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management4 is 
also unsuitable for managing the shared responsibility requirements because of its 
contents. The Joint Convention would also be difficult to amend because it comprises 
both participating nuclear and non-nuclear states. Thus, this chapter argues the case 
for designing a completely new and separate treaty for the long-term storage of HL W 
in multinational repositories. Such a treaty would have four additional advantages. It 
would have the capacity to facilitate cooperation between the states during the 
negotiation phase of forming a new treaty. A carefully and specifically designed 
treaty with appropriate new legal concepts5 would have the propensity to alleviate 
public perceptions of risk with geological repositories. A specific treaty could assist 
with building public trust and enhance legitimacy for a multinational repository. And 
a multilateral treaty would also provide the necessary framework for governing the 
negotiated outcomes associated with a regional or global multinational repository.6
This chapter commences with a brief overview of the Joint Convention. It then seeks 
to refute the loss of sovereignty argument, often advanced by sceptics of interstate 
cooperation, by highlighting some examples where states have collaborated to 
resolve collective action problems. It advocates the stepwise approach to 
multinational repositories by outlining the necessary and beneficial phases of regime 
fonnation.7 The process of regime fonnation can assist with negotiations and 
identify and establish the fundamental requirements that should be included in a 
treaty designed for the specific issue to be resolved by a collaborative approach. A 
concluded agreement for a multinational repository would need to manage the shared 
costs, provide ownership details of the HLW, outline the procedures for monitoring 
4 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste 
Management 1997, INFCIR/546. [hereinafter, the Joint Convention]. 
' P. Riley, "Policy and Law Relating to Radioactive Waste: International Direction and Human 
Rights." Paper presented at the 9th Intemational Conference on En'lironmental Remediation and 
Radioactive Waste Management, Oxford, 21-25 September 2003 p6. 
6 The arguments for securing a Multilateral Treaty can be applied equally to either a regional or 
multinational re positories and as such the word regional will only he repeated in orde r to make a 
specific point. 
1 IAEA. "Teclutical, Institutional and Economic Factors Important for Developing a Multinational 
Radioactive Waste Repository." 1-22. Austria: IAEA-TECDOC-1021, 1998. 
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safety, and enable the retrieval of the HLW if required. Finally, with an emphasis on 
process and compliance, a case is made for a specific type of self regulating treaty. 
The Need for a Specific Multilateral HLW Repository Treaty 
The 1997 Joint Convention8 and the 1994 Convention on Nuclear Safety9 are the 
prevailing international conventions on nuclear safety, with both aiming to achieve 
high levels of safety worldwide with the use of incentives measures. The Convention 
on Nuclear Safety primarily encourages the safe management of nuclear activities 
associated with energy creation, while the Joint Convention promotes the safe 
management, storage and disposal of spent fuel and radioactive waste. The preamble 
to the Joint Convention maintains that the waste should, 11as far as is compatible with 
the safety of the management of such material, be disposed of in the State in which it 
was generated", but then it leaves open the option of inter-state cooperation under 
certain circumstances. 10 Thus there are no measures in the Joint Convention that 
prohibit a multinational repository, and it is an important instrument for guiding the 
safe management ofHLW. 
When the nuclear states enter into formal agreements, the obvious expectation would 
be for them to endorse or uphold the non·binding IAEA safety codes with detailed 
mandatory standards. However, this was not the case with these two prominent land­
based conventions on nuclear safety. The Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint 
Convention both lack specific safety obligations. Both conventions consist of vague 
principles rather than mandatory requirements, and both rely on the Parties to talce 
appropriate national measures to maintain safety. 11 Katia Boustany argues that the 
two treaties 11highlight a worrying trend in nuclear regulation, whereby they retain 
their legal status of hard law but are effectively transformed into soft law because of 
their contf;Ot".12 The 'soft law' option is unsuitable for a multinational HLW
repository for two main reasons. Firstly, the unproven technology for safeguarding 
the long-lived radionuclides in the HLW requires the support of binding institutional 
8 Supra n4 the Joint Convention. 
9 Convention on Nuclear Safety 1994, INFCIR/449. 
10 Ibid paragraph (xi) of the Preamble. 
11 lbid Article 18. 
12 K. Boustany, "The Development ofNuclear Law-Making or the Art of Legal Evasion." Nuclear
Law Bulletin 61 (1998) p44. [hereinafter, Boustany, 1998). 
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arrangements. Secondly, a multinational repository will require widespread public 
acceptance in a number of nation states, and the attainment of the necessary public 
confidence would be most difficult without fonnal regulatory backing. Thus it is 
unclear how beneficial the Joint Convention, which covers spent-fuel and radioactive 
waste, could be for a shared multinational repository, without significant 
renegotiation to instil binding regulatory obligations on the state parties. 
In an effort to meet the objectives of the Joint Convention, two linked articles were 
adopted, which required the Contracting Parties to prepare a national report13 for 
each review meeting.14 The first review meeting for the Joint Convention occurred in 
November 2003, with the Parties concluding that the Convention, the Review 
Meeting and the peer review process all contributed to the enhanced safety of spent 
fuel and radioactive waste management. 15 One notable benefit of the review 
meetings, and of peer review, is that they enhance the capacity for infonnation 
sharing, which inevitably leads to a greater understanding of particular problems and 
potential solutions. Yet the peer review process only partly offsets the shortcomings 
of self monitoring and reporting. Despite having agreed to specific guidelines for the 
structure and content of the national reports, some states did not follow the fonnat at 
all, and there was much variation amongst those that did. 16 Clearly there needs to be 
a greater emphasis on reporting factual compliance, rather than merely stating 
national regulations or mere objectives. 17 It would also be beneficial for there to be a 
dngle uniform global waste classification inventory, combined with uniform global 
safety standard criteria for geological repositories. The considerable lack of 
unifonnity in both practice and procedures among the Contracting Parties to the Joint 
Convention strongly suggests the need for a complete new treaty to specifically 
cover shared multinational repositories. 
ll Supra n 4 Article 32, the Joint Convention. 
14 Ibid Article 30. 
15 L. Williams, (Chair). First Review of the Contracting Parties to the Joint Convention on the Safety
of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, JC/RM.1/06/Final 
Version 2003. 
16 lbidp2. 
17 IAEA. Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive 
Waste Management: Guidelines Regarding the Form and Structure of National Reports, 
INFCIRC/604, 2002. 
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Another drawback with the Joint Convention is that some of the state parties have no 
operating nuclear power plants. While those states would have an interest in 
maximising global security, it is difficult to envisage a non-nuclear state agreeing to 
the hosting of a multinational repository without a binding agreement that included 
shared responsibility provisions. It is also most unlikely that any state that did not 
obtain direct benefits from nuclear power would contribute to any costs relating to a 
multinational repository. The Joint Convention is also unsuitable for amendment 
because agreement to include mandatory requirements would be virtually impossible 
to achieve among the participating states with such diverse interests. When the 
limitations of the current safety and other nuclear conventions are considered, 
combined with the need for suitable liability requirements discussed in the previous 
chapter, the argument for a specific treaty to manage a complex multinational 
repository becomes clearer. 
The Benefits of Shared Sovereignty 
Thf.:re is however often a reluctance for states to adopt an international regulatory 
framework because of a perceived 'loss of sovereignty'. Despite this reluctance, there 
is a symbiotic relationship between international law and international politics that 
cannot be ignored, 18 and the loss of sovereignty argument has been overcome many 
times by the collaborative action of nation states.19 While it is self-evident that 
international law cannot exist without the consent of sovereign states, modem nation 
states are increasingly turning to international law to help with the creation and 
promotion of nonns such as peace and security, and for a range of general 
environmental principles and rules.20 
In 1648 the Peace of Westphalia involved the signing of a number of treaties that 
ended the Thirty Years War,21 and it is often referred to as the beginning of the 
modem international system of sovereign states. International relations and 
international law have evolved since that time, but the central principle of the 
18 M. Byers, The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and
International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
19 Supra n I.
20 P, Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law. Second ed. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003 p231. 
11 Essentially this was a religious war between European Catholics and Protestants. 
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sovereign authority of the territorial state remains. The 1995 Conunission on Global 
Governance documented three important norms that stem from the principle of 
sovereign authority.22 First, all sovereign states, no matter how large or small, have 
equal rights. Second, the territorial integrity and political independence of all 
sovereign states are inviolable. And third, political interference in the domestic 
affairs of sovereign states is not pennissible.23 
The sovereignty of states is the main principle upon which the modern world is 
ordered, but it is also a contested concept.24 The traditional understanding of state 
sovereignty, as 'supreme authority' and 'external independence,' is no longer 
applicable in every situation, if it ever was. Stephen Krasner argues that the 
Westphalian model has never been a completely accurate description of many of the 
entities that have been called states.25 There are varying degrees of autonomy, with 
even the most powerful states having to accept compromise and in some cases 
outside scrutiny or 'interference'. State rulers have either chosen or have been 
compelled by international nonns to accept certain principles such as democracy, 
human rights, fiscal responsibility, environmental conunitrnents, and restrictions in 
nuclear weapons capabilities. States and their citizens have enjoyed the benefits of 
shared sovereignty by working collectively to reduce the use of ozone-depleting 
gases. They have enjoyed the benefits of integrated world markets, the exchange of 
information and knowledge and have benefited from collaborative efforts on disease 
prevention control. 
Yet one can still find trepidation about moves towards a more integrated political 
society and the perception of'losing sovereignty' can be relatively easy to create and 
then maintain. This is sometimes the case in Europe, with the debate on 'integration' 
often revolving around the relinquishing of sovereignty. At the June 2004 elections 
in the UK, some of the pro European Labour candidates lost to the Eurosceptics, 
22 I. Carlsson & S. Ramphal, (Co-Chair). Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission 
on Global Governance. Oxford: Oxford University Pre�s, 1995. 
21 lbidp68. 
24 R Vll.yrynen, "Sovereignty, Globalisation and Transnational Social Movements." International 
Relations of the Asia-Pacific 1 (2001) p23 l, 
25 S. Krasner, "Compromising Westphalia. (Nuclear Issues in Asia)." International Security 20 (1995)
pi 15. 
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whose main platfonn was the predictable 'loss of sovereignty' argument that a more 
integrated Europe would bring. Despite those concerns and the Labour losses, the 
UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, continues his push for closer links to Europe.26 In
the aftennath of the elections, and in defence of a negotiated European constitution, 
he said the proposed wording demolished the myths about Britain surrendering 
sovereignty to a federal superstate. "Myths that the constitution would force Britain 
to join the Euro, give up its United Nations Security Council seat and hand over 
control of its armed forces, taxes, oil and foreign policy to Brussels had been 
demolished".27 
In reality, states voluntarily collaborate and share sovereignty on a range of issues. 
John Richardson, deputy head of the delegation of the European Commission in 
Washington, provides the following definition to help explain why the European 
Member States share sovereignty. 
The sovereignty of a nation is its ability to take the action necessary to control its own 
destiny, achieve its aims, and further its interests in an independent manner. 28 
There is now widespread recognition that states are unable to individually solve a 
range of problems associated with a modem integrated interdependent world.29 Many 
states in Europe opted for the single European currency, and adopted common 
monetary and fiscal policies, because of the direct benefits to be gained by doing so. 
For the smaller states, in particular, those gains could only be achieved with a more 
collaborative�shared fonn of sovereignty. One of the main lessons from the European 
integration experience is that effective sovereignty can sometimes best be achieved 
by sharing it. 30
26 G. Jones, "Brown Puts Ambition on Hold as Blair Leads EU Fight." The Daily Telegraph, Thursday
22 June 2004. 
27 Ibid. 
2
g J. Richardson, "Sovereignty: EU Experience and EU Policy." Chicago Journal of lnternattonal Law
1 (2000) p323. 
29 I. Kaul, P. Conceicao, K. Le Goulven & R. Mendoza. "Why Do Global Public Goods Matter
Today?," in Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, edited by I. Kaul, P. 
Conceicao, K. Le Ooulven & R. Mendoza. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
lo Ibid.
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Peace and security are arguably the overarching objectives that motivate states to 
take collective action and are the foundation principles underpinning the Charter of 
the United Nations.31 Article 1 {I} outlines the purposes of the United Nations as 
being 
to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective 
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the supression 
of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful 
means, and in confonnity with the principles of justice and international law, 
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a 
breach of the peace.31 
There are many examples of collective state involvement to maintain peace and 
security under the auspices of the UN, with peacekeeping efforts being perhaps the 
most visible.33
Another example of state collaborative efforts to maintain security is the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). NATO was established in Washington on 4 
April 1949, to help protect an alliance of the US and European states during the Cold 
War.34 However, it took the unprecedented terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, 
for NATO to invoke Article 5, its collective defence article, for the first time.35 That 
transnational alliance rose to the challenge of international terrorism and did not 
waver throughout the campaign in Afghanistan. Differences did emerge on the 
decision to invade Iraq, with France and Germany being the two prominent 
opponents.36 Nevertheless, the comments of the British Foreign Secretary, Jack 
Straw, speaking in the the aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks, on our need to reM 
think our attit,,des to concepts like 'independence' and 'sovereignty' are profound. He 
contends: 
31 Charter of the United Nations 1945, I UNTSxvi. 
32 Ibid Article 1.
31 W. Durch, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparative Analysis. New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1993. 
34 The North Atlantic Treaty 1949, 34 UNTS 243. 
35 W. Walker, "Europe Backs America NATO Invokes Article 5 in Wake of Attacks." Europe October
(2001). 
36 J. Gaffuey, "Highly Emotional States: French-US Relations and the Iraq War." European Security
13 (2004), 247-72. 
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In today's world, by pooling sovereignty, a people may end up with more, not less, 
control over their lives. This is because, in an interdependent world, our security and 
prosperity depend on our ability to influence events in the rest of the world, not on our 
ability to stop others from influencing us. 37 
It does not follow, however, that an expanding globalised world requires some fonn 
of universal supreme organisational authority, or overarching 'world government'. 
Such a move would not only be extremely controversial and impractical, and in any 
case no international organisation is equipped to provide world governance. 38
Following the failure of the League of Nations, the United Nations came into 
existence in 1945 with 51 states committed to promoting world peace and security.39 
Heavily influenced by the desire for the atrocities of World War Two never to be 
repeated, the UN began with much optimism. That high level of confidence was 
somewhat misguided because the UN was never intended to provide global 
governance, as some have thought. Thakur maintains that observers of the UN can 
largely be divided into two groups: the romantic and the cynical.40 The fonner sees a 
visionary role for the UN and blames any failures on a lack of collective state will. 
The cynics, on the other hand, highlight the fact that the UN takes credit for its 
successes but quickly points to an absence of political will to explain away its 
failures. The critics maintain that the organisation is top heavy and suffers from a 
lack of direction, wasteful spending, lack of accountability and an inability or 
unwillingness to implement meaningful refonn. As in many debates, the reality lies 
somewhere between the extreme views. The strength of the UN resides not in any 
propensity to 1govern' but in its ability to provide a universal forum to facilitate 
international cooperation and to enhance negotiated outcomes between states.41
In the international arena, states collaborate to promote human rights, democracy and 
trade, to enhance security, to better manage natural resources and to resolve 
37 J. Straw, "Speech by the Foreign Secretary." Paper presented at the Launch of the Centre for
European Reform Pamphlet, Royal United Services Institute, London, 11 December 2001. 
38 P. Birnie & A. Boyle, International Law and the Environment, Second ed. New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002 p34. [hereinafter, Birnie & Boyle, 2002]. 
39 There arc now 191 states in the UN. 
40 R. Thakur, "Introduction," in Past lmpe,fect, Future Uncertain: The United Nations, edited by R.
Thakur. London: Macmillan Press, 1998, pl. [herein;ifter, Thakur 1998]. 
41 Ibid. 
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environmental problems, and states often use treaties as a means of achieving their 
overall aims. An effective international agreement requires the participation, and 
perhaps most importantly the clear conunitment of states to resolve the collective 
action problem. In a functiona! analysis of sovereignty, Franz Perrez concludes that 
the understanding of sovereignty based on absolute freedom and independence is no 
longer conceptually useful when dealing with some of today's interdependent 
environmental, social and economic realities.42 Focusing on environmental issues, he 
maintains that sovereignty involves a duty to cooperate, in order to deal effectively 
with modem global challenges. Basing his argument on the existence of a range of 
international regimes, Perrez further contends that international environmental law 
already accepts such a duty to cooperate. However, his analysis neglects to provide 
reasons why states collaborate to resolve particular issues, as international law 
cannot of itself impose a duty on states to cooperate without some form of consensus. 
International law, however, can and does provide a framework to facilitate 
collaboration between states with shared interests and desires, and that collaboration 
often culminates in a formal agreement. 
Regime Formation 
In the absence of world government, regimes play a central role in providing a range 
of mechanisms for regulating the relationship between states. Oran Young makes a 
clear distinction between government - formal centralised organisations, and 
governance - social institutions, such as regimes.43 Slaughter, Tulumello and Wood 
continue the theme of governance by drawing on the similarities between 
international law and international relations theory.44 The authors highlight the
resemblance between definitions of regimes in international relations and 
international law. They define international governance as "formal and informal 
bundles of rules, roles and relationships that define and regulate the social practices 
42 F. Perrez, Cooperative Sovereignty: From Independence to Interdependence in the Structure of
International Environmental Law. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000 pp2 & 176. 
43 O. Young, "Rights, Rules, and Resources in World Affairs," in Global Governance: Drawing
Insights from the Er,vironmental Experience, edited by 0. Young. Massachusetts: Massachusetts 
Institute ofTechnology, 1997, pp4-5. 
«A.Slaughter, A. Tulumello & S. Wood, "International Law and International Relations Theory: A 
New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship." The American Journal of International Law 92 
(1998) p371. 
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of state and non-state actors in international affairs11•45 Among the widely accepted 
regimes fitting that definition is Treaty Law. The process of treaty making, from the 
initial stages to achieving consensus and eventual agreement, is particularly 
conducive to states resolving complex issues. States utilise treaties to facilitate 
cooperation for the greater good and they rely on the legal dispute mechanisms 
inherent in the treaty to resolve issues of contention. 46
It is too narrow to view formal treaties as mere restrictive documents regulating the 
behaviour of states in a given issue area. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 47 for instance, enables states to have greater control over 
ocean resources. The 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons48 
facilitated the use of nuclear technology for peaceful energy creation, and has helped 
to a !arge extent to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. International law has also 
been used to facilitate solutions to potential risks. Under the precautionary pr inciple, 
states are encouraged to counteract threats of serious or irreversible damage, and a 
lack of full scientific certainty may not be used as a reason for postponing cost­
effective measures to prevent envirorunental degradation. 49 Treaties such as the 
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 199?5°
and the Montreal Protocol of 198?51 were heavily influenced by the imperative to act 
without conclusive proof. International law and various institutions actively promote 
the concept of sustainable development, and they help raise world health standards 
and the recognition of human rights. International regulation should therefore not be 
viewed as negative and restrictive. Rather, it should be recognised for its capacity, 
especially during the regime building phase, to facilitate cooperation and incorporate 
innovative legal concepts. 
45 Ibid. 
46 D. Siegel, "Legal Aspects of the IMF/WTO: The Fund's Articles of Agreement and the WTOAgreements." The American Journal of International Law 96 (2002) pp561-99. 
47 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, 21 JLM 1261. 
48 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1968, 7 JLM 809. [hereinafter, NPT). 
49 Report of the UN Conference on Environment and Development 1992, UN Doc. 
A/CONF,151/26/Rev.1.Principle 15. 
so Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 1997, 37 /LM 22. 
51 Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 1987, (Montreal Protocol) 26 ILM 154 
[hereinafter, the Montreal Protocol]. 
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Agenda Forlllation 
The phases leading up to the fonnation of a treaty regime are critical to securing a 
comprehensive framework and in achieving ultimate success with both the intent and 
objects of particular treaties. Young describes the three developmental stages in 
c reating regimes as agenda fonnation, negotiation and operationalization. 52 The
essential first step in the fonnation of a treaty involves the issue gaining 
consideration, preferably at the highest levels of govenunent. For example, the 
Declaration on Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region53 was championed by 
the Norwegian foreign minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg, but only really shifted to the 
negotiation stage when the Russian foreign minister, Andre Kozyrev, agreed to the 
concept. 54 The Barents Region consists of thirteen counties in the northenunost parts
of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Rm;sia. With joint Nonvegian and Russian 
ministerial backing, the negotiations gathered momentum, and in 1993 the Barents 
Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) was established as a forum for inter-governmental 
cooperation in the Barents Region. 55 Among the main focus areas of interest were
economic cooperation, health and social issues, human trafficking, energy and the 
environment. At their Sixth Session in Bodo, Norway in March 1999, BEAC 
discussed issues of nuclear safety and radioactive waste. One of its objectives is to 
advance safe interim HL W storage in the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk regions in 
Russia. BEAC is one example of a successful regime that benefited from the direct 
involvement of senior govenunent ministers who helped drive the issue on to the 
political agenda. 
'Much of the credit for raising the awareness of multinational repositories, at least 
among the international nuclear intelligentsia, can be attributed to Charles 
McCombie and Neil Chapman.56 At the international level the IA.EA has contributed
to the advancement of of the case for multinational repositories. The Pang ea project 
also raised awareness of the issue. Those efforts have progressively put the issue on 
s1 Supran3 Young, 1998. s3 Declaratio11 on Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region 1993, First Session of the Barents
Euro-Arctic Council: Kirkenes, 11 January 1993. [hereinafter, BEAC, 1993]. 
54 Supran3 Young, 1998 p8. ss The Barents Euro-Arctic Council has seven members consisting ofDenmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway, Russia, Sweden and the European Conunission. 
56 Both formerly with Pangea Resources International (PRI) and now with the Association for 
Regional and International Underground Storage (ARIUS). 
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the international agenda. But multinational repositories have not yet gained senior 
goverrunent backing in any country. Government agencies responsible for 
radioactive waste, particularly those associated with ARIUS and SAPIERR, do 
provide teclmical support and funding for ongoing research into the multinational 
repository option. Yet thus far no political leader has championed the cause, and the 
multinational repository concept cannot be viewed as a 'first order' priority issue until 
it receives the direct involvement of government ministers from a significant number 
of nuclear states.57 
Clearly, commitment from the main nuclear states would be most beneficial for 
bringing about a comprehensive multinational solution for the safe global 
management of HLW. A more limited number of states could engage in the 
formation of a shared repository, but to exclude any nuclear state that lacked the 
means to better safeguard its HL W would weaken the overall global security 
argument. The US, France and the UK are major nuclear states with a pro-active 
stance on world security, and it would be desirable if they were to play a leading role 
in a global multinational repository option. 58 Those states could play a leading role in 
their specific regions. A clear commitment from the larger nuclear states would 
encourage the small states to participate in a collaborative regional or global solution 
to the HLW problem. Moreover, multilateral treaties have greater credibility when 
the larger states are committed to the interdependent solution that the specific treaty 
is designed to help achieve. This is clearly evident in the environmental field, with 
the Montreal Protocol having greater state commitment than the Kyoto Protocol.59 
Negotiation and Operational Phases 
Once an issue gains consideration on the international political agenda, the next step 
in regime formation is the negotiation phase. 60 This is a crucial stage in the process, 
as it enables detailed information exchange, provides a forum for clarifying overall 
s7 For factors promoting collective action in the provision of public goods, see T. Sandler, "Global and
Regional Public Goods: A Prognosis for Collective Action." Fiscal Studies 19 (1998): 221-47. 
SS Ibid. 
s9 S. Barrett, "Montreal versus Kyoto: International Cooperation and the Global Environment," in
Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 2 Jst Century, edited by I. Kaul, I. Grunberg & 
M. Stem. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999 p216. [hereinafter, Barrett, 1999].
60 Supra n 3 Young, 1998 pll. 
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''objectives and allows the state parties to highlight their particular interests and 
concerns. There is obviously some overlap between the negotiation and the 
operational phases. The negotiation period can take some time, as evidenced by the 
case of UNCLOS, negotiations for which lasted over ten years.61 Because of the 
potentially long duration of negotiations, it would be beneficial for the nuclear states 
to get together as soon as practicable to discuss in detail the issue of HL W from a 
regional or global perspective. Only at such a meeting could the nation-states clearly 
identify and articulate their shared objectives and desires. The most likely incentive 
for nuclear state cooperation is the enhancement of global security that underground 
storage ofHLW would hring.62 The states could discuss cost sharing arrangements
and the benefits of finalising a formal treaty to engender trust and help alleviate the 
public perception of risks with the repository proposal. The prospects of regime 
formation are enhanced by common ethnic, cultural, historical or geographical 
relationships. 63 The states participating in the SAPIERR project in Europe appear to 
fit those criteria and the prospect of securing a repository would likely be enhanced 
from attempts to formalise a treaty. 
The economic cost of constructing an underground geological repository 1s 
considerable and is beyond the means of the majority of the smaller nuclear states 
acting alone. This assertion has been widely documented and put fonvard as a main 
argument for a shared repository, by proponents in states such as Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Switzerland,64 Taiwan and the Ukraine.65 One form of cost sharing arrangement is to 
apply the user pays principle. Under that system an agreed fonnula could be devised 
for the allocation of construction and operation costs, based on each state's 
percentage of the waste destined for the repository. 
61 A. Cha yes & A. Cha yes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory
Agreements. Cambridge, Massachusett..: Harvard University Press, 1995 p6. [hereinafter, Chayes & 
Chayes, 1995]. 
62 R. Oxburgh. "Making a Meal of our Nuclear Waste." Geoscientist 12 {2002) pl2.
, 
63 Supra n 53 BEAC, 1993.
64 Electric utilities and waste agencies from these three States and from Hungary and Japan founded
the Association for Regicnal and International Underground Storage (ARIUS) in 2002 which is an 
association that promotes radioactive waste storage and dispos11l. See ARIUS. "Arius Newsletter." 
May 2002, pl. 
65 P. Witherspoon, "Introduction to Second World Wide Review of Geological Problems in
Radioactive Waste Isolation." In Geological Problems in Radioactive Waste Isolation: Second 
Worldwide Review, edited by P. Witherspoon. Berkeley, California: Lawrence Berkley National 
Laboratory, 1996 p3. 
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The same fonnula could also be applied to manage the potential liability burden by 
linking the total cost of reparation directly to the amount of exported waste. Thus if 
an accident were to occur in the future, the states utilising the repository would meet 
the reparation costs based on the percentage split, as outlined in chapter four.66 If 
agreed, each state utilising the repository could be required to make payments into a 
centralised insurance fund to be held in trust by the host state. The individual states 
would have the autonomy to raise the funds in a manner of their choosing. One 
option for raising funds, which has applied in the US since fiscal year 1983, would 
be to place a small fee on the nuclear utilities that generate electricity from the 
nuclear reactors to help pay for radioactive waste disposal. 67 This would be passed 
on to the consumers and would be factored into the overall cost of nuclear power. 
The benefit of a combined state reserve fund would be to provide funding 
arrangements on an ongoing basis and to access monies quickly in the event of an 
accident. 
The objective of including shared responsibility and liability requirements is that 
they would act as a preventative safety measure,68 and the international law concept 
of state responsibility appears to be the best means for achieving that goal. Under a 
shared responsibility and liability system, each participating state has a direct 
financial incentive for the repository to remain safe, and this would increase the 
likelihood of proper monitoring procedures being put in place and enforced. Regular 
monitoring would help prevent accidents or radioactive leakage into the 
environment. The IAEA could provide additional expertise, serving the role of 
independent inspectorate, to overcome any shortcomings with a self-monitoring 
system.69 Detailed records of achieved safety standards could be regularly 
maintained. The treaty could also include a return clause under the combined fund 
arrangement, which would enable the states to access the money in the event that it 
was under utilised. The timeframe involved would need to be negotiated, but it 
66 Supra Chapter Four p137. 
67 Section 302 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act 1982, Public Law 97-425, 42 U.S.C. 10222. 
68 R. Rayfuse, "International Environmental Law," in Public International Law: An Australian
Perspective, edited by S. Blay, R. Piotrowicz & B. Tsamenyi. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 
1997. 
69 The IAEA has the required expertise and already performs a similar role on a range of nuclear 
installations. 
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would have to be in the hundreds of years. There might be reluctance among some 
states, at least, to make payment into an insurance fund to be managed over the long­
term without such a return clause. 
There may be a temptation for a financially impoverished state to consider hosting 
the repository as a means of raising revenue. One state that has already expressed an 
interest in importing radioactive waste is Kazakhstan.70 Yet the public perception of 
the risks involved in geological repositories is one of the most difficult aspects to 
overcome, and any serious proposal could not risk being perceived as offering any 
form of 'coercive inducement'. To overcome that .perception, and to gain the 
necessary international community acceptance, the states involved would have to 
clearly demonstrate a lasting commitment to the host community, in order to 
alleviate the public perception of risk in shifting the burden of responsibility to the 
voluntary host state. Finn financial assurances including long-term liability 
commitments would greatly assist with confidence building, but these assurances 
·i·· would have to be endorsed in a treaty to demonstrate a clear commitment to the host 
state. 
Risk and Regulation 
The public perception of the risks associated with all nuclear activities has been a 
significant constraint in implementing the nuclear indust_ry's preferred option of 
geological HLW repositories at the national level.71 Thr�ughout the radioactive 
waste policy literature, public opposition to repository siting has been identified as a 
major problem.72 There are vast differences, however, between the risks from nuclear 
reactors and those from geological repositories. The impact of a reactor accident is 
usually immediate and can be profound, whereas the fear with repositories is the 
potential for the radioactive waste to leach into the ground-water systems over a 
70 V. Nee & K. Sewall, "Can Kazakhstan Profit from Radioactive Waste? Domestic and Legal
Perspectives on a Proposal to Import Radioactive Waste." The Georgetown International 
Environmental Law Review 15 (2003) p429. 
71 P. Slovic, M. Layman & J. Flynn. "Perceived Risk, Trust, and the Politics of Nuclear Waste,"
Science 254 (1991): pt 603. 
72 D. Easterling & H. Kunreuther, The Dilemma of Si ting a High-Level Nuclear Waste Repository.
Boston: Kluwer, 1995; A. Blowers, D. Lowry & B. Solomon, The International Politics of Nuclear 
Waste. London: Macmillan Academic and Professiona� 1991; F. Berkhout, Radioactive Waste: 
Politics and Technology. New York: Routledge, 1991. 
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period of time. It is estimated that the latter could occur only after hundreds of years, 
when the canisters selected eventually corrode. Despite the nuclear industry having 
focused intensely on the safety aspects of repository design, those efforts have not 
transferred into alleviating the widespread negative public perception of all things 
nuclear. This perception transfers into considerable apprehension at the shorter term 
risks associated with the transportation of the HLW on the high seas,73 and at the 
risks involved with disposal of the waste in an underground repository. The 
underground repository option relies on the multi-barrier technology and on suitable 
geology. One key difficulty with this option is tbat the nuclear industry is unable to 
provide an existing example of success, to demonstrate the safety aspects and 
alleviate the negative public perception of risk. 
As demonstrated in the above case study of the PRA proposal, the public perception 
of risk is quite high when it concerns the voluntary hosting of a multinational HL W 
repository. The main factors that contributed to the high anxiety levels in Australia 
were a perception of secrecy, mistrust of government,74 and negative media 
exposure, which when combined amplified the negative perceptions of the risks 
associated with the multinational repository concept. Thoff. perceptions were 
compounded by the fact that, after a 40-year operational life, the repository was to 
become the responsibility of the Australian Government. There were no attempts to 
share responsibility for the HL W or the associated risks over the long-term and thus 
no mention of the need for a regulatory multinational agreement to manage those 
risks. Consequently, PRA failed to convince the conununity and the governing 
bodies of the technological safety features of the Pangea repository concept,75 or that 
the economic benefits outweighed the risks. 
The use of regulation has been prominent at a national and international level to 
support various safety features and sound behavioural practices in a range of risk 
73 While the duration is short compared to the time-span in the repository, this is likely to be the most 
vulnerable period for a terrorist attack. 
'
14 The mistrust of government commenced with the allegations of secrecy and the apparent lack of 
transparency about Ministerial discussions with Pangea, and was increased by the ability of the Green 
groups to link the locations for the national low and intennediate level "dumps," with the Pangea 
multinational repository. 
7� See also regarding the national repository in Australia, S. Hanis, ''The Reality of Our Nuclear
Dump Is That We Can't Ensure Its Safety." The Advertiser, 20 August 2000 p18. 
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management areas. Environmental protection legislation was enacted in the early 
1970s throughout Western democracies, in response to comnuinity concerns with the 
risks posed by industrial pollution, environmental degradation and diminishing 
natural resources. The risks fr.om nur,lear activities have long been appreciated, with 
both domestic and interna'.�.cnal law used in an effort to enhance safety. Among the 
main pieces of legislation covering the safety of nuclear installations in the UK are 
the Health and Safety at Wodc Act 1974, 16 and the Nuclear Installations Act 1965,11 
whlle the Radioactive Substances Act 199318 regulates the disposal of radioactive 
wastes generated by any facility. In the US the Energy Reorganization Act 1974
established the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. And '.n Australia nuclear safety is 
governed by the Australian Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety Act 1998
(Cth). 79 These and many other national laws allow nuclear technology to be used, 
and at the same time �ey help ensure that safety concerns remain a high priority. 
At the national level, legal agreements are also recognised as an important 
mechanism for building public trust and assisting with locating radioactive waste 
sites. For example, the success of the Port Hope Area Initiative in southern Ontario 
Canada, was due to the combination of a legal agreement with a step-by-step 
community-driven approach. In the 1980's, two attempts at siting a low-level 
radioactive waste facility failed because of insufficient community involvement. The 
legal agreement between the Government of Canada and the Municipalities of Hope 
Township, Cfo:rington and Town of Port Hope clearly lays out the terms under which 
the initiative will proceed. 80 It includes property value protection and host 
community grants in direct response to the community wishes. The agreement 
involves a commitment of $CAN 260 million by the government and commits the 
parties to cooperate toward the development and implementation of the Initiative. 
The legal agreement is viewed as a milestone in the long-tenn management of local 
historic wastes.81 
'76 1974 c. 37.77 1965 c. 57.78 1993 c. 12.79 No 133, 1998.
so P. Brown & D. McCauley, "Port Hope Area Initiative." Paper presented at the 9th International 
Ccfoference on Environmental Remediation and Radioactive Waste Management, Oxford, 21-25 
September 2003 p4. 
BI /1!,id,
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Similarly, Sweden used legal agreements to support its innovative model that 
actively involves local communities in the siting process for a HL W repository. 
Recognised internationally, the Oskarshamn model is based on complete 
transparency and direct public participation in the decision-making process. Its 
success lies in building innovative new methods for public participation within the 
existing legal framework of the environmental impact assessment process. 82 In 
March 2002, the Oskarshamn municipality council decided to allow the industry to 
commence deep borehole investigative drilling, subject to thirteen conditions. The 
last condition in the agreement requires a clarification in law as to who will be 
responsible for the waste post repository closure and that clarification must occur 
during the site investigation process. Thus legal agreements have been used to 
underpin negotiated outcomes for radioactive waste facilities at the national level. 
Similar arrangements would be beneficial for a multinational repository in the 
international arena. 
The importance of international regulation for nuclear activities is already evident. 
The risk of nuclear weapons proliferation was recognised soon after World War 
Two, and it is unlikely that nuclear electricity generation would have gained 
widespread acceptance without concerted efforts to conclude an agreement on anns 
control. Those efforts culminated in the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty in 1968.83 Since that time, many international conventions and treaties have 
been enacted to protect humans and the environment and to increase levels of safety 
for a ·range of nuclear activities. Some treaties are prohibitive, such as the 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other 
Matter 1972, 84 which bans the dumping of HL W at sea. Others such as the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention have codified much of the 
existing state practices relating to nuclear activities. Birnie and Boyle maintain that 
,': 
ipe latter two treaties "represent an important stage in the evolution of international
regulation and supervision of nuclear power and its waste products". 85 Given the 
82 C. Thompson, "In My Backyard Please." Nuclear Engineering lntematio11al 49 (2004) p44.
83 Supra n48 NPT.
84 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1046
UNTS 120 {1972). 
85 Supra n 38 Birnie & Boyle, 2002 p455. 
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need for shared responsibility and liability for HL W in a multinational repository, 
combined with existing state practices of enacting legislation to manage risk and the 
advantages associated with treaty formation, and trust building, the arguments for a 
specific multilateral treaty should overcome fears about any perceived loss of 
sovereignty. 
Effectiveness and Compliance with Treaty Law 
�le a Treaty is an important source of law, it relies on the conse:.�t of states for its 
very existence, and it is not the 'law' itself that brings about the change in state 
behaviour but the desire and the political will of the participating states themselves. 
International law is primarily underpinned by the concept of reciprocity, and states 
obey the rules and obligations of treaties most of the time.86 The fundamental norm 
underpinning International Law is pacta sunt servanda - treaties are to be obeyed. 
To do otherwise would undennine the entire international legal order, upon which so 
many states depend for security, trade, navigation, human rights and the protection 
and regulation of natural resources. State commitment, effectiveness and compliance 
are therefore necessarily interrelated intrinsic components of a successful treaty. 
The foundation of any multilateral treaty is nation state commibnent, which is 
demonstrated by the required number of states fonnally ratifying87 a particular treaty
to bring it into force. Because of the time scale required for HL W to decay to 
accepted safe levels, responsibility for the safe management of the repository will 
span many generations. 88 Consequently, the need for an effective treaty combined 
with robust and lasting compliance measures are fundamental requirements in any 
legal framework designed to cover multinational repositories. As an incentive based 
treaty, the Joint Convention does not contain compliance measures,89 which further
strengthens the argument for a specifically designed treaty for a multinational 
repository that would include compliance measures. In the event of a breach of 
international law, states rely either on dispute settlement procedures, or they can 
adopt the softer managerial approach to resolve cases of non-compliance. 
86 L. Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy. London: Pall Mall Press, 1968 p47.
87 Ratification is the process offonnally endorsing the Treaty into domestic law.
88 D. North, "A Perspective on Nuclear Waste." Risk Analysis 19 (1999) p755.
89 Supra n 12 Boustany, 1998 p44.
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Under the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice states can seek 
adjudication for the resolution of various environmental and other disputes. 90 Or they 
can use other arbitrational forums, as in the dispute between Ireland and the United 
Kingdom in relation to the MOX plant at Sellafield. This was heard at the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and in the UNCLOS arbitration 
tribunal.91 Although widely available and increasingly used by states in the past 
decade or so, these types of forums are adversarial by nature, and are usually only 
accessed after an event has occurred. In other words, there is often little emphasis on 
, dispute avodiance. These various dispute resolution options remain available to all 
participating states, but certain issues may be more suitably resolved at a much 
earlier stage under the terms of the relevant treaty. 
Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes highlight the fact that in many instances non­
compliance of treaty requirements is unintentional, mostly occurring due to a lack of 
capability, clarity or priority, and as such are problems that are more suitably 
resolved by a managerial model. 92 This model relies primarily on a cooperative 
problem-solving approach rather than a coercive one. Thus the notion that a treaty 
must have 11teeth, 11 in other words strong coercive enforcement mechanisms, is 
somewhat misleading. To rely solely on coercive enforcement measures to ensure 
compliance with the majority of treaties suggests either a lack of commitment among 
the state parties or a poorly designed legal framework in the given issue area. 
The managerial model or 'soft' enforcement Of treaties should not, be confused with 
'soft law' mentioned earlier. Treaties are classified as hard law, and the issue is how 
to ensure treaties are complied with, once its terms are agreed to. Soft enforcement of 
treaties is common and usually consists of self-regulating measures combined with 
some fonn of inherent supervisory international institutional arrangements. 
Among the most innovative institutional arrangements for encouraging cooperation, 
achieving consensus and meeting agreed obligations are self-contained legally 
90 See Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dam, ICJ Reports (1997) p7. 91 P. Sands, Principles of International Environmental Law. Second Edition, New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2003 pi 74. 
92 Supra n 61 Chayes & Chayes, 1995 p22. 
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binding treaties. Heavily used in Multilateral Envirorunental Agreements, these 
,, {,' particular frameworks establish independent intergovernmental bodies with decision-
making powers, a Secretariat, and specific budgetary provisions. The independent 
body or plenary organ consists of delegates from the member states and is called 
either a Meeting of Parties (MOP), as in the Montreal Protocol, or a Conference of 
Parties (COP), as in the Kyoto Protocol. Robin Churchill and Geir Ulfstein refer to 
these particular forums as "autonomous institutional arrangements" (AINs) because 
of the decision-making powers and likely compliance mechanisms assigned to the 
COP.93 The ceding of some sovereignty to the plenary organ is offset by the 
involvement of high-level delegates from government, often ministerial,94 and by the 
need to achieve consensus in fanning decisions. Another feature of AIA's is their 
inherent capacity to remain flexible and innovative as research and knowledge in the 
specific area progresses. The capacity to adapt is achieved by amending the annexes 
attached to the protocol in response to technical or political developments. One 
example of the ability to change international treaties under these flexible 
arrangements occurred in 1993, when the Consultative Meeting of the Parties 
amended the London Dumping Convention. That amendment effectively banned the 
dumping of industrial and all radioactive wastes at sea. 
Oran Young in his 1979 study suggested that: 
Compliance can be said to occur when the actual behaviour of a given subject confo� \\ 
\\ to prescribed behaviour, and non-compliance or violation occurs when actual behaviour ',, 
'\ 
departs significantly from prescribed behaviour. 95 
Young's definition is important for a number of reasons. Firstly it distinguishes 
compliance from implementation or ratification, the adoption of the particular treaty 
objectives into domestic law, which of itself does not ensure the necessary required 
behaviour. Secondly, it distinguishes compliance from effectiveness, as it is easy to 
comply with a weak agreement without necessarily impacting much on the overall 
93 R. Churchill & G. Ulfstein, "Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental
Agreements: A Little.Noticed Phenomenon in International Law." The American Journal of
International Law 94 (2000) p625. 
!1'4 T. Gehring, "International Environmental Regimes: Dynamic Sectoral Legal Systems." Yearbook of
International Environmental U.w I (1990) p36. 
95 O. Young, Compliance and Public Authority. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1979 pl72.
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intent of the treaty. If for example pollution reduction targets are set too low, or are 
not binding on a sufficient number of states, the end result may not match the objects 
of the treaty.96 For example, the Kyoto Protocol is an important step in the global 
efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but it is weaker for not including some of 
the larger developing states. With Russia's ratification, the treaty has now entered 
into force, despite the absence of Australia and the US. These two states rely heavily 
on fossil fuel for generating electricity and are among the largest greenhouse gas 
emitters per capita. The US and Australia have thus far refused to ratify because of 
the economic impacts, and because competing states such as China and India are not 
required to sign ,ip because of their 'developing status1.97 Consequently, the Protocol
is now legally binding, and many of the state parties are likely to comply with agreed 
targets, but overall global emission reductions may not meet the desired objectives 
and may have little impact on climate change. It is therefore most important to focus 
on effectiveness as well as on compliance to encourage states to change their 
behaviour from the outset. The Kyoto Protocol may yet prove successful but it will 
require the participation of the US and Australia as well as China, India and others in 
order to maximise effectiveness and mitigate global warming. 
A highly successful and effective international treaty regime that helped change 
actual state behaviour was the Montreal Protocol. In 1974, Sherwood Rowland and 
Mario Molina argued that a group of industrial chemicals called chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs) could (if production and emissions levels were allowed to continue) result in 
the destruction of the ozone layer.98 Global awareness of the problem increased
throughout the 1970s and gained momentum at both the World Meteorological 
Organization and the United Nations Environmental Programme. A loose framework 
convention was signed in 1985, but it was the Montreal Protocol two years later that 
made significant progress in terms of binding obligations and specificity. 99 While 
96 Supra n 1 Simmons, 1998 p78. 
97 V. Cusack, "Opposing Paradigms or Room for Convergence: The Australian Dilemma."
Environmental Policy and Law 31 (2001) p28. 
98 P. Sze 11, "Negotiations on the Ozone Layer," in International Environmental Negotiation, edited by
G. Sjostedt. Newbury Park, Califonnia: SAGE Publications, 1993, pp31-47.
99 I. Wettestad, "The Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol on Ozone- Layer Depletion," in
Environmental Regime Effectiveness: Confronting Theory with Evidence, edited by E. Miles, A. 
Underdal, S. Andresen, J.Wettestad, I. Skjaerseth & E. Carlin. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2002, p149-
70. 
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acknowledging that specific institutional frameworks cannot be universally applied, 
there are many aspects of the Montreal Protocol that may be beneficial to other treaty 
regimes. Importantly, a strong political commitment was evident by the US and other 
leading industrial states in the European Community, and a special effort was made 
to include the developing nations in the CFC reduction process. The cost of 
supplying the global public good of reducing ozone-depleting substances was small 
relative to the benefits. 100 Industry provided the technical solution, with the 
manufacture of alternative replacement gases for use in aerosols and refrigeration. 
Arguably the specific flexible characteristics of the Montreal Protocol assisted with 
the negotiations, while the internal compliance mechanisms contributed to its 
effectiveness. The ability of the state parties to amend the Montreal Protocol was 
demonstrated early, with some important changes made during the second MOP in 
London in June 1990. Following further research and reassessment, the initial fifty 
per cent reduction target was viewed as inadequate, and a complete phasing out of 
the 'offending gases' was agreed to. The number of controlled substances was 
increased from eight to twenty, IOI and the scope of the process was expanded, with 
over 80 states agreeing to the changes in London. Important initiatives were included 
to encourage the participation of 1developing' states. The preamble was amended to 
include a reference to the specific needs of developing states, with provisions for 
access to and transfer of both relevant and alternative technologies. 102 A multilateral 
fund was established to provide financial assistance to developing states to meet the 
incremental costs of complying with the Protocol. The amendments passed during 
the second MOP helped secure the support of China, India and Brazil, who signed up 
to the Protocol. The treaty was significantly strengthened by the inclusion of the 
obligatory phase-out targets, and specific incentives for developing state 
participation were also contained in the 1990 amendments. As Ian Rowlands says, 
the Montreal Protocol as amended in London is the legal linchpin of the international 
regime to protect the ozone layer. 103 
100 Supra n 59 Barrett, 1999 p201. 
IOI /bidpl95,
102 UNEP. Report of the 2nd Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol. UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3.
1990, Article IOA. 
1113 J. Rowlands, "The Fourth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol: Report and Reflections."
Environment 6 (1993) p25. 
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In any treaty, the setting of detailed binding legal obligations requires the political 
commitment of the signatories, combined with practical and effective compliance 
mechanisms. The Montreal Protocol placed an emphasis on inducement rather than 
on enforcement, and it used the less confronting legal tenn of 'non-compliance' in 
preference to 'unlawful action'. 11Non-compliance is usually defined as a breach of 
obligations under public international law, or an internationally wrongful act". 104 The 
first MOP established an open-ended working group charged with the task of 
designing procedures for ensuring compliance with the obligations under the 
Protocol. It took some time before the negotiations achieved consensus, and it was 
the fourth MOP that adopted the non-compliance procedures (NCP). 105 The NCP are 
best understood as a fonn of dispute avoidance; the entire process focuses on 
securing an amicable solution. The NCP can be invoked by any of the state parties, 
by the Secretariat, or in some instances the relevant Party itself may admit to being 
unable to meet its obligations. rn6 The matter is then referred, usually with some
documentary evidence, to the hnplementation Committee for consideration. This 
committee applies various techniques based on non-confrontation rather than 
adjudication. It investigates the non-compliance, makes recommendations to other 
bodies, including the MOP, and provides a publicly available report after each 
meeting. 
The main features of the NCP are an emphasis on maintaining transparency, 
dissemination of information, confidence building, monitoring and data reporting, 
and the incentive based multilateral fund. rn7 All of these features have a role to play, 
and gain in strength and effectiveness when used in an integrated way. All parties to 
the Protocol are legally required to report baseline and annual production quantities, 
including import and export of each controUed substance.108 In the initial years many 
104 0. Yoshida, "Soft Enforcement ofTreaties: The Montreal Protocol's Noncompliance Procedure
and the Functions of Internal International Institutions." Colorado Journal of International 
Environmental Law and Policy 10 (1999) pl04. ios UNEP. Report of the 4th Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances That
Deplete the Ozone Layer. UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15. 1992, Annex IV. 
106 Supra n 104 pi 15, 
107 D. Victor, "The Operation and Effectiveness of the Montreal Protocol's Non-Compliance
Procedure," in The Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments: 
Theory and Practice, edited by D. Victor, K. Raustiala & E. Skolnik.off. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
MIT Press, 1998, pp137-76. [hereinafter, Victor 1998]. 
108 Supra n 51 the Montreal Pro:ocol, Article 7. 
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states failed to provide the required data. The developed states experienced limited 
bureaucratic problems, but were constrained by the desire among some trading states 
to protect 'con:fidential1 transactions. This was gradually overcome by increased 
transparency, knowledge that similar states had complied, and growing confidence in 
the process over time. The developing states had greater difficulty meeting their 
reporting requirements and gains were made only when their perfom1ance was linked 
to qualifying for financial assi;:.tance. An example of the soft managerial approach 
was the grnnting of the 10-year delay period to phase out CFC's to the developing 
states.109 Up to the middle 19901s, the hnplement,don Committee's main focus of 
attention on data reporting was on missing data, rather than on suspected 
inaccuracies.110 
The incentive-based multilateral fund, designed to encourage the developing states to 
participate in  the Protocol, was more effective following a conditionality amendment 
in 1994. At MOP6, the parties sought to rectify the missing data problem, by linking 
funding directly to the data reporting requirements. The amendment made the 
qualification entitlement for funding under Article 5 conditional upon providing the 
baseline data within one year of approval of their MLF country programme. 111 That 
1994 amendment achieved significant gains in data reporting, and is one example of 
the success in directly linking benefits to compliance. David Victor contends that the 
NCP was more effective when the responsible institutions under the Montreal 
Protoci:-! combined rewards with the threat of sanctions. 112 The sanctions of 
wit'nholding funding or of restrictions to trade were never applied under the Protocol, 
but even the implied threats to do so helped ensure compliance. The 1994 
amendment is another example of the capacity for MOP1s to remain flexible anc!. to 
achieve consensus to respond with a practical solution. The multilateral fund also 
demonstrates the state Parties' ability to effectively manage complex and substantial 
financial arrangements. As of December 2003, the industrial states had contributed 
$US 1.7 billion to the fund. 
109 Ibid Article 5. 
"
0 Supra n 107 Victor, et al., 1998 pl44. 
lll UNEP. Report of the 6th Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances That 
Deplete the Ozone Layer. UNEP/OzL.Pro.6n. 1994. 
112 Supra n 107 Victor, 1998 pl39. 
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While every issue requires its own specific fonn of solutions, and associated 
institutional mechanisms, lessons can br drawn from various responses to collective 
action problems. There are similarities between the Kyoto and Montreal protocols, 
but the latter is arguably a more complete, inclusive and successful treaty. It is not 
intended here to resolve all possible obstacles to a multinational HL W repository 
treaty, but some of the main considerations are provided. There is the 11otable 
advantage that the number of states required, to make the multinational repository 
option a success, is quite small compared to the large number of states required to 
mitigate global warming, or as was necessary to repair the ozone layer. Thus the fine 
details, as to what should be included in a multilateral treaty for the shared 
repository, are best left to the participating states, but the negotiators could draw 
from some of the more favourable mechanisms of the Montreal Treaty. 
The main strength of the Montreal Protocol was its emphasis on inclusiveness and its 
capacity to use innovative flexible methods to maximise state participation. The 
states joining the multinational solution for HL W could leave open the option of 
other states joining at a later stage, and could ensure that there are no additional 
penalties for late entry. The states involved would most likely wish to adopt the 
autonomous self-regulating mechanism of the MOP arrangements. This would 
enable the participating states to take control and they could link compliance directly 
to befefits. MOP also allows great flexibility for the states to amend the treaty to 
adapt to new circumstances. Once the states agree to participate in the multinational 
repository, it is not envisaged that there would be much of a problem with non­
compliance, and therefore the soft managerial approach is more than adequate. 
Conclusion 
A multinational repository requires the fonnation of a specifically designed 
multilateral treaty to manage a range of complex issues. There are many advantages 
with fonnulating a 'new1 binding treaty regime, including the capacity for the 
relatively small number of participating states to have greater control over the entire 
process. The negotiating period would help achieve the necessary collaborative 
response to provide the public good of enhanced security by safeguarding the under­
secured HL W in the shared repository. A multilateral regulatory regime would 
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provide the institutional framework for sharing both the costs of constructing the 
repository and the potential future burden of risk. The treaty would enable the states 
to include shared responsibility and liability arrangements for their particular 
situation. A voluntary host stat-� would huve difficulty coming forward in the absence 
of some form of 'state responsibility' arrangements. 
In establishing the rules, norms, and procedures, the Treaty could provide an agreed 
framework for the ownership of the HLW and spent-fuel. A legally binding treaty 
would help reduce the potential for future accidents over the timeframe required for 
storing the HL W in the chosen repository, with the use of detailed monitoring and 
preventive measures. With each state required to share the costs for 'harm' and 
reparation, the likelihood of neglect decreases.113 The IAEA could provide additional
safeguards by acting as an independent inspectorate and by providing a forum for 
infmmation and knowledge sha ring. An agreed framework would also assist the 
states involved to gain public confidence, which would increase the likelihood of 
intemational community acceptance in the eventual site selection process. Thus, a 
comprehensive regulatory regime would provide the necessary institutional 
framework to support the technological safeguards, and thereby help to alleviate the 
public perception of risk. 
113 B. Sandvik & S. Suikkari, "Harm and Reparation in International Treaty Regimes: An Overview."
In Harm to the Environment: The Right to Compensation and the Assessment of Damages, edited by 
P. Wetterstein. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997 pp57-71.
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CHAPfER SEVEN 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND TENTATIVE 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study has examined the merits of a multinational geological repository for 
safeguarding high-level radioactive waste (HLW) for nuclear states seeking a 
cooperative solution. One of the biggest challenges confronting those advocating the 
multinational :repository option is public opposition from within the potential host 
state. 1 That opposition stems from the public's perception of risk about the 
radioactivity in the HLW, a perception which is also conunon in many countries 
seeking a national repository site. 2 A monitored retrievable repository removes the 
finality aspect and therefore can help alleviate some of the perceived risks associated 
with HL W containment or leakage. However, without adequate long-term shared 
responsibility and liability arrangements, the perception of risk within the potential 
host state is likely to be amplified by the media, environmental groups and perhaps 
even from the political parties in opposition. 3 Notwithstanding the problem of risk 
perception, there are three main motives for countries to favour the multinational 
repository option. These are the economic, environmental and security benefits to be 
gained from utilising a shared repository. 
The strongest argument for participating in multinational repositories is the security 
benefits provided by safeguarding the HL W in secure underground locations. An 
appreciation of the security risks from terrorist acts on nuclear facilities has increased 
I This was evident during the PRA debate in Australia. 
2 F. Short & E. Rosa. "Some Principles for Siting Controversy Decisions: Lessons from the US
Experience with High Level Nuclear Waste." Journal of Risk Research 2 (2004): 135-52; A. Blowers,
D. Lowry & B. Solomon. Tlie International Politics of Nuclear Waste. London: Macmillan Academic
and Professional, 1991; N. Lenssen,Nuclear Waste: The Problem That Won't Go Away. Washington:
Worldwatch Institute, 1991.
� N. Pidgeon, R. Kasperson & P. Slovic. The Social Amplification of Risk. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003; 0. Renn, W. Bums, J. Kasperson, R. Kasperson & P. Slovic. "The Social
Amplification of Risk: Theoretical Foundations and Empirical Applications." Journal of Social Issues
48 (1992): 137-60.
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markedly since the recent rise of extremist forms of terrorism. 4 Some of the large 
nuclear states are well advanced with national HL W repository sites, but many of the 
smaller nuclear states may not have suitable geology or the financial capacity to 
construct an expensive repository for relatively small amounts of HL W. A failure to 
adequately slfeguard all HL W raises security issues for the state in which the waste 
is located, for the states in close proximity and perhaps even for states some distance 
away. Safely securing the maximum amount of HLW therefore becomes a global 
public goods problem solvable only by the collaborative effort of the nuclear states. 5
Given this security argument, it follows that a multinational geological repository for 
storing HL W is necessary in order to maximise security benefits for a large number 
of nation states. At the global level there are various scenarios available. States could 
participate in a large 'international' repository perhaps under the auspices of the 
IAEA. 6 That option is likely to be problematic and tends to reflect or be perceived as 
a 'top down' approach. It also doesn't appear to have the necessary broad public or 
political support. The preferred option is for the states to take control of the shared 
repository. Thus the multinational repository option is likely to be pursued at either a 
regional or at a broader global level. In the regional scenario a number of nuclear 
states would 'club together' to solve their HL W problem. Successful implementation 
at the regional level requires both the necessary political commitment and a 
specifically designed multilateral treaty to provide a framework for governing many 
of the complex issues involved in the shared repository. The second scenario would 
involve a network of global repositories located in various parts of the world. The 
second and more comprehensive global solution, although achievable, is much more 
ambitious and would succeed only with the direct involvement of a number of the 
leading nuclear states driving such a concept from the outset.7 Although the security 
4 G. Allison, .Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe. New York: Henry Holt,
2004.; The Future Foundation. Public Ath'tudes To the Future Management of Radioactive Waste fo 
the UK. Report for United Kingdom Nirex Limited, February 2002. 
5 For a discussion on preventing transnational terrorism as a global public good see T. Sandler, 
Collective Global Action. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. 
6 IAEA. Developing Multinational Radioactive Waste Repositories: lnfrastuctural Framework and 
Scenarios of Cooperation. IAEA-TECDOC-1413, 2004 p 18. [hereinafter, IAEA-TECDOC-1413, 
2004], 
7 The UK and US governments actively participated in collaborative responses to ozone depleting 
substances and especially in the efforts to secure the Montreal Protocol. 
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benefits are greater with a global solution, the political realities may be such that it 
becomes more practicable to secure an operating regional multinational repository 
first. 
The theoretical framework used in this thesis draws upon the twin disciplines of 
international law and international relations in an attempt to gain a better 
understanding of why nation-states collaborate to resolve collective action 
problems.8 Regime theory and particularly fonnal treaty law merges well with public 
goods theory. This dual approach enhances the capacity to locate integrated solutions 
to various collective action prohlems.9 Essentially, public goods theory provides the 
best means to uncover the main incentives for state cooperation. To achieve the 
necessary political commitment,10 HLW has to be seen as an international collective 
action problem. In the later chapters of this thesis I explored the mechanisms 
available in international law to manage the shared responsibility and liability issues 
for the long-term storage of the HL W. I have argued that the international law 
principle of state responsibility is the best instrument available for regulating the 
issue of collective nation state responsibility, 11 over the required timeframe, and is 
therefore the best means of protecting the host state. And providing such legal 
protection is an essential part of winning the required public trust in the host 
community. 
The thesis bega.'!l with an introduction to the problematic issue of HL W management 
and provided a brief summary of the nuclear fuel cycle. I examined the policy 
constraints of selecting suitable repository sites at the national level in some of the 
main nuclear states. Among the themes that consistently impede the implementation 
of HL W repositories, at both the national and international levels, are the public 
8 A-M. Slaughter, A. Tulumello & S. Wood. "International Law and International Relations Theory: A
New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship." The American Journal of International Law 92 
11998), 367-97. T. Gehring, "International Environmental Regimes: Dynamic Sectoral Legal Systems." Yearbook of
International Environmental Lnw I (1990): 35-56. 
10 I. Kaul, I. Grunberg & M. Stem. Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 2/st
Century. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. 
II Based on the International Law Commission's draft articles. 
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perception of risk concerning all things nuclear, 12 social amplification of that 
perceived risk, 13 and the link between secrecy and mistrust of some nuclear 
regulatory authorities. The presence of one or more of these factors increases the 
likelihood of evoking the 1not in my backyard 1 (NIMBY) response from the 
cornmunity.14 Those residing in close proximity to the 'selected1 site tend to be the 
most outspoken and active in their opposition. The two largest nuclear states 
reviewed, the UK and the US, have for decades struggled to achieve public trust and 
thus gain acceptance for their chosen HL W repository sites. A conunon characteristic 
employed by both states has been the now discredited 'decide announce defend' 
(DAD) tactic, which engenders a rapid loss of public truot.15 That loss of trust 
invariably leads to a NIMBY response, which can make it difficult to gain public 
acceptance for any repository site in the particular country. 16 Conversely, states such 
as France and Sweden appear to have maintained public trust, and both have well 
developed HL W policies. It is therefore essentia! for the proponents of the 
multinational repository to have in place a two-way communicative process from the 
outset that promotes trust and encourages public participation in the decision making 
process. 
My analysis of the attempt by Pangea Resources Australia (PRA) to secure a 
multinational repository in Australia provides an opportunity to evaluate the �oncept 
and to examine one public response to the shared repository option. By assessing the 
PRA 'proposal' against the 'triple bottom line' policy tool of economic, environmental 
and social considerations, 17 some of the inherent weaknesses with the multinational
12 J. Flynn, "Nuclear Stigma," in The Social Amplification of Risk, edited by N. Pidgeon, R. Kasperson
& P. Slovic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 326-52. 
13 0. Renn, W. Bums, J. Kasperson, R. Kasperson & P. Slovic. "The Social Amplification of Risk:
Theoretical Foundations and Empirical Applications." Journal of Social Issues 48 (1992): 137-60. 
14 S. Hunter & K. Leyden. "Beyond NIMBY: Explaining Opposition to Hazardous Waste Facilities."
Policy Studies Journal 23 (1995): 601-19. 
15 DEFRA. "The Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee's Advice to Ministers on the 
Process for Formulation of Future Policy for the Long Term Management of UK Solid Radioactive 
Waste." September 2001, pB; B. Rabe, J, Becker & R. Levine. "Beyond Si ting: Implementing 
Voluntary Hazardous Waste Si ting Agreements in Canada." American Review of Canadian Studies 30 
(2000): 455-78. 
16 T. Porte & D. Metlay. "Hazards and Institutional Trustworthiness: Facing a Deficit of Trust." Public
Administration Review 56 (1996): 341-47. 
17 M, Kane, "Sustainability Concepts: From Theory to Practice," in Sustainability in Question: the 
Search for a Conceptual Framework, edited by J. Kohn, J, Gowdy, F. Hinterberger & J, van der 
Straate't'\, Northampton, Massachusetts: Edward Elgar, 1999, pp. 15-31. 
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repository proposal, as presented in Australia, become apparent. Unfortunately for 
PRA, those shortcomings created a vacuum that was quickly filled by the social 
amplification of risk. 18 This led to the public perceiving the risks from the shared 
repository to b�i greater than the benefits. Since the repository was set to receive only 
20 per cent of the world's accumulated HLW, it was difficult to sustain the security 
benefit arguments put forward by PRA. 19 Although Australia would have gained 
financially in the short to medium term, the long-term costs of managing the 
repository were largely unknown. Consequently, the Australian public and Australian 
governments were not prepared to accept total responsibility for other countries' 
HLW, or the associated risks from managing the repository after the 40-year 
operating period. 20 The outcome of the PRA attempt in Australia indicates that the 
benefits to all states participating in the multinational repository need clarification, 
and those benefits when refined will have to be effectively communicated, in order to 
gain the necessary public confidence to overcome the public perceptions of risk. 
In outlining the problem of securing multinational repositories, recognition was 
given to the fact that some nuclear states possess suitable geology, relevant expertise 
and the desire to safely dispose of all radioactive waste within their own borders.21
Other states do not have the appropriate geology, or may be unable to justify the cost 
of constructing an expensive repository for small quantities of HLW. Some of the 
smaller nuclear states will likely have to pool resources and engage in some fonn of 
collaborative solution.22 There is concern in some quarters that attempts towards a 
multinational solution might impede or delay national efforts, and the shared 
repository concept is strongly resisted by the agencies ,cesponsible for HL W 
18 The amplification ofri�!.: w as most prevalent in South Australia, see for example, P. Coorey & B. 
Huppatz. "Coming to a Dwnp Near You." The Advertiser, Friday 19 November 1999 pi; P. Coorey & 
L. Mellor. "Not in 'OUi" Jla� ·
.cy
ard: No Nuclear Dump , Says Olsen." The Advertiser, Saturday 20
November 1999 pi; P. Barry, Media Watch: ABC Tel evision 11 September, 2000.
19 Dupont and Associates and Bergin and Associates. Advancing Australia's Security Interests-Hosting 
a Common Nuclear Waste Facility for the Asia-Pacific Region. Paper prepared for Pangea Resources 
by Dupont and Associates and Bergin and Associates, August 1999. 
20 "Legislative Assembly." Western Australian Parliamentary Debates, Wednesday 8 September 1999 
�885.I Sweden, Finla nd, France and perhaps the United States have the more developed high-level waste 
repository policies. 
22 C. McCombie & N. Chapman. "Regional and International Repositories: Not If, But How and
When." Paper presented at the World Nucl ear Association Annual Symposium, London, 5-7 
September 2002. 
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management in France, Finland, Sweden and the UK. To overcome opposition to a 
'collective solution', proponents of the multinational repository regularly emphasise 
the importance of a 1dual track1 approach whereby the nuclear states keep both 
national and international options open. 23 Whatever option is pursued, the benefits of 
national or multinational repositories will have to outweigh the public's perception of 
risk. 
Applying public goods theory to the multinational repository concept allows for a 
more comprehensive analysis of the benefits to both potential states participating in 
the collaborative solution and to other states. The theory of public goods has recently 
been applied to a range of global collective action issues, including peace and 
security, financial stability, global warming and ozone depletion, in order to gain a 
greater understanding of how such issues might be best resolved.24 Public goods 
theory has not yet been specifically applied to the problematic issue of HLW 
disposal. For a multinational repository to provide a 'public good' it must possess two 
central characteristics. Firstly, it must have non-excludable benefits that extend 
beyond the nuclear states using the repository, to benefit other nuclear and non­
nuclear states. Secondiy, its benefits must be non-rival in consumption, meaning that 
the good can be consumed by one state without detracting from the benefits availabie 
to the other states using the repository. A single multinational repository requires 
careful forward planning to minimise potential space limits to avoid any restrictions 
on those wishing to use it in the future, but that rival component of space and usage 
is essentially a technical problem that is more likely to be resolved on a region by 
region basis. The benefits of usage, however, are non-rival between the accepted 
users of the repository. The efficiency, security and environmental gains to user 
country X are not losses to user country Y. So there is no rivalry with regard to the 
benefits the participating states receive from using the repository. 
23 Ibid.
24 I. Kaul, P. Conceicao, K. Le Goulven & R. Mendoza. "Why Do Global Public Goods Matter
Today?," in Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, edited by I. Kaul, P. 
Conceicao, K. Le Goulven & R. Mendoza. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
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The economic incentives for participating in multinational repositories are relatively 
straightforward. The construction of geological repositories involves high capital 
costs that are largely independent of the amount of waste to be placed in them. 25 For 
every repository there are costs incurred for research, administration, licensing, 
infrastructure, equipment, and security. It is difficult to provide a precise d�llar 
figure for repository construction, as there are variations from state to state, but the 
IAEA estimates the capital costs of a single repository to be in the billions of $US.26 
Yet the cost of constructing a multinational repository will not be much higher than 
the cost of constructing a single national repository. The required level of funding for 
a national geological repository is beyond many of the smaller nuclear states acting 
alone but not beyond their means when acting together. There is already research 
into the feasibility of a regional repository for some states in Europe, and economies 
of scale are a large motivating factor for the small nuclear states involved in that 
project.27 The economic savings relate only to the participating states, but they are a 
collective action benefit unobtainable by states acting separately. 
Whi1e public goods theory is a useful tool for examining collaborative funding 
arrangements,28 its main application in this study was to determine the broader 
benefits for both participating and non-participating states in a multinational 
repository. The main premise underpinning national and multinational geological 
repositories is that they must help protect human life and health and the environment, 
now and into the future. Until recently, the short-tenn benefits of geological 
repositories were not considered urgent, and the focus was on the need to safeguard 
the HL W in a manner that ensures no migration of radioactive substances back to the 
environment. Because some of the radionuclides in the HL W have extremely long 
half-lives, the public in most countries has not been willing to accept the long-tenn 
risks associated with geological repositories. Paradoxically, the risk of terrorism in 
25 Supra n 6 IAEA-TECDOC-1413, 2004 p23. 
26 Ibid. 
27 V. Stefula & C. Mccombie. "SAPIERR paves the way Towards European Regional Repository."
Paper presented at the 5th International Conference on Nuclear Option in Countries with Small and 
Medium Electricity Grids, Dubrovnik, Croatia May 2004. 
28 See T. Sandler, On Financing Global and International Public Goods. School oflntemational 
Relations, University of Southern California, July 2001. 
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recent years may well transcend the public's perception of the risks associated with 
long-term underground storage/disposal of the HLW. 
The most compelling public good benefit that a multinational repository would 
provide is enhanced international security. Safeguarding the HL W in a secure 
underground environment removes the potential for a terrorist strike on surface waste 
storage facilities. 29 Underground storage would also provide additional safeguards 
against the theft of weapons-useable material from extracted spent fuel rods by 
securing them directly in the repository. A multinational repository would therefore 
provide the public good of enhanced security, if it enables a group of states to place 
their HLW and spent fuel in a geological repository, rather than leaving the waste 
under-secured on the surface. 
If the objectives of multinational repositories are to maximise environmental 
protection and to enhance regional or glob a? security by safeguarding the HL W, then 
it follows that any future proposal should ideally involve all nuclear states in 
possession of under-secured waste. The distinction between regional and global 
public goods is a matter of the degree of the universality of the benefits supplied. For 
the shared multinational repository concept to be globally beneficial, it must provide 
a comprehensive means of safeguarding the total quantity of the world's under­
secured HL W. This would require the involvement of a large number of nuclear 
states and perhaps three or four multinational repositories located in different parts of 
the world. While this is desirable in terms of enhancing global security, the 
involvement from the outset of such a large number of states would make consensus 
more difficult to achieve. One of the factors Sandler identifies for the optimal 
promotion of collective action is the involvement of a limited number of 
participating states. 30 Thus on practical grounds the case for regional cooperation 
seems stronger than that for a global solution. 
29 R. Oxburgh. (Chair). Managing Radioactive Waste: the Government's Consultation. House of Lords
Select Committee on Science and Technology, 23 November 2001; R. Stone, "Deep Repositories: Out 
of Sight, Out of Terrorists' Reach." Science 303 (2004): 161-64. 
30 T. Sandler, "Global and Regional Public Goods: A Prognosis for Collective Action." Fiscal Studies
19 (1998) p221. 
208 
For nation states to embark on a multinational repository raises questions of 
responsibility and liability for the shared inventory of HL W to be located in the host 
state. The absence of any commitment to share responsibility for the HL W and its 
long-term management during the PRA debate contributed to Australia rejecting the 
proposat.31 The most recent IAEA report on multinational repositories identified the 
twin issues of responsibility for the HL W and associated long-term liability as areas 
requiring future study.32 My discussion of the state responsibility concept should 
assist with that research, and as a starting point I provide an overview of the existing 
civil nuclear liability �egimes. While likely to cover liability during the 
transboundary shipmen'. of the HLW,33 the civil liability regimes are unsuitable for 
the long-term shared responsibility and liability requirements of multinational 
repositories. The m<'.in areas of deficiency are a lack of adherence to the liability 
regimes; a limitati1)n of claims in time;34 and the fact that liability is channelled 
exclusively to the operator.35 In addition, both nuclear and non-nuclear member 
states are signatories to the liability conventions, and the presence of such a large 
nUi-n.ber of stat�s with varying interests makes potential liability amendments difficult 
to achieve. 
The 1997 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the 
Safety of Radioactive Waste Management comprises nuclear and non-nuclear 
member states. 36 It is the main international legal instrument guiding the safe 
management of HL W and is applicable to all geological repositories. The Joint 
Convention is an ihcentive based treaty and it would need significant amendments to 
provide the necessary legal framework to adequately cover all aspects of a 
multinational repository. The question of shared responsibility and liability for the 
31 See N. Minchin, "Questions without Notice: Nuclear Waste Storage." Australian Parliamentary 
Debates, Senate, 18 October 1999, p9813. 
n Supra n 6 IAEA-TECDOC-1413, 2004 p41. 
33 At least among the signatory members. As stated previously a detailed study of the transboundary 
liability arrangements, during the shipment of the HLW, was beyond the scope of this thesis. 
3-4 M. Lee, "Civil Liability of the Nuclear Industry." Jounial of Environmental Law 12 (2000): 317-32.
35 N. Pelzer, "Focus on the Future ofNuclear Liability Law." Journal of Energy and Natural
Resources Law 17 (1999): 332-53. 
l6 Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste 
Management 1997 INFCIR/546. 
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HL W pertains only to the participating states in the multinational repository, and as 
such the Joint Convention is also considered too difficult to amend. A more desirable 
way forward is to identify the best means available under international law that the 
participating states could use to accommodate shared responsibility and liability for 
the HL W over the necessary long timeframe. The only mechanism with the capacity 
to achieve that objective is the international law concept of state responsibility. State 
responsibility is the principle whereby states can be held accountable for breaches of 
obligations under international law.37 There must however be a clear identifiable 
international obligation for state responsibility to be invoked. State responsibility has 
been essentially a bilateral matter between the responsible and the injured states.38
The concept is widely accepted under customary international law, but to rely on that 
source of law only would provide limited opportunities for state responsibility to be 
effective for multinational repositories. To ensure that state responsibility can be 
invoked, it is necessary to establish a clear identifiable international obligation. The 
most direct way of providing clear obligations on states is to fonnalise those 
obligations in a binding treaty. Based on my review of the liability regimes and the 
1997 Joint Convention, it becomes apparent that there is a need for a specific binding 
treaty pertaining only to the participating states in the multinational repository. 
The finalisation of the draft articles on state responsibility by the International Law 
Commission (ILC) in 2001 39 was timely and potentially advantageous for the shared 
repository concept. The shift away from a bilateral notion of responsibility, to 
obligations to the international community as a whole, is a significant 
advancement. 40 By drawing upon the obligations erga omnes concept, the ILC 
provided innovative ways of extending the possibility of providing specific 
obligations to the international community'as a whole, to a group of states, and even 
to a single state. The states negotiating for a multinational repository have at their 
disposal the ILC Draft Articles to draw from, if they so desire. The choice of 
37 I. Brownlie, The Rule of Law in International Affairs: International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary
o[the United Nations. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998 p79.3 D. Shelton, "Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility." The Amen'can
Journal of International Law 96 (2002) p839.
39 See J, Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introductfon 
Text ond Commentaries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
40 E. Brown-Weiss, "Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century." The American
Journal of International Law 96 (2002): 798-816.
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including relevant sections or modified versions of the ILC am(:;�C�\\ in a specific 
�.,,:, 
treaty is the prerogative of the s�ates concerned. Clearly much of the work has been 
done by the Special Rap porteurs, and the capacity i s  now available for the 
participating states to accept long-tenn obligations for managing the HLW, and then 
agreeing to invoking liability provisions in the event that those obligations are 
breached. Such a commitment would demonstrate confidence in the repository 
design; it would help alleviate the public's perception of the associated risks and may " 
even help achieve broad community acceptance for the multinational repository 
concept. 
; ' , ,  
' 
11 
<.) '  
'.'.;. '• 
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